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THE MARTYRED MAHATMA

By MAXWELL LEIGH

THE murder of Mr. Gandhi is likely to be remembered as one of the world's great tragedies and as a crucial point in the development of a great people and a great religion. It is a matter for deep thankfulness that the responsibility for law and order in India had already been committed by the King-Emperor and his representatives to Indian hands and that the circumstances of the crime afforded no excuse for a renewal of the communal violence which it was the last achievement of the victim to assuage. It might for those reasons be supposed that, while all civilized persons must unite in deploring the end of a life so honourable, it is the business of none save Hindus to consider the motives of the murderer. But the tragedy of Birla House is fraught with meaning for all who feel any concern about the future of many millions of souls extremely susceptible to religious influences.

THE MAN

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born on October 2, 1869, the youngest child of the fourth wife of a Bania of Porbandar, Kathiawar. His father and grandfather had risen to high office in a Native State (to use an expression still "in order" in their day) and did not regard Western education as a menace to India. His community was still sufficiently orthodox to disapprove of sea-faring, and he was formally pronounced an outcaste when he sailed for England in 1888. He was called to the Bar in 1891, and returned to India in July of that year. Two years later he had gone to Durban to conduct a case for a Muslim firm of Porbandar. Within three days he was in difficulties about the wearing of a turban in court, and he soon found himself up against the colour-bar in other ways. He

decided to champion his countrymen in South Africa. During the next year he devoted himself to studying their conditions, and in 1894 he was asked to fight for them against a Natal Government Bill to disenfranchise them. His efforts resulted in the Bill being disallowed by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon. In 1896 he returned to India in order to escort his wife and children to South Africa. While in India he wrote a pamphlet about Indians in South Africa, a cabled summary of which incensed public opinion. When he landed at Durban at the end of the year he was mobbed and rescued by the police. Joseph Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary, cabled to the Natal Government to prosecute his assailants, but Mr. Gandhi urged that they must have been acting under a misapprehension. His forbearance turned public sympathy in his favour, and increased the prestige of the Indian community.

When the Boer War broke out in 1899, though his sympathies were with the Boers, his loyalty to the Empire prompted him to raise an ambulance corps of Indians. In 1901 he returned to India, but before the end of 1902 he was recalled to Africa. In 1906 he formed an Indian Ambulance Corps at the time of the Zulu Rebellion. But the Transvaal Government passed a law against Indian immigration, and a Passive Resistance campaign was launched. In January, 1908, Mr. Gandhi was sentenced to two months' imprisonment, but was released after negotiations with General Smuts. Indian grievances were not, however, removed: in 1913 both Mr. and Mrs. Gandhi were arrested; C. F. Andrews negotiated an agreement with General Smuts. When war was declared in 1914 Mr. Gandhi was in England and began to organize an ambulance corps, but bad health compelled him to return to India: he was given a great reception at Bombay in January, 1915. From 1919 onwards he was the outstanding figure in Indian politics. The foundations of his philosophy had been securely laid in England and Africa.

In London he first read the *Bhagvad Gita* in Edwin Arnold's translation and also in the original. In Africa he read the Upanishads, the Bible, the Koran, Tolstoi's *Kingdom of*

God and Ruskin's *Unto this last.* He had made practical experiments in Tolstoian communism, and in passive resistance. He was convinced that the only real values were those of human character, that true dignity came from work done for the common good, without respect of race or rank, and that, in the long run the faith of the just will prevail over unjust violence.

Many have remarked the curious contrasts in the total impression made by this singular man. Complete lack of physical beauty, but irresistible personal charm. A habit of addressing crowded and emotional audiences in listless tones and in a dialect few of them could understand, about topics which did not greatly interest them, but with a power that kept them all spell-bound. A reputation for inflexible integrity and unswerving devotion to ideals, together with an impish propensity to do and say quite unpredictable things. Time and again he came to the aid of authority hard put to it to maintain law and order: time and again he set law and order at naught. A thorough knowledge of, and respect for, the letter and spirit of the Christian Gospel did not prevent ardent championship of much that seemed incompatible with it.

It is perhaps inexcusable in one who never set eyes on him to offer any explanation of so complex a personality, but to such an one it appears that the little Bania earned his title of Mahatma (great soul) by his devotion to two ideals, not always reconcilable. He was a great humanist and he was a great patriot. In South Africa these two forces pulled together. Here the Indians were struggling to improve their economic and political status *vis-à-vis* the European settlers, most of whom held strong views about the inherent right of the "white man" to keep the "black man" in subjection. The disciple of Ruskin thought, not in terms of white and black, of capital and labour, but of particular employers and particular employees. His sympathy was always enlisted on the side of the under-dog. When the under-dogs were both employees and Indians, their champion was thrice-armed. Mr. H. S. L. Polak, his closest colleague in that struggle, has reminded us:

that there was then no distinction of Hindu and Muslim: "in his earliest public work for his countrymen in Natal and the Transvaal . . . communal collaboration was always, under his influence, a matter of course." His patriotism did not necessarily involve an anti-British attitude: as has been mentioned he volunteered to serve the Empire on at least three occasions. Nor was he the type of patriot who exclaims: "My country, right or wrong!" When he thought that his compatriots were in the wrong, he told them so. Of his seventeen fasts, three were acts of penance for lapses by his intimates; four were protests against resort to violence by his supporters; three were in restraint of inter-communal riots; three were connected with his championship of the Outcastes—one of them meant to touch the consciences of other Indians, one to induce the authorities to let him carry on his propaganda from prison, and one to protest against the "award" which separated them as electors from the caste Hindus.

When humanism and patriotism were yoked together, he was truly formidable. With the wisdom of the serpent he chose a weapon for which there was a good vernacular name—*Ahimsa,* i.e., non-violence. In England the Suffragettes had shown its effectiveness. Mr. Gandhi was certainly fortunate in that his opponents were almost always men who believed in chivalry and sportsmanship. We may wonder whether the Congress would have committed itself to the attainment of self-rule by means of non-violent non-co-operation in 1920, or "by all legitimate and peaceful means" in 1921, if the House of Commons had failed to endorse Mr. Churchill's view that, in dealing with rebellion, the idea of "frightfulness" was absolutely foreign to the British way of doing things. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Mahatma both appeared at his best and achieved most, when he had to deal with those who could meet him on spiritual ground. The long-drawn-out conversations in the Viceroy's House at New Delhi in 1931 reached the desired conclusion because Lord Irwin did not vaunt himself, was not easily provoked and hoped all things.

There are many who think that, if Mr. Gandhi's sole con-

cern had been with the furtherance of Indian independence, he would have laid his foundations more securely and progressed more rapidly by taking each instalment of power as it was offered and making the most of it. This procedure would have been quite in keeping with a Bania's business methods: accounts in India are habitually settled by cutting Treasury notes in half, sending one set of halves by registered post and the other set on receipt of an acknowledgment of the first set. It is hard to resist the suspicion that here Mr. Gandhi's patriotism prevailed over his humanism. For his love of India had a mystical side: India was for him an eternal entity, one and inviolable, whose freedom must proceed from her inherent excellence, and not be bestowed by a condescending outsider. He explained to the Aga Khan in 1946 that his own ideal was the same as Marx's, i.e. that the State should wither away, but he did not believe the desired end could ever come by Marx's Dialectic: on the contrary, the principles of non-violence and obedience to conscience, once practised, would inevitably make the State wither away. He went on to speak with approval of the ancient South American custom of human sacrifice with the proud consent of the victim. He did not rely on "other-worldliness" as the motive force to bring about a truly civilized society built on love and forbearance, but held that man's proud place in the universe was justified only if he obeyed the highest commands of conscience. (Letter in *The Times,* February 5, 1948.) From this we can understand how he combined with this claim for India of a proud place in the universe a conviction that, to gain it, India must follow the hard way. Those who knew him best had no doubt that he himself habitually obeyed the highest commands of conscience and submitted to the sternest self-sacrifice in so doing. Sir Reginald Coupland, writing of the passive resistance movement of 1919, says "it was soon apparent that in this small, frail, ascetic, subtle-minded evangelist Indian nationalism had obtained a most formidable champion. For, while Gandhi's revival of old Hindu doctrine appealed to Hindu intellectuals, his bearing and behaviour stirred one of the deepest chords in the Indian peasant's heart —reverence for a Saint."

The same note is sounded by many others: an English journalist who "covered" the Irwin-Gandhi conversations in 1931 described him as "probably the most formidable man that Asia has thrown up since Mohammed." An eminent English author who knows India and her history well regards him as the greatest Indian since Buddha. At the time of his seventeenth and final fast last January a French newspaper wrote of "his secret weapon—that spiritual violence which was taught so long ago by the gospels and the men of the gospels." The heads of two French political parties wrote as follows:

> "Gandhi is no Chief of State, he has no physical power at his command. He acts by the sacrifice of his person on two peoples who have faith in him. At a moment when war appears irrevocably unleashed between two peoples, at a moment when it has already begun, a stubborn old man arrests it from his bed of sickness." (M. Maurice Schumann.)
>
> "A man who moves a world is never without grandeur. But when this world throbs with 400 million souls and when this man is no more than a puff of wind, his struggle becomes divine." (M. Léon Blum.)

It is not as a politician but as a saint and a prophet that M. K. Gandhi won the name of Mahatma and stands forth in the eyes of the world as India's Representative Man.

The Murder.

The tragedy of India's loss of her national hero was heightened by the details of his taking off. According to the Press reports the assassin was a Mahratta Brahman, aged 36, a member of an association originally founded as a religious organization for the conservation and purification of Hinduism. Such a "youth" might have been expected to be a whole-hearted admirer of the Mahatma. His technique as a murderer was painfully reminiscent of a brilliant novel, published in the year of his birth.[1] What his motive may have been is, pending reports

[1] Sri Ram, *Revolutionist.* (Constable and Co.) 1912.

of the trial, a matter of speculation. Not long before, a bomb had been thrown during one of the Mahatma's daily prayer-meetings by a Hindu refugee who had escaped to Delhi after suffering much at the hands of Muslims in Pakistan, and was aggrieved to find that there, in consequence of the Mahatma's efforts to restore communal harmony, he was required to yield precedence in the *queue* for housing to the co-religionists of his persecutors. It may be proved that a similar grievance was rankling. But this was not the only bone which the enthusiasts for the conservation and purification of Hinduism had to pick with the Mahatma.

Among the under-dogs whom Mr. Gandhi had valiantly championed none were under a deeper obligation than the Out-castes, otherwise called Pariahs, Untouchables, Scheduled Castes, Depressed Classes and (by Mr. Gandhi) *Harijan* or Children of God. These terribly under-privileged persons outnumber the total population of Great Britain. It is impossible to under-stand their relationship to the other inhabitants of India without some reference to the main features of the baffling complex known as Hinduism. If the word *catholic* is understood in the sense of "universal", then Hinduism can claim to be the most catholic of religions. There are no theological doctrines common to all its adherents: a Hindu is free to worship any number of Gods, from 330 millions to none. (The Jains, who are numerous in Kathiawar, believe in a Moral Law, but not in a Divine Legislator: the sages who declared the Law were no more its authors than Newton was the author of the Laws of Motion.) There have been profound Hindu philosophers of many differ-ent schools: there have been great religious poets, contempla-tives, mystics, ascetics, devoted lovers of a personal God, zealous servants of their fellow-men, and, of course, innumerable lesser men of all degrees, down to simple animists and to perverted types like the Thugs. Probably the tenet observed by the greatest percentage of this very mixed company is veneration of the cow. But a very large proportion of them would be agreed about three things—the distinction of Castes with the Brahmans pre-eminent, the duty to respect the Rule of Life, and the in-exorability of the Law of Action.

How the Caste system developed and how the Brahmans came to the top are much debated problems. The latest book on the subject is *Caste in India* (C.U.P., 1946), by Dr. J. H. Hutton, who was Superintendent of the Indian Census of 1931. There it is suggested that when the Aryans of the Rigveda invaded India about 1500 B.C., they were organized in three classes (*varna,* lit. " colour "), the priestly, the knightly and the " other ranks "; they distinguished themselves as " twice-born " from the natives, who were either recognized as a fourth class or ostracized as " no class." The terms " caste " (*jât*) and "class " (*varna*) are not synonymous. Dr. Hutton holds that post-vedic scholars, seeking authority for the caste system in the earliest Vedas, interpreted the nature of the classes in terms of the caste system as they knew it. The fact remains that the caste system dominates the life of India. The Rule of Life (*dharma*) is for me largely a matter of ceremonial observances prescribed by the Brahmans for my caste, and the Law of Action (*karma*) ensures that the state of life (i.e. the Caste) to which it shall please God to call me at my next re-birth will depend on my success in following the Rule of Life now.

Of the merits of the Caste system much has been written. Dr. Hutton says that its most important function has been to integrate Indian society, to weld into one community the various competing, if not incompatible, groups composing it: he holds that to destroy it might be disastrous to the society which is constructed on its framework. It has operated as a shock-absorber in times of invasion, eased the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy, and fulfilled the functions of Trade Unions, eugenic agency, and courts of honour and morals. In many ways it has bulked large in the *bene esse* of Hindu society.

The matter in which it is most open to criticism is the position of the Outcastes. In the North of India the influence of Islam and of the Sikhs has done much to mitigate their degradation, but in the South they pollute members of a caste not only by contact but even by proximity and, in an extreme case, by visibility. They are excluded from temples and forbidden to know the scriptures, and to use the public wells,

schools, etc. For the past twenty years the political leaders of India, at the Mahatma's urgent instance, have made the uplift of the Harijan one of the main planks in their platform. When Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1932 awarded separate electorates to the " Depressed Classes ", Mr. Gandhi started a fast unto death, true to his faith in the mystical unity of all Indians, and he was supported by the Congress (who probably thought in terms of an extra fifty million votes), though not by the most emancipated Outcastes. During the short period (1937-9), when several Provincial Governments were controlled by a Congress majority, laws were enacted securing local option for giving the Scheduled Castes access to public wells, conveyances, schools and even temples, but it is uncertain how much use was made of this option. Sir R. Coupland states that Mr. Gandhi's persistent campaign must have had some influence on Hindu public opinion, but a gulf still yawns between his precepts and common practice. There has certainly been much sympathy with the uplift movement among the more progressive and enlightened Hindus, though probably many of them were somewhat scandalized when the Mahatma took to emptying his own slops. And there is almost certainly a hard core of Orthodox Hinduism which is thoroughly alarmed at a movement that seems to cut at the very roots of their religion, inasmuch as it holds that the Caste system is a matter not of its *bene esse* but of its *esse*. Dr. Hutton may see " no reason why a great improvement in the position of the outcastes should not be made within the system as it exists to-day and without any necessity for destroying a social order which performs a number of useful functions both for the individual and the society ", and probably hosts of Hindus agree with him. The question is how many zealots for the conservation and purification of Hinduism still believe that to take liberties with the Rule of Life may jeopardize the eternal welfare of the twice-born. We are told that the Hindu Mahasabha has now suspended all political activities and will concentrate on the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and a solution of the country's social, cultural and religious problems in order to create a powerful and well-organized Hindu society in an independent India. What this may portend for the

Harijan depends upon what is meant by a well-organized Hindu society.

Whether the crime was in fact prompted by hatred of the Muslims or by zeal for Brahman ascendancy or by invincible abhorrence of intercourse with Outcastes may be disclosed during the trial: whatever be the answer, it is certain that a long time will elapse before any of these evil spirits is finally exorcised: and it is probable that the caste-prejudice will survive most obstinately. For several centuries Hindus and Muslims have had ample experience of neighbourly harmony: in districts and provinces where more than ninety per cent. of the population have been members of one community, the other community never doubted its security and could sometimes even count on a special measure of protection. In schools and colleges, above all in the Army, mutual forbearance and friendliness have been taken for granted. It was for some decades an article of the Nationalist faith that British officials deliberately fostered ill-feeling between Hindus and Muslims. Nothing could be further from the truth. It cannot be denied that Muslim reluctance to be merged in a single sovereign State of All-India was based on the assumption that Self-government meant majority-rule on the British model. This reluctance might have been overcome, if the leaders of the National Congress had been more fully alive to its sincerity and intensity, and had taken some pains to mitigate it. By denying its existence they encouraged it to harden as the date of emancipation approached.

The age-long way of Hinduism with intruders has been to accommodate and gradually assimilate them. Islam had been very indigestible, but mutual tolerance was a well-proved possibility. Where the Hindus have themselves been the intruders, however, age-long tradition has regarded certain racial strains, undignified occupations and *outré* habits as unsuitable for assimilation and therefore unworthy of accommodation. For them has been reserved the outer darkness. The " conditioning " of successive generations in observing the Rule of Life has been very drastic: it will probably take several generations to undo it. Meanwhile those who are, like the Mahatma, called to serve

the Harijan run the risk of illustrating the truth of Bernard Shaw's message of condolence on the murder—"it shows how dangerous it is to be good". But if it should prove that the murder has shocked the conscience of India as effectively as the death of Telemachus shocked the conscience of Rome, then indeed humanity will once more have cause to thank God for the blood of the martyrs.

The Moral for Anglicans

On any showing, Mohandas Gandhi was from the time of his arrival in Africa in 1893 to the day of his death dedicated to the cause of Unity, between Indians and non-Indians, between Hindus and non-Hindus, between caste-Hindus and outcaste-Hindus. The Bishop of Bombay, preaching in Bombay Cathedral at the hour of the Mahatma's cremation, said: "I would have you think of him as a friend. For it is the ministry of reconciliation to which he devoted himself—between peoples and between the communities of his own people." The bishop recalled how in 1933, when a fast had brought him to death's door, C. F. Andrews said to him: "Bapu, who will reconcile India and Britain, if you die?": and he rallied to this call. The sermon continued: "Only one hand shot him down, but every one of us must feel that any enmities in our own hearts, any fears or suspicions of our fellows, added to the strength behind that arm. We share the blame . . . and should determine to amend ourselves."

This exhortation has a special relevance for Anglicans at this time. On September 27, 1947, three Christian Churches solemnly declared in St. George's Cathedral, Madras, that they had become one Church of South India. The Lambeth Conference, summoned for July 1, is likely to declare the mind of the assembled bishops of the Anglican Communion with regard to this declaration. If by any chance it were to become clear that the weight of Anglican authority disapproves of it, the ministry of reconciliation would have received a serious setback and the arm of its assailants would have been strengthened.

In his Duff Missionary Lectures for 1945 on *The Christian*

Message to the Hindu,[2] Dr. A. G. Hogg gave, out of the fullness of long experience, a very sympathetic account of the spiritual ferment going on among Hindu literates in South India. He frankly admits that we are not justified in persuading a Hindu to break with the community which means so much to him in every department of life, and which manifests "the mystery of the fellowship" with a completeness to which few Christian congregations attain, unless he can be assured of a welcome into a family of comparable unity. He grants that there are certain matters in which the most devout Indians find that the faith of their fathers does not satisfy their highest ideals, and he rightly holds that in stimulating and trying to satisfy their hunger and thirst after righteousness Christian missionaries are justified and stand the best chance of success. Rather strangely he generally uses the word *communal* in a laudatory sense: in recent Indian journalism it is almost always a term of abuse. Still more strangely, he has little to say about Untouchability: this is without doubt the subject about which the Hindu conscience is most sensitive, and that not merely because it is so easy for a South African to meet an Indian's demand for equality of status with the retort: "What equality of status has the Outcaste with the twice-born?" Much more are those who are most in earnest disturbed by the thought of Gandhi's sufferings in the cause of his beloved Children of God. Just in so far as Christians have received the lowliest outcastes into their fellowship and helped them to achieve a spiritual and moral integrity marvellous in the eyes of those who had despised them, so far can the Christian Gospel be presented to the modern Hindu with that "'challenging relevancy" which Dr. Hogg truly regards as a pre-requisite of its acceptance.

Unfortunately Christian missionaries have to be very circumspect in stressing this point. For, if they enlarge on "the communion of saints", they lay themselves open to damaging counter-attack. Dr. Hogg remarks wistfully:

"Christ trusted his New Israel to organize itself,

[2] S.C.M. Press. January, 1947. 6s.

merely choosing for it its first leaders. If only that New Israel, in organizing itself for the discharge of its mission, had not failed to 'keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace' how much less hard would have been the saying that the challenge of the Gospel in India is not fully declared except as including a challenge to join the organized Church. For then would the convert from Hinduism more readily have felt that the costliness of obeying that summons was the costliness not of a duty but of a privilege."

Hitherto, if a Christian in conversation with an orthodox Hindu made any comparison between Islam's doctrine of the equality of all the Faithful in the Mosque and the exclusion from Hindu temples of a large part of the flock claimed by the Hindu leaders, he could be silenced and shamed, not so much by a reference to Christian churches which have a wall of partition between the outcaste converts and the others, as by a reference to those Christian congregations which exclude one another from their respective sanctuaries. It has often been difficult for Anglicans to commend their principles to Indians in the face of their practices.

Hindu politicians were always very sceptical about the value of promises made by successive Parliaments to grant self-governing institutions to India. As recently as 1942 Mr. Gandhi spoke contemptuously of "post-dated cheques". When the Church of India, Burma and Ceylon became autonomous, it was a great help to those who strove to break down the scepticism to be able to point to an instance in which the central authority had, of its own accord, handed over control, and that in a sphere which is always most jealously guarded. The Church of South India now stands for Indians as a test of the Christians' attitude towards their own ministry of reconciliation. If the Lambeth Conference blesses the Madras declaration as a venture of faith inspired by the Holy Spirit, then the cause of Reconciliation will be notably advanced not only in India but throughout Christendom. If the declaration were to be damned, with faint praise or worse, the cause would be grievously

enfeebled. For the fanatical defenders of Brahman privilege could then with "false adulterate eyes give salutation to" supposedly kindred spirits in the Christian fold. They could claim that, however widely our theory might differ from theirs, we too have our Brahmans, that we too have post-vedic scholars who, looking for authority for our Orders in our earliest Vedas, have interpreted the nature of the primitive Ministry in terms of the Orders as they know them.

The bishops of the daughter Churches overseas are very properly careful to respect the feelings of the members of their mother Church of England. It is incumbent on us members of that Church at this crucial juncture not to stress too insistently any tradition of the Elders which may make the Word of God to be of none effect and not to quench any smoking flax. If the Mahatma's labours for unity in India should stimulate the Christian Churches of that land to further the movement towards unity among themselves, his martyrdom will have fertilized a field wider even than India.

IDEALISM AND THEISM

By F. H. CLEOBURY

One rather remarkable feature of the religious situation in Great Britain to-day is the apparent complacency with which leaders of Christian thought view the fact that philosophy, as taught in our leading universities, has become largely atheistic. In the case of students who are reading history or classics or even science, their main studies are not likely to give them a bias against any Christian influences which may be brought to bear upon them during the formative three or four years, but in view of the present dominance of logical positivism it is certain that a large number of those students who, owing to the possession of unusually critical or speculative minds, have chosen philosophy as their main subject, will be taught that all metaphysical statements, including of course all sentences containing the word "God", are meaningless.

The writer of a recent popular, and in many ways excellent, book on the Christian faith begins by telling his readers that he does not propose to use any arguments to show that there is a God. One could not quarrel with this, of course, if he merely meant that such arguments were outside the scope of his book. But he actually disparages such arguments, at any rate by implication, and seems to think that even if not invalid they are unnecessary and that Christian apologetics can begin by *assuming* the existence of God. Certain exponents of the "theology of crisis", again, have argued that it is wicked presumption, and a result of our fallen condition, to imagine that we are capable, *in* that fallen condition, of valid rational theology—capable, that is, of constructing a valid argument for the existence of God.

Now metaphysical thought is not a special kind of thought. It is merely consistent and persistent common-sense. If there are no valid arguments for the existence of God, then people with keen minds and honest purpose will not try to persuade themselves that they still believe in God. It is futile to appeal to " experience ". Only the greatest and rarest of mystics have even *claimed* an immediate apprehension of the one Mind which is the ground of all, and even in their case one cannot dismiss as irrelevant the fact that in their " ordinary " moments they believed in God either because they believed that there were sound reasons for such belief or because they had never seen reason to challenge the belief in which they had been nurtured. Nor could one get round the fact, if one had to admit that it was a fact, that there were no rational grounds for believing in God, by arguing that our reasoning processes have been vitiated by the Fall. For if we cannot trust our reason, this argument itself, with Barthian arguments generally, is suspect. Moreover, one could support the most fantastic hypotheses by the argument that the absence of any manifest rational grounds for holding them true is due to the faultiness of our reasoning processes. In short, a disparagement of human reasoning powers in general and a disparagement of metaphysics in particular is a very dangerous weapon for the Christian to use.

In this connexion it is interesting to quote Dr. R. S. Franks who, writing in the *Congregational Quarterly* for July, calls attention to the fact that " even the orthodox Protestant scholastics of the seventeenth century had to admit an instrumental use of reason (*usus organicus*) in the interpretation of the Bible in order to define the things of which it speaks ".

Speaking broadly, we can for our present purpose make three main groupings of philosophers in Great Britain to-day—logical positivists, dialectical materialists and theists. A book of great significance to theists, recently published, is Maurice Cornforth's *Science versus Idealism* (Lawrence and Wishart). It is written from the standpoint of materialism, and theists who are idealists will be amused to find themselves classed with logical positivists. The latter are vigorously attacked. In

reading the book I have found myself half the time agreeing with the materialists against the positivists and the other half agreeing with the positivists against the materialists. My beliefs in theism and idealism have been strengthened in the process. I think Mr. Cornforth is right in his thesis that all forms of positivism and phenomenalism are, fundamentally, restatements of Hume, and that the underlying fallacy in Hume is his view that knowledge is a matter of receiving numbers of distinct "simple impressions" plus "complex impressions" which are merely combinations of the simple ones. But, on the other hand, the positivists are right as against the materialists in their dismissal of a self-existent "matter" existing out of all relation to consciousness and capable of "causing" consciousness as a sort of by-product.

Elementary histories of philosophy usually summarize the development from Locke to Hume somewhat as follows. Locke regarded knowledge as the reception of a number of impressions "in the mind", and Berkeley had therefore little difficulty in showing the inconsistency of Locke's belief that by juggling with these feelings "in" his mind he could nevertheless know that an independent material world existed. But the exposition usually goes on to say that by the same arguments with which Berkeley dismissed Locke's "matter" Hume dismissed Berkeley's permanent self, conceived as the recipient of the impressions and ideas. All that Hume left was the series of feelings itself, not a mind or soul or self receiving the feelings. The exposition then proceeds, if the writer thereof is not himself a Humian positivist, to the point that the lesson to be learnt from all this is that it is fallacious to regard knowledge as the mere receiving of an aggregate of separate feelings, and that knowledge is in essence, and in its earliest beginnings, the direct perception of a continuously existing world, with permanence underlying the changes. Modern theists, whether idealists or realists, are in agreement here. The only issue between them is that the idealist cannot attach any meaning to the notion of a world existing apart from its presentation to that unifying principle which we call the self, cannot see how there could be any proof that anything exists out of relation to a self, and

cannot see what there is to gain by asserting that such existence out of relation to a self is actual or possible. As all theists, whether they call themselves idealists or realists, agree that the real world is sustained and known by God, and as no idealist believes that when he loses consciousness the real world is extinguished, since it exists for God and for other people, the differences between idealism and realism do not affect theism in the slightest degree.

It would be generally agreed that the real reply to Hume came from Kant. But I still think that Berkeley's view that we have a notion of the permanent existence of the self was perfectly right so far as he went. The simple fact is that if we are to think at all we must believe in the more or less permanent existence of selves—of ourselves and other people. The bad influence of Descartes on philosophy was not his *cogito ergo sum* but his view that everything must be doubted which cannot be deduced from self-evident principles. It is metaphysical doubt, not metaphysical belief, that must be justified. We must take the world of common-sense as real to begin with, and if later we profess doubt about any feature of it we must be prepared to produce positive reason for our doubt — we must be prepared to show where uncritical common-sense has led to inconsistencies. Berkeley was right in accepting his own and other people's existence as certain. I sometimes think that a sufficient refutation of logical positivism is that its exponents do not believe in it themselves, since by writing books to propagate it they clearly hold, in spite of their rejection of metaphysics, to the metaphysical belief in their own and other people's existence. The existence of other people, and even the existence of one's own self, cannot be verified in the narrow sense in which they use the word " verification ". The correct logical analysis of the emergence of the experience of doubt, of denial, and of the distinction between error and truth, appearance and reality, is based on the recognition that everything " given " to the new-born infant is taken by him as real to start with, and that he only begins to doubt or deny when his discovery of inconsistencies forces him to. There is no

reason why this attitude to reality should ever be changed, and when later in life he passes from implicit to explicit metaphysics he has no right to indulge in metaphysical doubt beyond the "evidence"—the clearly seen difficulties. It is metaphysical scepticism, not metaphysical belief, that needs justification.

But although there is no reason to doubt the reality of the self, there is real difficulty about "matter", regarded as a "thing-in-itself" out of all relation to mind. Idealists argue that since "secondary" qualities like colours are psychological facts, and since you cannot have definite primary qualities like positions and motions unless they are defined, and since they can only be defined by secondary qualities, therefore all objects are objects of consciousness. This does not mean that the real world is dissolved into a flux of sensations or ideas. It is a permanent and continuous although changing world. But it is a realized world—a world-for-you or a world-for-me, and if you and I and all sentient beings ceased to be, it would still be a world-for-God. Even if you quarrel with this analysis you cannot fall back on your permanent three-dimensional "material" world existing in its own right. If you will not listen to Bishop Berkeley you must listen to the physicists. If you, or they, think it worth while to maintain that a four-dimensional space-time continuum can "exist" out of all relation to an observer, well and good. But you can no longer claim that your view has the merit of being honest-to-goodness common-sense as against the airy-fairy speculations of idealists. Foot-rules which lose length for you and clocks which go slow for you when they move are no longer common-sense foot-rules and clocks.

Where does theism come into all this? Well, we must frankly face the fact that every argument against the idealistic monist's contention that the real is a unity is an argument against belief in God. If the real can be ultimately pluralistic there is no reason to believe in God. There are, fortunately, the soundest reasons for belief in the unity of the Universe, and by no writers have these been more cogently stated than by

absolutists. It is time that we ceased to dismiss absolutism as being out of fashion, as though it were a kind of hat, and asked ourselves what there is in it which Christians can thankfully use in the fight against modern metaphysical scepticism. I conclude by quoting a recent writer in the Johannesburg *Star*: "It is Whitehead who says that no philosophy is ever refuted, it is only abandoned. If this is true, we have as much right to abandon realism, if we wish, as the modern school of realists and logical positivists had to abandon idealism. For as a philosophy the latter was never refuted; such minor attempts as were made to refute what was supposed to be its fundamental premise revealed little more than misunderstanding of its teachings."

THE LITURGICAL MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

By KENNETH PACKARD

THE term "Liturgical Movement" has long been familiar to Catholic Christians on the Continent but is not so well understood in this country as it deserves to be. It denotes a widespread trend which had already gathered considerable strength in the Roman Church during the 30 years which preceded the outbreak of the second world war in 1939, especially in Germany, Austria and Belgium, and to a lesser extent in France, with strong repercussions in the United States of America. It had begun to exert a marked influence in the Church of England.

To some hearers the word "Liturgical" may be misleading; it may suggest that the principal concern of the movement is with ritual or ceremonial correctness, or with the academic study of different forms of worship. However interesting and important such matters may be, the Liturgical Movement is something far deeper and wider; it has primarily to do with the nature and function of the Church; it aims at recovering, both in thought and practice, the true pattern of the Church as Christ intended her to be, and as she is conceived in Scripture and set forth under such analogies as the "Body of Christ", the "Bride of Christ" or the "People of God". Hence on the Continent the Movement is often spoken of as a "Revival" or "Renewal" of the original or authentic conception of the Church. It derives its epithet "Liturgical" from its insistence that it is in the act of corporate worship, especially, though by no means exclusively, in the Holy Eucharist, that the Church is most truly herself; but so far from encouraging people to be

" sanctuary-minded " the movement lays an equal stress on the activity of the Church outside worship. The movement is, in fact, closely allied with " Catholic Action " and its powerful offshoots among Christian youth, which in France and Belgium are commonly known by their initials, J.O.C., J.A.C. (for "young farmers"), J.E.C. (for students), etc. A term which has come into general use in France for this aspect of the Liturgical Movement is *Pastorale Liturgique.* This bears witness to the close connexion between the offering of worship and the life of the worshipping community in the diocese and the parish.

The pastoral side of the Liturgical Movement in France has gathered such strength that there has been opened in Paris the *Centre de Pastorale Liturgique,* where, largely under the direction of Dominican and Benedictine Fathers, different manifestations of the movement are co-ordinated, experiments are recorded and constructively criticized, and plans are formulated for extending and commending the movement and all that it stands for to the Church in France and beyond France. A considerable literature has already grown up, and is continually increasing, round the whole subject. The *Centre* is the main, though not the only, publishing and distributing office for this literature, which includes an extremely interesting quarterly, *La Maison-Dieu,* and a popular illustrated monthly called *Fêtes et Saisons,* as well as the notable review *La Vie Intellectuelle,* and a whole range of other publications under the general heading of *Les Éditions du Cerf.*

On its literary side, and in practical activities as well, the Liturgical Movement has come out of the War strengthened and invigorated. There was in fact what might almost be called an " underground activity " of the Church during these six bleak years, five of them very bleak indeed for France. Many Christians in France and Belgium and Germany, being debarred from most of their ordinary activities and compelled to draw more closely together in small groups for worship and counsel and mutual assistance, have grown thereby into a deeper understanding of the true meaning of the Church, both on the universal scale and also on the diocesan and still more the

parochial level. Under the good hand of God many priests and their flocks have gained an enriched knowledge of their faith, both in theory and practice. In particular there has been a re-thinking of what is meant by calling the Church the " Body of Christ ", which may be simply stated in the following way: There is a very close analogy between the function of the human body and the purpose for which God has created the Church. The human body, in the first place, represents in visible form the essential self of a living person. No one can see my essential self, but anyone can see my body; and, judging by the combination of a number of characteristics rather than by a single feature, can recognize me or get to know me. In the same kind of way the Church exists to enable men to recognize and know Christ; he is incarnate no longer on earth as he was in Palestine twenty centuries ago, but he *is* incarnate in another and literally true sense in his Church, in so far as that Church is entirely faithful. The Church then exists, partly, in order to make the living Christ known to men in the actual world of sense, in space and time, " until his coming again ". But that does not exhaust the meaning of the analogy. I do not have a body merely to make myself known to others, but also to enable my " essential self " to do things, to express itself in action. So with the Body of Christ: a major purpose for the existence of the Church is that she may be the organism through which Christ acts in the world of men. For instance, the " acts " of Peter and John, Stephen and Philip, Paul and Barnabas, are in very fact the " works of Christ ", acting through the members (or limbs) of his Body. And the Church in any place, whether at Corinth or Ephesus or Nottingham or Timbuctoo, in so far as she is truly herself, literally carries on the works of Christ, doing those things which Christ " would have done ". This gives a deeper emphasis to the unity of the Church, on the world-wide scale but also on the local level; for harmony and co-ordination between the members, in obedience to the "Head", are essential conditions of the right and effective functioning of the Body.

But there is a third reason why I have a body; and this is that my " essential self " may have an organ through which to

receive impressions of the world of sense, space and time. It is part of the function of a body to feel, to experience, to suffer. As with its other two functions, it may do this as a whole or through certain members. In similar fashion the Church is to represent Christ in the sphere of suffering; the Body of Christ both corporately and through individual members must confront the enemies of Christ, the "world, the flesh and the Devil", opposing or exposing herself to their impact and assault. And it will be the inevitable consequence that the more fully the Church is true to her own character, the more she will find herself engaged in such conflict and will be marked with the wounds of Christ. The Church on the Continent has found and verified all this deepened conception of the Corpus Christi in the bitter experience of war, defeat and oppression, and has been thereby cleansed and strengthened, and made a "vessel" more "meet for the Master's use". St. Paul's repeated words about the Church as the Body of Christ, echoing as they do our Lord's own figure of the Vine and the Branches, have come alive as never before to the Christians of France, Belgium and Germany. It has become clearer, too, that this analogy has a double reference, first to the Catholic Church as a whole, and then to the community of the local church, which normally means the parish. All this is, of course, no new discovery; but it is the recovery of a very vital truth which has long been obscured through the prevalence of a one-sided individualism in the Church, in Catholic as well as in Protestant circles.

With this in mind, it is not hard to see why the remarkable Church revival in France in these post-war years (and the parallel revival in Catholic Germany and Austria) is based to a large extent on a re-discovery of the spiritual meaning and possibilities of the diocesan and parochial system. For here is the very framework, handed down from the early centuries of Christendom, in which the Church, as Corpus Christi, on the secondary or local level, can find her natural sphere of operations. In the parish is her native soil and climate. There is the parish church, often a heritage from the earliest days of national history, but used and enriched by each generation in

turn; the temple which God has chosen to place his Name there; the home of the family of God; the foot of the ladder linking earth and Heaven; the workshop of the parish priest; the centre from which Christ (through his Body) reaches out to claim his place in every home and every heart in the parish. And in the parish system, spiritually considered, there is not merely a matter of organization but a network of mutual and personal responsibilities between priest and people. This is, to use the expressive French word for which there is no exact equivalent in our language, the *Mystique* of the parish. And it is out of this that the Church revival is taking place.

One is tempted to wonder whether the absence of any Church revival in this country, indeed the loss of ground by the Church, may not be connected with our failure to understand and exploit more fully the opportunities which the parochial system provides. For we of the Church of England are also inheritors of the same institution, the same mutual responsibilities, the same treasure in our parish churches. It is this inheritance which distinguishes us from the Nonconformists on the one hand, and what Bishop Gore used to call the "New Italian Mission" on the other; it is that network of mutual relationships which is, spiritually considered, the most valuable part of the Establishment. Yet we consistently ignore or undervalue our diocesan and parochial system, preferring as often as not to take a leaf out of the dissenters' book and work on congregational lines, sacrificing the true community which is the basis of the parish system for sheer individualism. No wonder, when this happens, that people begin to talk of the end of Christendom in this country, and produce panicky broadsheets calling for a new "set-up" altogether. The parish system has not broken down in England, nor need it do so; it is not being used to full advantage; and one may hope that the Liturgical Revival abroad may teach us some salutary lessons.

The Church in France has, however, certain advantages over us in this field. The situation is not complicated, as it is here, by the existence of numerous dissenting bodies, though

Atheism (or at least hostility to the Church) is much stronger than in this country. Another reason why the parish system has not been able to work so effectively in England as in France still operates though it is now beginning to pass away. For generations the Church of England has depended to an unnatural extent on the prosperous middle class; its clergy and its communicant members have been mainly drawn from that relatively "leisured" section of the population, and the "working-man" and his family (with few exceptions) have been almost outside the sacramental life of the Church altogether. The exclusiveness and conscious superiority of this dominant class necessarily militate against a true community spirit in the parish, and tend rather towards individualism in religion. Now that this class is less dominant and less prosperous, many churches are "feeling the draught"; many former members have weakened in their allegiance and there is no other section of English society which can step into its place. But this certainly does not imply that the parish system has broken down, or that Christendom is dead. It should point us to our failure to understand properly the *mystique* of the parish, and lead us to make the most of this system lying ready to our hands as the basis of Christian community life. We can learn much from the truly popular character of the Church in France, where though large sections of the population may reject its claims altogether, it is integrated with the life of all classes of society; the worshipping community in its parishes commonly forms a representative cross-section of the inhabitants as a whole.

During the War, then, the Church, in many parishes of France, became more deeply aware of her nature as the Body of Christ in the parish; to such priests and people it seemed that Christ himself was present in the life of his Church in the parish. This has led to a deepened sense of unity and solidarity within the parish, to a greater sense of fellowship in Christ, and, not least, to a clearer appreciation of what is meant by corporate worship, the worship of the Body of Christ in the parish. It has strengthened the desire, already present in circles which had been influenced by the Liturgical Movement, for the whole

or parts of the Mass to be said or sung in the vernacular. During the War wide permission was granted to parish priests as well as to chaplains, in France (and still more in Germany), to use the " vulgar tongue ". Immediately after the War formal consent was asked, in certain dioceses of Germany and Austria, for this temporary permission to be extended as a permanent thing. The application was seriously and sympathetically considered by the meeting of the German bishops at Fulda and the advice of the Vatican was sought. The result was no doubt disappointing to the more ardent advocates of a vernacular Mass, but it marks definite progress in that direction; for authority was given for the Epistle and Gospel to be read in German, and where this is not done the clergy were urged to read a vernacular translation immediately after the liturgical scriptures. In France, too, there is evidently a widespread desire for a vernacular Mass; this found expression at the 1946 National Congress (of the *Centre de Pastorale Liturgique*) of which more will be said below. The Cardinal Archbishops of Lyons and Toulouse, who were present at the congress, could not see fit to sponsor the forwarding of a request to Rome for permission to use French instead of Latin, but it is certain that more will be heard of this request. As in England, the influence of the bishops in France must be expected to be in a conservative direction. There is at least this to be said in favour of their attitude, that neither in France, nor even in Germany, is there a vernacular Bible whose language is comparable to that of our Authorized Version. Indeed, as Cardinal Lefebvre said at the 1946 Congress at Saint-Flour, "*la simple lecture, en français, de l'épître ne serait pas beaucoup plus claire que sa lecture en latin*". Still less has the Church on the Continent a vernacular Missal which could for a moment rank with our Book of Common Prayer, though very serious study is being given to the production of a uniform vernacular Missal of dignity and beauty.

The reluctance of the authorities to grant what seem to us not very revolutionary proposals must not blind us to the fact that the proposals themselves are pointers to the way the

Church on the Continent is thinking; there are many other pointers in much the same direction to be found in the pages of the eleven volumes of the quarterly *La Maison-Dieu,* which have so far appeared. Some of them are experiments tried during or just after the War; others are suggestions thrown out for discussion. Here are one or two of them, drawn from the Church in France and Germany. In Germany and Austria congregations have always been accustomed to take a larger part in the action and words of the Mass than in other parts of the Latin Church, and during the War, with the enhanced stress on the integration of the priest's and the people's parts in the Mass, a number of parish priests adopted the custom of celebrating from the east side of the altar, facing the people (a custom which has survived in Italy in the archdiocese of Rome and at papal Masses). There is a strong movement, both in France and Germany, in favour of a single Mass in a parish church on a Sunday, and that a sung Mass with communion of the people. And such a Mass, sung by the people and not by a choir, a " messe paroissiale ", is regarded as a local extension of the pontifical High Mass, the bishop's eucharist being considered as the historical norm of Christian worship. Then, again, great stress is laid upon the " liturgical sermon " at Mass; its function is declared to be an exposition of the scriptures of the day (including the excerpts from the Old Testament which form the introit, gradual, etc.); it is spoken of as a " homily " (*ὁμιλία*) rather than a preachment (for the display of eloquence), an intimate talk of the pastor with his flock about the things of God as presented by the scriptures of each week, and as they have application to the actual concerns of God's people in the parish. So important is this considered to be that a special course lasting several days was organized at Vanves last year by the C.P.L. for the study of the Liturgical Sermon. Along with this emphasis on " the ministry of the Word of God ", it is significant to note that there is a powerful revival of Bible-study. The theology on which the Liturgical Movement is based is strongly biblical; and on the parochial level one hears of many parishes where the parish priest is calling

groups of his people together (as seems to have been widely done during the War), for the study of the Bible, and for informal discussion about the life and activities of the Church in the parish, as in the parish meetings which are proving so valuable in some English parishes. There is a growing interest in the spiritual meaning of the Old Testament, which might well be copied by churchpeople in our own country; the writer of one article says: "The liturgical reading of the Bible, according to which the texts are not considered by themselves, but as foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ, is the true and the only really satisfying way of reading the Old Testament."

Just because the Church of England, like the Churches of the Continent, has inherited the traditional patterns of the diocese and the parish, so we find again and again an echo of our own parochial problems and tasks in the experiences related in *La Maison-Dieu*. For instance, the pastoral problems presented by nominal membership, by formal baptisms and weddings, are a constant concern of the Liturgical Movement, and we might learn much from a study of the discussion of these matters in its literature. We find an insistent demand for greater strictness in the administration of these sacraments, and in some quarters a desire for a wider use of baptism by immersion, and for adult baptism. (Incidentally there appears to be a considerable expectation that the Pope may soon give permission for the rite of Baptism—and of Holy Unction also—to be administered in the vernacular.) The problem of "man-power" which presses upon us has its counterpart in France; there is in particular the difficulty of serving outlying hamlets and small villages which have a church but no resident priest, a difficulty which bears heavily on a country like France, with more than twice as many villages as England, and a more definitely rural character as a whole. To meet this problem it is quite unashamedly suggested that Mass should be celebrated and Communion given in the afternoon or evening in the outlying places, known as *dessertes*. This has been quite general during the War, when the bishops usually asked for communicants to observe a 3-hour fast from solids, and a 1-hour

fast from liquid refreshment. There has been a tendency to tighten things up again now that the War is over, but in some of the great *manifestations populaires* which have taken place since the War the climax has been an open-air Mass celebrated at midnight, with general communion of the people. Some glowing descriptions of such occasions are given in the pages of *La Maison-Dieu* (and other journals), though in some quarters also they are criticized as " stunts ", which are not likely to have a permanent effect for good. The best-known of such occasions, as far as this country is concerned, are probably the procession of the Vierge de Boulogne, and the pilgrimages to Vezelay, but equally impressive was the vast midnight gathering in the *Stade de Colombes* (the scene of many international football matches) to give thanks for deliverance from the War. All the 400 parishes of the diocese of Paris were represented, and Mass was said simultaneously at 400 portable altars, microphones being used to make it as far as possible a genuine concelebration of all the parish priests of the diocese with their bishop. It is said that communion was given that night to no fewer than 30,000 of the faithful. Another *manifestation populaire* was an open-air Mass, this time in the afternoon, in the grounds of the Palais de Chaillot, near Paris, when communion was given to thousands of men who had been repatriated after forced labour in Germany. The Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris was himself the celebrant, and the occasion is described as most moving and is believed to have brought about a reconciliation to religion among very many who had lapsed for years.

While speaking of forced labour, one may mention that *La Maison-Dieu,* in one of the earlier volumes, gives some details of the life of the numerous priests who were taken off to labour camps in Germany and Austria and other occupied territories, especially those confined in the notorious barracks at Dachau. These were for some months after their arrival deprived altogether of the Blessed Sacrament, and adopted the custom of reciting the Mass together as they were marched off to their work morning by morning. After some time a number of consecrated Hosts were smuggled to them in a tobacco

pouch by a young Breton soldier who was working in another gang near by, and had procured them from a camp which had a chaplain who was sympathetic. Later on, facilities were given them for the proper celebration of Mass in a building set apart for a chapel.

The most important task, apart from its literary work, yet undertaken by the C.P.L. has been the organizing of national liturgical congresses. Hardly was the War ended than preparations began for the first of these; it was duly held for four days at the beginning of September 1946 in the picturesque little cathedral city of Saint-Flour, in the Auvergne, and the subject was the Parish Mass. It was thought at first that about 200 delegates might be expected, but so great was the interest shown that accommodation had to be found for no fewer than 800 bishops, priests and laity, from 67 dioceses, mainly in France and Belgium. The bishop of the diocese (Mgr. Pinson) gave the opening address on the first day, his subject being "The Liturgy in the Life of the Church", and the Cardinal-Archbishop of Lyons presided over the second day's proceedings. The greater part of the discussions were concerned with practical points, such as methods of giving the laity a greater part in the words and action of the Mass, and the recovery of a sense of active membership among nominal Christians. A large part of the third day's session was devoted to the music of the Mass and its religious value, the subject being introduced by an excellent paper by the learned Benedictine, Dom Lambert Beauduin. He sought to show that for historical and theological reasons, as well as practical, the norm of Sunday worship should be the sung Mass of the Parish, the people not assisting as spectators but taking part as actors in its drama. "Let the people sing" was the theme of more than one speaker; and one realized how fortunate we are in our Church of England in our great tradition of hymn-singing, which gives the congregation its chief vocal part in our services. The congress came to an end on the Sunday afternoon with the representation of several religious plays, in the open-air, interspersed with the singing of popular religious folk-songs.

The Congress of Saint-Flour ended on the note of Sunday as the day of joy; and it was no accident that this was the subject chosen for the second national congress held last September at Lyons. A full report of this congress has not yet reached us, but there is little doubt that it will have proved as important and valuable as the first. Cardinal Gerlier, the Archbishop of Lyons, himself was president, with the support of a large number of other bishops. The title was *Le Jour du Seigneur, Mystique et pratique du dimanche* (" the Lord's Day, its spiritual and practical significance "), and the attractive programme-folder was headed with two striking slogans, " In a suffering world, the Joy of Christ " and " *Gaudium Domini Fortitudo Nostra*". The various addresses and discussions covered a wide field, from the " theology of Sunday ", a subject dealt with by Father Congar, the author of the well-known *Chrétiens désunis,* to " Sunday in the family-circle " and " Sunday Bible-study ". But the main emphasis was on the recovery of the Christian Sunday as a day of joy; in face of the threatened " collectivization of leisure " by the totalitarian state, *la reconquête chrétienne du dimanche* becomes " the essential condition for overcoming violence, terrorism, injustice and oppression, the indispensable element in the preservation of respect for personality, for family life and the human dignity of labour " (Canon Cardijn, chaplain-general of the J.O.C., whose address at the Congress was entitled " A crusade for Sunday "). Side by side with such a crusade is a campaign for a better cultural standard, for a better use of the leisure of Sunday, and small but significant beginnings have been made in the *Centre de culture ouvrière* (a kind of W.E.A., sponsored by the Church), and the *Association Travail et Culture,* which has the support and co-operation of a number of artists in various fields. It is clearly realized that it is of little use to preach Sunday observance unless the Church can at the same time hold up both to her own members and to the society in which she lives the " picture " of a Christian Sunday which is worth-while enough to capture the imagination of young and old. " Such a ' picture ' is for the heart what an idea is for the mind " (Professor Romano Guardini).

This realistic Christian approach to the question of Sunday observance is very heartening and extremely relevant to our English situation; it is not so long ago that we used to hear the "Continental Sunday" spoken of rather smugly as something which was rapidly consigning the French and other nations to perdition, with the connivance if not the assistance of the Church. Now it looks as if the shoe may turn out to be on the other foot, and England may have to look to the Continent for help in rescuing the Christian Sunday from capture by the forces of Antichrist.

THE LIVING THEOLOGICAL TRADITION OF THE EASTERN CHURCH

By AUSTIN OAKLEY

THIS paper is an attempt to bring to the notice of English readers a modern theological work,[1] important out of proportion to the size of the book, which was published in Paris three years ago, but which has recently gained attention here through the presence of the author in this country during the past summer, and through his lectures and personal influence.

We are becoming familiar by now with the phenomenon in the East of the lay-theologian. It is a false dichotomy to presuppose that theological works must be written only by clergy and bishops, and read by the laity. Byzantine history supplies a steady stream of examples of the lay theologian, both imperial and common, right down to the fifteenth century, while the same tradition has been carried on in Greek and Russian Orthodoxy down to the present day. Indeed, among Anglicans the conspicuous names of W. J. Birckbeck, Evelyn Underhill and C. S. Lewis suggest themselves. The vital truth of the matter is that the real qualification for theological study and exposition is competent knowledge irradiated by deep Christian conviction and the living of a devout spiritual life, a definite charisma of the Spirit. The true meaning of the Christian faith will not yield itself to purely scientific, so-called objective treatment, but only to the Christian who lives and practises what he believes.

[1] *Essai sur la Théologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient.* By Vladimir Lossky. Aubier, Paris, 1944. 250 pp. +.

From another point of view, the author in his introduction to his book reveals a further false distinction between theology and " mysticism." It is a popularly fallacious conception that theology can only be departmentally mystical, *en marge* as it were, and as a result of peculiar personal experiences, or that theology must be predominantly rationalistic. He claims (and the development of his main theme as well as his copious documentation bears this out) that all true theology is mystical, in that it manifests the divine mystery, the data of Revelation. Throughout the book, the central mystery in which all else is centred and consummated, is the mystery of the Triune God, the divine Trinity in Unity.

M. Lossky's theology is never primarily polemical, but the general treatment of his august theme, so amply illustrated as dependent on the Scriptures and the Fathers, is of particular value to us Anglicans, who, following Western developments, have concentrated attention on the Trinity in relation to man, almost to the exclusion of the contemplation of the eternal essential life of the Three Persons in One God. Popular Anglican preaching might lead a critical theologian to think that the Incarnation alone is central for us, that the summary of belief in our Catechism exhausts the content of what we have revealed to us of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, thereby reducing that belief to a merely economic relation to us as created beings, and a nexus of relations between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It is easily seen that such a tendency relegates the mystical life to the status of a Christian paregy, and encourages not only a concentration on " Jesus worship ", an exclusive emphasis on " the Christ after the flesh ", but also a ready acceptance of the doctrine of the double Procession of the Holy Spirit, as the ultimate expression of the revealed being of God the Holy Ghost. He insists (with a formidable catena of patristic testimony) that the Eastern Fathers have consistently taught that the fundamental expression of the essential Trinity (as set forth in the Chalcedonian-Constantinopolitan Creed) is contained in the formula *ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνέυματι,* and that divergence from that formula involves

dogmatic confusion. Attempts to express the essential life of the Trinity as consisting in inner and innate relations, or to consider the Holy Spirit to be the bond or link between the Father and the Son, has led (through preoccupation with the economic aspect) to the formulation of the Western addition to the Creed in the Filioque clause.

But lying at the very root and source of Eastern Theology is the insistence on the fundamental mystery of the Divine Being, *les tenèbres divines*. Given classical expression in the short treatise of the pseudo-Areopagite, " Concerning Mystical Theology ", brought into the main stream of Orthodox theology in the seventh century by St. Maximus the Confessor, the apophatic (*ἀπόφασις*, negation, denial) character of our knowledge of God remains constant until it reaches its fully developed form in the writings of St. Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century. God is ultimately invisible, intangible, inaccessible, incomprehensible. His essence is unutterable, such is the perfection of him. That which is positive in our knowledge is partial and imperfect. To know is to have a knowledge of that which exists; but God is beyond and above any object. To approach him all that is inferior to him must be denied. The divine Light renders all else invisible. Only by *ἀγνωσιά* (something meaning, indeed, more than mere " ignorance ") can we reach *les tenèbres divines*.[2] The author admits that the subject did not escape the notice of St. Thomas Aquinas, but with the result that for him the positive knowledge of God and the negative apophatic way are regarded as two antinomous methods to be resolved in a synthesis. In this synthesis, the resolution is in favour of positive theology, as the higher and primary form, since positive theology finds its meaning by maintaining that affirmations of the nature of God have a value *modo sublimiori* than we can affirm of created things. Such was not the solution of the pseudo-Areopagite, who ever sub-

[2] It is incidentally of great importance that the great Eikon (still existing) of the Church of the Holy Wisdom in Constantinople, depicts the " Unknown God " as a shrouded darkness approached by five ascending steps of human wisdom.

ordinates the positive way to the apophatic and insists on leaving the antinomy unresolved. By purification from the contemplation of all created things, man is made capable of union with him who surpasses all created being and all human knowledge. God is not the summit of all things known, but our consummation and end is union with the Divine Trinity, whose essence is unknowable and unknown. This sublime conception remains constant in the main true stream of Eastern theology to this day.

That the negative way is a form of neo-Platonism is often affirmed by the West. Yet the line of demarcation between mystical Eastern theology (and all true theology is mystical) and the teachings of Plotinus is clear. The neo-Platonists never admitted that God was ultimately unknowable, but only that in order to know him, the multiple ways of knowing should be reduced to the absolute simplicity of the " One ". Only then would simplicity of union be accomplished. Neo-Platonism is not apophatic.

Emphasis on this fundamental position of Eastern theology is necessary, since, without it, the whole closely-knit system is not easily grasped. The author then proceeds to treat in greater elaboration the Divine Trinity, both in essence and Creation. After a revealing chapter on Image and Likeness, he returns, in the light of his previous exposition, to the Oeconomy of the Holy Spirit and of the Son. This leads him to ecclesiology, the doctrine of the Church. The last three chapters treat specifically of the way of union with God, since this treatise by its very nature is no mere intellectual exposition but a theological study of the spiritual life.

In his fuller treatment of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, M. Lossky begins with a discussion of terms, as they were adopted and adapted to Christian use in the great Trinitarian century, the fourth. At this stage of our exposition, the important point in terminology would seem to be the stress on the originally synonymous meaning of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* the equal dignity of both terms, in contrast with the inferior

and somewhat artificial meaning of the Latin term *persona* as paired with *essentia*. This, through all the adaptations of Greek terms, gives a definite colour to classical patristic exposition in the East. But the main difference between the Greek and Latin exposition is revealed in the fact that the East always starts from consideration of the Hypostases (Personæ) and proceeds to that of the Essence. This is particularly striking in the treatment of the Person of the Father, the principle of unity in the Trinity. He is the Fount and Source, *πηγάια θεότης* of the Son by eternal Generation, of the Holy Spirit by eternal Procession.

The Holy Trinity, as St. Athanasius insisted, is monarchic: a single principle (*ἀρχή*) of the Divinity. The Unity of the Trinity is safeguarded by the One Only Father, who is the One God. And, further, the Persons and the Nature of the Trinity do not imply any logical precedence. That which distinguishes the Son from the Father and the Spirit is that he is begotten, that which distinguishes the Spirit from the Father and the Son is that he precedes. But ultimately, the apophatic way is the more perfect: the Father is neither begotten nor proceeding, the Son is neither the Source nor the Procession, the Holy Spirit is neither the Source nor the Begetting. On the other hand, the Father in a timeless movement of love *ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀγαπητικῶς* confers his one Nature on the Son and the Holy Spirit, not by division but by unity. Once again, confusion in the character of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, such as is introduced by a doctrine of double Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, irremediably mars the original exposition and use of terms.

The Latin Fathers, on the other hand, make their starting-point from the Nature of God and proceed in thought to consider the Three Persons. This method, the inverse of their own, led the Greek Fathers to suspect a tendency in the West by which emphasis on the One Nature has been detrimental to the distinction of the Persons, and has revealed itself as a purely natural and philosophically conditioned explanation of relations between those Three Persons in the One Nature. The Greeks

will always maintain that the Nature of God is inconceivable to man, apophatic, and because apophatic, giving rise to antinomies. The truth and richness of the divine revelation is always dependent on the preservation of the balance of antinomy of thought, and is destroyed by any attempt at a purely philosophic explanation, or by an attempted fusion of apophatic and positive theology. It is clear that the main doctrinal difference which divides East from West is the Western doctrine of the double Procession, a doctrine which (whatever its historical origin) is symptomatic of a theological temper of mind, which has grown sharper and more rigid since the effective drifting apart of Latin and Eastern Christianity.

Contrary to generally received opinion, the doctrine of the uncreated energies of God, connected specifically with the theology of St. Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century, is clearly proved by the author to be the faithful carrying on of a theological tradition from St. Irenaeus through the Eastern Fathers. Indeed it is one of the triumphant marks of M. Lossky's exposition of the living theological tradition of the Eastern Church, that he is able with complete freedom and consistency to move backwards and forwards from the earlier centuries to St. John of Damascus, the later Byzantine era and the comparatively modern period of the Russian theologians and spiritual teachers of the last century in Russia.

To understand the meaning of the uncreated Energies of God, it is necessary once again to stress the distinction already made between apophatic and positive theology. Eastern teaching will always insist that the Essence of God is inaccessible and incommunicable, that it belongs to the realm of the apophatic. But as revelation and manifestation entering into the realm of positive or affirmative theology, there is a procession from the Nature of God, inseparable from him, of power (*δύναμις*) or energy (*ἐνέργεια*) rays of Divinity, images expressive of the movement (*κίνησις*) or springing forth (*ἔξαλμα*) of God. In this uncreate energy man is able to participate, although the Eastern Fathers make it clear that the uncreate Energies do not exist specifically for man. Were there no Creation, God would

still overflow in the shining rays of his divine Glory. Yet this manifestation becomes such to us in Creation, Redemption and Deification. As far as we are concerned it is relative, but as far as concerns God it has no causal relation, but is a free act, a movement of the Will of the three Divine Persons.

Nor do the manifestations of the God of Glory (Eph. i, 17), of the Son's splendour of the Father's Glory (*ἀπάυγασμα τῆς δόξης*) (Heb. i, 3) of "the Spirit of Glory" (I Peter iv, 14), eternal as they are, imply that the world of creation is co-eternal, since the created world has a beginning *ex nihilo* in the Will of God. For the purpose of the expression of this truth, Eastern theology (following the teaching of both Old and New Testaments) applies the term "Light" (*φῶς*). This is the Light in which God appeared to the just men of the Old Dispensation. This is the same light which permeated the Humanity of Christ and shone forth in his Transfiguration, and this is the uncreate and deifying Grace that is the heritage in the Holy Spirit of the saints of the Church, both here and beyond.

The doctrine of the uncreate energies of God was hotly attacked in the fourteenth century and has not ceased in the intervening time to come in for much misunderstanding in the West. The main objection comes from those who profess to see in it an attack on the simplicity and unity of God: a setting up of a double Godhead, a lapse therefore into polytheism. But it is pointed out by the author that the West has become a stranger to apophatic theology and its correlative antinomy of thought and expression, and has fallen back on a philosophic doctrine of a simple essence of the Godhead, the *actus purus,* which, while allowing for relations within that essence, regards the essence as being such that the Hypostases (Persons) themselves receive the character of interior relations. It can, therefore, find no place for any conception corresponding with a spiritual reality, that while being divine, is not of the divine essence.

There are, therefore, the following definitions in Eastern theology: There is distinguishable in God the Three Hypostases in one Essence or Nature. There are the Energies, processions

from the Nature, but not of the Essence, yet inseparable from It. In turn the Nature is inseparable from the Hypostases. The Godhead is One, not a composition of Persons, Nature and Energies. The uncreate Energies are those by which the Godhead, incommunicable in his Essence, is revealed to man. There is no division of the nature of God, an unknown and a known, but rather two modes of the One existence, in his Being and his Power or Energies.

When the author turns from the fullness of the divine uncreated life in its Unity and Trinity, to the nature of man, it becomes clear that his exposition finds it completeness in the New Creation in Christ, in that state of being for man which can only be realized by his participation in the Divine Nature, by *θέωσις*. Herein lies the central truth of Eastern anthropology. Man himself is a great mystery, in the Pauline sense of the revelation of that which was ever hidden in the mind of God, and revealed in Jesus Christ. The very fact of his creation is not scientifically verifiable, but accepted by an act of faith, whereby the leap over the chasm from the increate to the created is believed, whereby the unthinkable fact of something outside God other than he is accepted. The apophatic (if it is only apophatic *à rebours*) must be admitted if man is to find his true place. The creation of man, in which was explicit from the beginning his deification in Christ, is the outcome of the free purpose of God, in whose act there is neither necessity nor repentance.

There is in man a multiplicity of hypostases (*μυριυπόστασις*) in a single nature, in contradistinction to the perfection of the Divinity, in which there are Three Hypostases and One Nature. In the Christ, the Word Incarnate, there are two Natures (a divine Nature by Essence and right, and a human nature, which he took of the Holy Virgin) in a single Hypostasis. But in the perfection of redeemed man there are also two natures, a divine nature, not by Essence or right, but by the Power or Energy of God (the power given to become a son of God, as St. John teaches) which is unified with his human nature in one hypostasis, the perfection of which is peculiar to each man, yet

dependent upon the gathering up of all in Christ. Herein man realizes the true Image and Likeness of God. Yet it is significant for the true understanding of this doctrine, to see clearly in the first place that such perfection is not only a gift but the result of man's co-operation with the Divine Energy, his *συνεργία*. The life of man, in his journey to perfection, involves penitence, illumination and union with God. This is the royal way of the saints through all the ages. And in the second place, it is clear that perfected man, while incorporated into Christ, does not become God. His second nature as a Son is not that of the unique Only-Begotten One, but is the result of the divine power given him of the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. The author emphasizes the resultant difficulty in the East of the " Imitation of Christ ", so avidly and yet somewhat uncritically stressed in the West, and always given there an intensely humanistic complexion.

Those in whom the formation of the second nature given to man is exemplified are the saints, but pre-eminently, in Mary the Holy Mother of God. On this broad and sound theological basis is demonstrated the veneration and honour paid to her. In her is the perfection of the human and divinely participated natures in a single hypostasis, which perfection is that which results from the union of human beings with the Divine Trinity.

It is a commonplace of exposition among us to speak of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, but to neglect the complementary truth, the double aspect of the Church whereby she is also the pleroma of the Spirit. The Church is both Christological and Pneumatological, the creation of the Two Persons of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, sent by the Father into the world to accomplish the same work in different ways. That work is union with the Divine Trinity. The work of the Incarnate Son has reference to the unifying of our nature in which we are incorporated in him, while the work of the Holy Spirit has reference to the sanctification of the myriad human hypostases of that nature. The Church is both the Body of Christ and the fullness of the Spirit. As St. Athanasius defines it *αὐτὸς ἐστι θεὸς σαρκοφόρος, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄνθρωποι πνευματοφόροι*

This conception of the Church as both Christological and Pneumatological differs from that of the West, in its general preoccupation with economic theology, with its earthly aspect and its human implications, its organization and the like. The Eastern tradition, founded equally upon the Incarnation and Pentecost, finds the true unity of redeemed human nature in the Body of Christ, and the perfection of each human hypostatis in the progressive deification within the one Body, of each by the work of the Holy Spirit. As to nature, we are parts or members of the whole, which is Christ: as to hypostases (or as the West prefers to say, persons) we are complete, each containing all. Thus the unity and multiplicity of the Church is emphasized. In that it reflects the character of the Divine Trinity, there is seen in that Mystery (whose work the Church is) the revelation of its true life, its unity, its catholicity, its holiness and its apostolicity. It is ever of the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit.

This summary, inadequate as all summaries are, can be but an introduction to M. Lossky's study, which it is hoped will shortly appear in English dress. Two notes run through it: a consistency of Scriptural and patristic evidence and support, and the fact that it is a living tradition. It rightly claims to be identical with the teaching of the East from the beginning and to keep that identity through changing fashions of thought. Nothing quite comparable with its devout incisiveness, its learning and maturity of expression, has yet reached us from that treasury of Christian wholeness of the Orthodox tradition, which is not only a profession of faith but a way of life in the Mystery of the Triune God.

DIXIT CRANMER ET NON TIMUIT—II

A Supplement to Mr. Timms

By GREGORY DIX

THE evidence of Cranmer's theological writings is such as to range him with the Zwinglian controversialists of his day against their no less Protestant opponents, the Lutherans and Receptionists, in the animated quarrels over eucharistic doctrine which had already destroyed the unity of the Reformation. There is, however, another way of discerning Cranmer's personal position in these controversies—by his alliances. Mr. Timms has brought forward information on Cranmer's relations with Ridley, Hooper and Bucer, purporting to show that Cranmer sided with Bucer and the Receptionists against Hooper and the Zwinglians. I could wish that the examination had been extended to a larger number of witnesses, *e.g.* to all those men whom Cranmer picked out to serve him personally as chaplains or in other offices. Yet for the moment I am content to accept the limitation of this enquiry to these three. I only hope that Mr. Timms will believe them.

First, then, Nicholas Ridley. Mr. Timms was right to bring him into it, for Cranmer himself declared that it was Ridley who " by sundry persuasions and authorities of doctors " finally moved him to renounce that lingering belief in transubstantiation to which he had hitherto clung.[41] This was apparently in 1546, when Ridley was living with Cranmer as his chaplain. But Mr. Timms's brief account of Ridley will hardly stand without some supplement. " Ridley himself ", he says,

[41] Cranmer, Examination before Brokes. *ap. Miscellaneous Writings,* ed. Cox. Parker Soc., 1846, p. 218.

" had been converted by reading the ninth century treatise *de Corpore et Sanguine Domini* of the Benedictine Ratramnus, printed editions of which had been issued in 1532 and 1541 ". And again: " Both Cranmer and Ridley are found allied against Hooper, à Lasco and the Zwinglians generally, in such matters as the Strangers' Church in London, the vestment controversy, kneeling at Communion ". If Mr. Timms infers from these things that Ridley was a Receptionist, he is mistaken. First, though Foxe affirmed of Ridley that " the first occasion of his conversion was by reading of Bertram's book of the Sacrament ", he also allows that he " was first called to the savouring and favouring of Christ and his gospel, partly by disputation before and other his treatises ". Ratramnus or " Bertram " does not in reality seem to have had much to do with Ridley's change of opinions. He had first read " Bertram " as early as 1534, but he still accepted the " corporal presence " as late as 1539, at the time of the passing of the Statute of the Six Articles. His abandonment of this belief seems to date from 1544 or 1545. Secondly, Ridley, judging from his quotations, seems to cite " Bertram " not from the Cologne edition of 1532, nor yet from the English version put out in 1548,[42] but from the Zurich edition of 1534, with its Zwinglian notes and introduction by Leo Jud (or Judae, as he called himself), Zwingli's chief lieutenant in the ministry of Zürich.[43] Whatever we may now think of Ratramnus's own opinions—whether he was in essentials orthodox (as Boileau tried to show in the 17th century), or whether he was a forerunner of Calvin (as Barclay has suggested), or whether he was just a devout Carolingian in a muddle (as I suspect)—we have to remember that in the 16th century he was seized upon by the Zwinglians as a heaven-sent weapon against the Lutheran doctrine of the " oral manducation ", and was made much of in all their propaganda in

[42] *The Boke of Barthram, Priest, intreatynge of the bodye and blode of Chryst* . . . By M. Raynalde and Ant. Kyngstine.

[43] Bullinger, not Jud, succeeded Zwingli in the chief pastorate chiefly because Jud was identified with Zwingli's war policy against the Catholic Cantons, which ended in Zwingli's defeat and death at the battle of Kappel.

consequence.[44] Thirdly, if Cranmer and Ridley are frequently found allied against Hooper on questions of practical policy, that was not in itself a contingency unlikely to befall sensible men, whatever their doctrines. This quite intelligent theologian had about as much discretion and *savoir faire* as a mule in the "give and take" required in the management of men and affairs, especially in a period of rapid change. Ridley stated their real relations with delicacy but exactness when he replied to Hooper's gift of a copy of his chief doctrinal work on the eucharist, *Hyperaspismus de Vera doctrina et Usu Coenae Domini* (which defends an outright Zwinglian doctrine) with the following avowal: "But now, my dear brother, forasmuch as I understand by your works, which I have yet but superficially seen, that we thoroughly agree and wholly consent together in those things which are the grounds and substantial points of our religion . . . howsoever in times past in smaller matters and circumstances of religion your wisdom and my simplicity, I confess, have in some points varied".[45] Hooper, however, had been aware for some years that they were in fundamental agreement on the eucharist. Writing to Bullinger on February 5, 1550, Hooper had cited Ridley, then Bishop of Rochester, as one of the six bishops who "as far as I know entertain right opinions in the matter of the eucharist. I have freely conversed with all of them upon this subject, and have discovered nothing but what is pure and holy".[46] Hooper might be impolitic, but he could recognize a fellow-Zwinglian when he discussed the burning question of the moment with him at some length. Why should we disbelieve both men when they declare that they agreed with one another about the eucharist?

[44] Though Saint John Fisher mentions Ratramnus with approval in his *de Veritate Corporis . . . contra Oecolampadium* in 1527, I do not think he had read him—or at all events not the whole treatise—but had "lifted" the reference from Trithemius. The *editio princeps* of "Bertram", of whom MSS. were rare, only appeared six years later.

[45] Ridley, *Letter ix. Works*, ed. Christmas, Parker Soc., 1841, p. 355 (undated, but written early in 1555).

[46] *Original Letters, xxxvii*, ed. Hastings Robinson, Parker Soc., 1846, p. 76.

Neither was prone to compromise, as their vigorous controversy with one another over vestments sufficiently indicates.

It is interesting, however, to find that it was by "authorities of doctors" that Ridley was able to complete the subversion of Cranmer's former belief about the sacrament. As early as 1537 the archbishop had been particularly interested in this aspect of the vehement controversy then proceeding between the Lutherans and the Zwinglians. In the previous winter the renowned humanist Joachim Vadianus (von Watt) had sent him a copy of his *Aphorisms on the Consideration of the Eucharist,* a learned plea for the Zwinglian position. Cranmer took twelve months to answer, and even then replied very coolly:

> "Unless I see stronger reasons brought than I have been able to see hitherto, I have no wish to be a patron or supporter of this your opinion . . . I have read almost everything that has been written and published by both Oecolampadius and Zwingli, and have learned thereby that all men's works need to be read with discrimination."

They contain much which is valuable, but he especially wishes that they had not

> ". . . done violence to the authority of all the ancient doctors and primitive writers of the Church of Christ put together. For however you may twist your ingenuity, you will never prove to me, nor, I think, to any impartial reader, that those ancient authors make for your side in this controversy . . . since this doctrine (*sc.* the corporal presence) was already set forth to us from the first age of the Church by the Fathers themselves and Apostolic men. What man of piety can even bear to listen to such a thing, let alone believe it? To say no more, our good Lord would never have left his only beloved spouse in such shameful darkness for so long".[47]

It was thus only after a long and critical consideration of the Zwinglian thesis, and the overthrow in his mind of what he

[47] Cranmer, *Letter cxciii, ap. Miscellaneous Writings,* ed. Cox. Parker Soc., 1846, pp. 342-3.

conceived to be its principal difficulty—the testimony of the patristic tradition—by Ridley's exegesis of the Fathers, that Cranmer finally subscribed to the doctrine of the Swiss Reformers. We have no direct evidence as to the particular arguments Ridley employed with him or the "authorities" concerned. But there are coincidences, not only of selection and arrangement but also of treatment, in the patristic extracts used in Cranmer's *Defence of the True and Catholic Doctrine* and the latter part of Ridley's *Brief Declaration of the Lord's Supper* on the one hand, and Oecolampadius's elegant essay, *Quid de Eucharistia Veteres . . . senserunt Dialogus* on the other, which probably illustrate some of the passages which Cranmer and Ridley considered together, and the sort of exegesis they found satisfying. In his published writings on the eucharist Ridley said nothing to which a moderate Zwinglian could have taken exception, but his treatment is for the most part *simpliste* and negative. He denies transubstantiation and the Mass, but he does not go into the questions then being so bitterly controverted among Protestants. In private he was less guarded. We have seen his and Hooper's private acknowledgements that they were agreed in essentials on eucharistic theology. In a conversation with Secretary Bourn and others, which Ridley recorded afterwards in his own hand, we find him energetically defending the central Zwinglian thesis that in the words of institution *Corpus est figura corporis* (a perversion of Tertullian with which all Zwinglians made hearty play against their opponents), and other outright Zwinglian positions.[48] Such was the man to whom Cranmer said that he owed his own final eucharistic beliefs.

We come now to Bucer who, though he was no Lutheran, certainly did not go all the way with Zwingli, but retained and defended a belief in a "Real Presence", by faith in the recipient. His stay at Lambeth from April to October 1549 was unwelcome to the English Zwinglians, and Mr. Timms was right to quote in this connexion Hooper's complaint to Bullinger:

[48] *A Conference between N. Ridley and . . . others.* Works, *ed. cit.*, p. 162.

"Bucer is with the Archbishop of Canterbury like another Scipio and an inseparable companion . . ."[49] This was not his first alarm on the subject:

> "When I gave your (Bullinger's) letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, he did not vouchsafe a single word respecting either yourself or your most godly church. Bucer has a very great influence with him, and the bishop will appoint him to the Regius Professorship at Cambridge. Master à Lasco is absent, which is a great grief to all godly persons."[50]

But Mr. Timms should have explored Hooper's correspondence a little further. With the departure of Bucer and Fagius to Cambridge in October, and the return of the charming Pole à Lasco, all danger of a reaction in Cranmer's mind, if such there ever really was, passed finally away. During the next eighteen months, which were all that Bucer had to live, Cranmer and he never met again, and the only communication which passed between them in that time was a brief note from the archbishop asking Bucer's opinion on the Vestment controversy, and Bucer's statement in reply.[51] Meanwhile Hooper was writing gleefully to Bullinger:

> "The Archbishop of Canterbury entertains right views as to the nature of Christ's presence in the supper, and is now very friendly towards myself . . . his sentiments respecting the eucharist are pure and religious, and similar to yours in Switzerland".[52]

[49] Hooper to Bullinger, 25 June, 1549. *Original Letters*, ed. Robinson, xxxiii, p. 67.

[50] Hooper to Bullinger, 31 May, 1549. *ibid.* p. 64.

[51] The correspondence is printed by Dr. C. Hopf, *Martin Bucer*, pp. 148 *sqq.* Cranmer seems to have taken pains beforehand to ascertain that Bucer's opinion would be on his side in the dispute with Hooper, and to have been rather disappointed with his answer that the vestments ought to be abolished, but that since this was not yet practicable, Hooper was mistaken in making so much fuss about them.

[52] Hooper to Bullinger, 27 December, 1549. *Original Letters*, xxxvi, *ed. cit.*, p. 71.

And again:

> "The Archbishop of Canterbury . . . gives to all lecturers and preachers their license to read and preach; every one of them, however, must previously subscribe to certain articles, which if possible I will send you; one of which respecting the eucharist is plainly the true one and that which you maintain in Switzerland . . . Now, as I hope, master Bullinger and Canterbury maintain the same opinions".[53]

And again:

> "My Lord of Canterbury, who is in truth a great admirer of you, when I received your last letter in his palace, and acquainted him with its contents, could hardly refrain from tears, when he understood your feelings with regard to the king and the kingdom, and also the perseverance of your church in these most lamentable times. He made most honourable mention of yourself and your profound erudition. You have no one, I am sure, among all your dearest friends, who is more interested about you . . ."[54]

Bucer was dead by then, after some disconcerting experiences.

As we have said, there is no record whatever of any contact, written or personal, between Bucer and Cranmer from October 1549 to the latter's death on 27 February 1551, apart from the brief note about the Vestment controversy (2 December 1550). Cranmer consulted Bucer about nothing at all in that period. He seems indeed to have deliberately avoided asking for the observations of any of the foreign refugees of the Receptionist school on the revision of the Prayer-book, and when he chanced to meet them to have refrained from informing them of the changes he intended to make.[55] Bucer's expression of his

[53] Hooper to Bullinger, 5 February, 1550, *Original Letters,* xxxvii, *ed. cit.,* p. 77.

[54] Hooper to Bullinger, 1 August, 1551. *Original Letters,* xl. *ed. cit.,* p. 93.

[55] See the Letter from Peter Martyr to Bucer, 10 Jan., 1551 cited by Hopf, *op. cit.,* pp. 61-2.

opinions in the *Censura* was not asked for by Cranmer, and was not addressed to him by Bucer but to Bishop Goodrich of Ely. It is likely that Goodrich brought it to Cranmer's attention, but I have failed to find any contemporary evidence that Cranmer ever saw it.

What, then, of the great influence which Bucer's *Censura* is traditionally said to have exercised on the compilation of the Prayer-book of 1552? Mr. Timms speaks the conventional language when he asserts that "these alterations (in 1552) follow closely the recommendations of Martin Bucer's *Censura* or criticism of the rite of 1549". The facts shall speak for themselves.

Bucer's comments on the eucharistic rite of 1549 are contained in chapters ii-ix of the *Censura*.[56] It is with these alone that we are here concerned.

In chapter ii, the only change Bucer asks for is the removal of the Ornaments Rubric of 1549; not, as he notes, that the mass-vestments have in them "anything impious *per se*, or that a pious man cannot use them piously", but because all vestments are unlike the simplicity of Christ and the Apostles. The substitution of a surplice in 1552 hardly met his principle.

In chapter iii he disapproves of the Antecommunion service when there are no communicants. This was not forbidden but ordered in 1552. He also asks for the abolition of celebrations anywhere but in the parish church. This was only restricted in 1552. He approves of the order in 1549 that the wafer shall be "unleavened and *fragilis*", only suggesting that it shall be made somewhat thicker than heretofore. Wafer bread was discontinued in 1552 and the fraction was omitted. He further demands that instead of the 1549 rubric requiring one or more communicants with the priest, *all* who obstinately refuse to communicate whenever the sacrament is celebrated shall be

[56] *Scripta Anglicana*, Basle, 1577, pp. 457-476. (Bucer appears to have lost count of his chapters. There are two numbered ix—the last about the eucharist and the first about baptism—and the numbering is thenceforward one wrong all through the book.)

excommunicated. This impracticable rigorism was not followed in 1552. He also asks that in future the Bread shall be delivered into the hands of the communicant and not into the mouth, to avoid "superstition". This was also the custom at Zürich, and was carried out in 1552.

In chapter iv, he deals with the offertory. He approves the sentences and the collection for the poor, as found in 1549. The method of the collection was changed in 1552. He asks that men shall always be placed on one side and women on the other in church. This was not prescribed in 1552. He objects to the 1549 rubric that the priest shall take only "so much bread and wine as shall suffice" for the communion, because this ministers to the "superstition" that the bread and wine acquire "some holiness" by "consecration". Once the "use" of them in communion is concluded, consecrated bread and wine ought to be restored to common domestic use. The 1549 offertory rubric prevents any practical illustration of this. The offertory was abolished altogether in 1552, but the celebrant was then allowed to have the remainder of the consecrated species for his own domestic uses.

In chapter v, Bucer inveighs against the liberty allowed in 1549 touching genuflection, the sign of the cross, knocking on the breast, and "other gestures of the never-to-be-sufficiently-execrated mass, which they exhibit[57] in administering the holy supper, and strive to retain and confirm the faith of the simpler and more superstitious sort of men in the thrice impious and deadly mass". (Bucer is just as good a protestant as any Zwinglian.) He demands that all leave for such "papistical gestures" be altogether taken away, and "rightful and moderate gestures such as can serve the pure religion of Christ

[57] Mr. Timms in another connexion seems to think that *exhibere*, "exhibit", in Cranmer's day were used only in the sense of "offer, furnish . . . administer", and not in the weaker sense of to "show forth". Here is the passage in Bucer: "... *gestus, quos in administranda S. coena exhibent* ...." *Censura*, cap. v. *Scripta Anglicana*, p. 465.

shall be prescribed". This can hardly be said to have been done in 1552.

In chapter vi, he objects to the provision for a second celebration on Christmas day. This was done away in 1552.

So far there is little which would suggest that the *Censura* had been followed at all in the compilation of 1552. Few of the extensive changes made then in the first part of the service are suggested by the *Censura*; those which the *Censura* suggests were for the most part not carried out. The important and extensive change involved in the complete suppression of the offertory goes further than anything Bucer had in mind, and in fact might negate his own suggestion. But the suppression of the offertory, like the replacing of the consecrated elements upon the table after the communion (which Bucer did not suggest) and their handing over to domestic use after the thanksgiving, is exactly what was done in the Zürich service. It is conceivable that such resemblances as there are between Bucer's suggestions and what was done in 1552 are quite accidental, and due to the following of Zürich, not of Bucer's *Censura*.

In chapter vii this impression is greatly strengthened. Bucer here expresses his very hearty approval of the rite of 1549 in general, though he has some anxiety that there is not enough preaching. But he makes it quite clear that he has no idea whatever of making the wholesale changes in the order of the parts of the rite which took place in 1552. He has no suggestion of breaking up the Canon, and expects it to continue with the sequence of the Intercessions, the so-called "Invocation," &c., as in 1549. He does not suggest placing part of it after the Communion, or transferring the *Gloria* from the beginning to the end of the service, or the Lord's Prayer to after the Communion, or the Communion devotions to the position of the Offertory. All this upheaval was of Cranmer's own invention, and was chiefly done in imitation of Zürich where, for instance, the prayer by which the elements were "set apart" was a brief fragment, ending with the words of institution, followed at once, without any "Amen", by the distribution of

the elements—just as in 1552.[58] All this was contrary to Bucer's ideas as set out in the *Censura,* and to his own former practise at Strassburg.

In chapter ix, we come to the heart of the matter. Assuming that the order of the Canon will remain as in 1549, beginning with the Intercessions, Bucer asks for changes in the prayer for the departed, but wishes to retain a mention of the dead and the Saints. In 1552 the position of the Intercessions was drastically shifted, and all mention of the dead and the Saints swept away. He goes on to ask for some important changes in the so-called "Invocation" of 1549, which will make it more expressive of his own "Receptionist" doctrine. With these changes he expressly desires that it may be retained. It was abolished in 1552. He also asks for verbal changes in the formula "and command these our prayers and supplications by the ministry of thy holy angels to be brought up unto thy holy tabernacle", to make it more scriptural. It was altogether abolished in 1552.

He comes now to his main point in this chapter, and indeed in the whole *Censura.* It is concerned with these phrases in the Canon of 1549:

> ". . . humbly beseeching thee that whosoever shall be partakers of this holy communion may *worthily receive the most precious body and blood of thy Son Jesus Christ and* be fulfilled with thy grace and heavenly benediction, *and made one body with thy Son Jesus Christ, that he may dwell in them and they in him*".

and also with this clause in the "Prayer of Humble Access" in its 1549 form:

> "Grant us therefore gracious Lord so to eat the flesh of thy dear Son Jesus Christ and drink his blood *in these holy mysteries,* that we may continually dwell in him".

"These words", he says, "of the true receiving and drinking

[58] See Bullinger's Appendix to Zwingli's *Fidei Christianae Expositio ap. Zwingli Opp.* ed. Schuler and Schulther, iv. Zürich, 1841, pp. 74 *sqq.*

of the body and blood of the Lord, I pray our Lord to grant may be retained exactly as they are . . . for these words are altogether pure and consentient with the words of the Holy Ghost". He then continues through five whole folio pages to praise and defend these few particular sentences, employing all his resources of scriptural exegesis and patristic citation to show that they ought not to be changed. He makes an open and forceful attack on the Zwinglian objections to them, and gives a careful exposition of Receptionism, and the way in which these particular sentences may be related to that belief. The argument turns throughout on the clauses I have italicized, which he repeatedly begs may be left unchanged. He ends with a paragraph that betrays emotion even through its pedantic Renaissance Latin:

> "It is therefore abundantly clear, at least to all that have the spirit of Christ our Saviour, from what I have here not indeed fully expounded but brought forward, that these words of the book, which I desire may be retained, are drawn from the very words of Christ and the Apostle, and thence were ever happily used in all the Churches of Christ, so long as the doctrine and discipline of Christ prevailed among them, and never furnished any occasion for any error. Wherefore I have a good hope that all of you with whom it lies to decide these things will gladly retain these words, and so declare to all the Saints dispersed throughout the world (whose eyes, as you well know, are all intent at this day most chiefly upon this kingdom, for that God has granted to it such a king and such bishops and such nobles) how carefully you cherish alike the sincerity of God's Word and the catholic consent of the true Church, and that you will not rashly and irreligiously admit of any novelty, as men of ill-will are wont to report of those who are zealous to purge out the old leaven of Antichrist and offer to the Lord a new and holy people sprinkled unto purification".[59]

Why all this anxious eloquence, and why the reference to the eyes of all good Protestants being fixed upon this country at

[59] *Censura,* ix. *Scripta Anglicana,* Basle, 1577, p. 476.

this time? Simply because Bucer saw that the crisis had come, and that these clauses which I have italicized would have to be the "test case". In the strife about the eucharist which had already permanently rent the Protestant world, the Zwinglians everywhere seemed to be in the ascendant about 1550, and Bucer's own life-long witness against them was failing. He was a dying man when he wrote the *Censura,* and he knew it. But the English Government and (what then amounted to the same thing) the English Church had not yet publicly taken up a decisive stand on the burning question of the moment—for or against Zwingli. True, Cranmer in his *Defence,* published in 1550, had already put out a very careful official statement of the sense in which the current liturgy of 1549 was to be understood, an explanation which must have left Bucer with few illusions as to what was coming. Gardiner controverted it, despite its official character, but only under cover of pretending that he thought it had not been written by Cranmer but by some impudent forger using his name. Bucer was silent. Early in 1550 Poullain, one of the Swiss Party at Lambeth but a friend of Bucer's from the old Strassburg days, had sent him a private warning that he must not "raise any controversy on the matter of the eucharist".[60] This cannot have meant against the Romanists—they were fair game for anyone under Edward VI. It must have referred to the controversies among Protestants, in which it was known that he was against the Zwinglians. Bucer replied that he would teach nothing contrary to what Peter Martyr had taught at Oxford—only to find that he, too, had gone with the prevailing tide and made concessions to the Zwinglians. Bucer was silent on the topic in public all through that year in Cambridge, presumably to avoid an open breach with the archbishop. He wrote his *Confessio de Eucharistia* in these months, in which he openly defends the Receptionist doctrine; but he significantly refrained from publishing it. While the clauses he defends at such length in the *Censura* were still recited in the English liturgy, it was still possible to claim that the English Church had not finally declared for the Zwinglians and against himself. But

[60] *Original Letters,* xxxviii. *ed. cit.,* p. 82.

towards the end of 1550 he must have had some hint from Goodrich of what was now intended, or he would hardly have been so earnest and insistent in his remonstrances on this particular point. He is making his last appeal—uninvited. And he makes it, not to Cranmer, who was already committed to the Zwinglians by the publication of the *Defence,* but to the King and the Council, to retain unchanged the only phrases in the rite of 1549 which could admit of a Receptionist interpretation —and so at least to leave the question open. He was right to be anxious. The phrases which he had so strenuously defended in the interests of Receptionism were all deleted from the Anglican liturgy in 1552, and have never since been reinserted.[61]

Cranmer did not rest content with excluding Bucer's "Receptionism" from all expression in the liturgy; he formally condemned it, in the name of the English Church. If the ramifying and somewhat scrambling controversies of the Zwinglians with their Protestant opponents had any single central issue, it was that of the disputes about the "ubiquity" of Christ's body. The Zwinglians insisted interminably that the risen and ascended body of Christ was a *physical* body, and as such is now in heaven "in some one certain place". Consequently it cannot be "present" in any but a purely mental and imaginary sense to the partakers of the Supper in divers localities on earth. It is there present to "the contemplation of faith", as Zwingli said. But in his humanity Christ is "really, essentially and corporally" present only in heaven, and therefore absent from the eucharist on earth. It is this somewhat crude reasoning which we must bear in mind in all the Zwinglian denunciations of any "real and corporal" presence, and which their Protestant opponents all refused to accept. "You insist", wrote Melanchthon bitterly to Oecolampadius,

> "that (in the eucharist) the body of an absent Christ is represented only as in a stage-play (*absentis Christi corpus tanquam in tragoedia repraesentari*). But I see that there

[61] I do not know how Mr. Timms reached the conclusion that in the "Prayer of Oblation" in 1552 "verbal changes were made in deference to Bucer". Poor Bucer—betrayed with a kiss!

> are promises given by Christ: 'I will be with you till the end of the world', and the like, wherein is no need to tear his Godhead apart from his manhood. Wherefore this is an opinion not fit to be held by Christian men, that Christ should so fill a certain place in heaven, that he must so sit there as though in prison".[62]

"We attribute", returned Oecolampadius,

> "a place in heaven to the body of Christ, not to set him in prison but in the worthiest habitation. Yet none the less he doth occupy some one single place in heaven, of whatsoever quality he may now be, because that is proper to a true body".[63]

Bucer, like the Lutherans, denied the Zwinglian assumption that the glorified body of Christ must be spatially localized, and further denied that, even if true, this need prevent its "real presence" and imparting in the eucharist.

> "For though we should grant you that he is circumscribed even in heaven by a physical place, how is that inconsistent with his being now truly present to us by faith? Even as the sun, in whatsoever part of the world we behold him, is truly present to us by sight.[64] . . . I am moved to write this much at length to you not only because I have seen what scandals have arisen in Germany from this particular disputation these twenty years and more (for it began four and twenty years ago), but because I sense this same spirit of contention beginning to rage here which has brought such great evils upon us in Germany . . ."[65]

[62] Melanchthon to Oecolampadius, cited by the latter, *Quid de Eucharistia &c.*, Basle, 1530, *f. a. 7. v.*

[63] *ibid. f.b.4.r.*

[64] Cranmer also used this analogy of the sun and its rays, in precisely the opposite sense from Bucer, to describe the "Real Absence". Gardiner naughtily brought out this contradiction of Cranmer and Bucer; and Cranmer could only reply, "Master Bucer saith not so much as you say", and let it go at that. *Answer*, ap. Cranmer, *Miscellaneous Writings*, Parker Soc., 1844, pp. 190-1.

[65] Bucer to Peter Martyr, June 20, 1549. *ap. Scripta Anglicana*, p. 549. This is an important letter for the understanding of Bucer's eucharistic doctrine, and its differences from that of Martyr.

The " Black Rubric " of 1552 said almost all that needed to be said, with its denial that " any adoration is done or ought to be done, either unto the sacramental bread or wine there bodily received, or unto any real and essential presence there being of Christ's natural flesh and blood . . . and as concerning the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ, they are in heaven and not here; for it is against the truth of Christ's true natural body to be in more places than one at one time ". But the " Black Rubric " was not of Cranmer's devising, though he approved it when the King and Council pressed for its insertion in the book of 1552. Yet its lawyer-drawn theology left one loophole, which he could close.

In the following year appeared the XLII Articles, for which he took full personal responsibility before Queen Mary's Commissioners:[66]

> " Forasmuch as the truth of man's nature requireth that the body of one and the self-same man cannot be at one time in divers places, but must needs be in some one certain place: therefore the body of Christ cannot be present at one time in many and divers places. And because (as holy scripture doth teach) Christ was taken up into heaven and shall there continue unto the end of the world: a faithful man ought not to believe or openly to confess the real and bodily presence (as they term it) of Christ's flesh and blood in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper ".[67]

Only Cranmer penned that stately English—the perfect summary of the Zwinglian belief in the " Real Absence ". Not only does this exclude any real and essential presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood from " the sacramental bread and wine there bodily received ", as the Black Rubric had done. It goes one step further. By denying any " real and bodily (*corporalis*

[66] *Misc. Writings*, Parker Soc., 1846, p. 220. *cf.* his letter to Cecil, 19 September, 1552, *ibid.*, p. 439.

[67] Article XXIX, of *Articles published by the King's Majesty*, 1553, *ap. Liturgies with other documents . . . in the reign of King Edward VI*, ed. Ketley, Parker Soc., 1844, p. 534. Anyone who examines the *Catechism* annexed to these Articles will find himself on familiar ground on p. 507.

—the favourite Zwinglian word) presence of Christ's flesh and blood from the sacrament *of the Lord's Supper"*, it denies any presence of the body to the participants either in the elements, or even "in the Supper", as Bucer had taught. The divine humanity is effectively segregated in its palace or prison "in some one certain place" in heaven from all earthly contact with the communicants, whether by the sacrament *or* by its celebration. The article thus excludes from the pale of Christian belief or profession even that vaguer form of Receptionism taught by Bucer, which believed in a "Real Presence" of the Body *per usum*. The full Zwinglian denial had at length been officially proclaimed as the only teaching of the English Church.

It was Cranmer's Pisgah. The royal mandate of King Edward VI to the bishops to enforce subscription to these Articles is dated June 7, 1553. By July 19 the last supporters of the usurpation of Lady Jane Grey had surrendered to Queen Mary, who arrived upon the throne just in time to save for the Church of England the possibility of a wider theological future than Archbishop Cranmer had devised for it. (This was her most permanent achievement. History can be ironical—and Anglicans have not been grateful.) When the time came for his material to be considered by other men, it would all not be used precisely as he had left it. Did they remember that at the last[68] he himself had claimed that it was all of a piece, and that he had never varied in the doctrine he had taught and embodied in all his various books and formularies since his conferences with Ridley in 1546?

At all events, it is clear that in the Liturgy of 1552 and the Article of 1553 Cranmer himself gave a decisive answer to the question "Was Cranmer a Bucerian Receptionist?" In so far as the prayers of our present Eucharistic rite are of Cranmer's workmanship, Receptionists (like the defenders of any form of Real Objective Presence) can only interpret them in worship as expressing their own belief by deliberately ignoring the declared intention of their author not only to repudiate but to exclude the devotional meaning which they seek to place upon them.

[68] Cranmer, *Miscellaneous Writings*, ed. Cox. Parker Soc., 1846, p. 218.

ANSELM, ON SIN AND ATONEMENT

By W. F. EWBANK

ANSELM has a singular explanation of sin and atonement; for, starting from unduly narrow principles and proceeding by strict course of logic, it virtually demonstrates its own defectiveness. His treatment of the subject is to be found in the *Cur Deus Homo* and its sequel the *De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato,* which I shall refer to, for brevity, as the *De Conceptu.*

The basis of the argument is his definition of sin (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 11):

"Anselm. *Non est itaque aliud peccare, quam Deo non reddere debitum.*

"Boso. *Quod est debitum quod Deo debemus?*

"Anselm. *Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subjecta debet esse voluntati Dei.*"

And a few lines further on he says of this perfect obedience of the will: *Hic est solus et totus honor, quem debemus Deo, et quem a nobis exigit Deus.* Sin is defined solely as disobedience, and any corruption, disease or pollution of human nature is excluded as not belonging to the essence of sin. It follows from this definition that sin can only reside in the rational will; as he says, in the *De Conceptu,* c. 3, of original sin, *puto nullatenus illud posse asseri esse in infante, antequam habeat animam rationalem.*

There grows also out of this definition Anselm's conception of the kind of wrong men do to God in sinning. As God's creatures, endowed with a rational will, men owe to him the "honor" of perfect obedience. By sinning, that is by disobedience, they have withheld the "honor" which is due.

Hunc honorem debitum, qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo quod suum est, et Deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 11.) The wrong done to God in sin lies in this withholding of "honor" and in nothing else. It does not lie, for instance, in the pain, ignorance and ugliness which are the effects of sin; these forms of evil are excluded by definition from the essential nature of sin. One might say that Anselm regards the wrong done to God as an insult only, and in no sense as an injury.

In grasping Anselm's idea that the wrong done to God is an insult, it is necessary to guard against misunderstanding. Take an insult as between two men. John Doe insults Richard Roe. In that event what has happened is that a rational will (Doe) has withheld the respect due to a person (Roe), whether as fellow-man or fellow-citizen or magistrate or officer, as the case may be. (For it is obvious that one cannot insult anything which has not at least some personality, and that nothing can offer an insult except a rational will. I cannot insult a gatepost, nor can I be insulted by a tree or a pig.) The insult John Doe has offered to Richard Roe is an analogy for the insult that man offers to God, when as creature he withholds the infinite respect, expressed in the form of perfect obedience, which he owes to the Creator. But let us suppose the respect which John Doe withheld was never justly due to Richard Roe, but was only supposed by him to have been due to himself. Then the analogy does not apply; for in that case it is not Richard Roe's real worth (*dignitas*) but his self-esteem that has been insulted. But this happens so often among men that we are apt to think of an insult as necessarily directed against someone's self-esteem. When men, by withholding their obedience, insult God, it is not his self-esteem they are insulting—that is not to be thought of—but the real worth (*dignitas*) of his ineffable Godhead. *Nihil ergo servat Deus iustius quam suae dignitatis honorem.* (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 13.)

The same strict conception of sin as disobedience is carried through into the account of original sin. The first sin was an act of disobedience. Its immediate effect in Adam and Eve

was the corruption of their nature: *totum, quod erant, infirmatum et corruptum est* (*De Conceptu,* c. 2). This corruption was not limited to the first parents, but was passed down to their children, just as, if they had remained unfallen, *qui de illis nascerentur originaliter, sicut illi, iusti essent.* (*De Conceptu,* c. 2.) The effect of this corruption was to make the human body subject to decay and to the rule of carnal appetites, and to infect the human soul with carnal affections, so that the will was no longer able to obey God.

Anselm held that man in his fallen condition is no longer able to render God the "honor" of perfect obedience. At the same time he held that this inability by no means extenuated man's guilt; for man himself is to blame for it, *ipsa impotentia culpa est.* (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 24.) He explains this by an illustration. A master gave his servant a task to do, and warned him not to fall into a certain pit, which he pointed out to him, since he would not be able to get out of it again to do the task; and if the servant nevertheless deliberately and unnecessarily fell into the pit, the fact that he was now prevented from doing the task would not exempt him from blame for not doing it, since it would be his own fault that he was so prevented. (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 24.)

Two things appear from this account of original sin: first that the corruption of human nature, while it is not itself sin, for sin is only disobedience, is nevertheless both the consequence of the first sin and the occasion of the inevitability of subsequent sins. Secondly, that all men are to blame for the first sin. I do not intend here to examine the question of "original guilt". It is sufficient to point out that Anselm holds the doctrine, and applies it to meet the contention that in disobeying God men cannot help themselves, and are not therefore altogether to blame. He explains it by the notion that all men are men by virtue of partaking in human nature, and that human nature was resident in its entirety in the first parents. For he writes of human nature in embryos and infants, that it cannot resist corruption and yet is to be blamed for its inability, *quoniam ipsa sibi facit eam* [*sc. impotentiam*]

deserendo iustitiam in primis parentibus, in quibus tota erat. (*De Conceptu,* c. 2.)

So much, then, to describe Anselm's conception of sin and guilt, grounded in his definition of sin as solely disobedience. The best way to appraise his conception is to trace in outline his doctrine of atonement, as given in the *Cur Deus Homo,* as this makes the defectiveness of the original conception to stand out clearly.

The account of the atonement takes the following course. Men have withheld the obedience they owed to God, and therein have wronged him, and have sinned. The sin must be requited, or there is a violation of perfect justice. God cannot permit a violation of perfect justice, because justice is rooted in his eternal being, and he has immutably willed that it is good. (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 12, II, c. 5.) But men cannot make good the wrong they have done. In the first place, whatever lies within their power pleasing to God they already owe to him as their Creator, and therefore cannot reckon it in payment of their wrong. In the second place, to have disobeyed God, even in the least thing, *unus aspectus contra voluntatem Dei* (*Cur Deus Homo,* I, c. 21), is a wrong so heinous in a creature, that it were better whole worlds should have perished rather than that it should have happened; so that all creation does not contain what could be offered in compensation for that wrong. Men therefore owe a reparation which they must pay, but cannot.

God who is perfectly just is also most merciful. He provides that those who could not shall be able to pay. Since men owe everything already to God, God will pay the debt himself, who owes nothing to himself. Since all created things are not enough to pay the debt, he will give in payment the only thing that is greater than all creation, himself. Since the debt must be paid by men, he, in his second Person, will assume the form of a man, and as a man will offer himself to himself in payment of men's debt.

Up to this point Anselm's argument has been faultless and convincing. After this point it begins to betray both its defectiveness and the cause of its defectiveness, namely, the unduly narrow original definition of sin.

The fault stands out when it is considered in what way the effect of Christ's atonement devolves upon men. Anselm keeps on down the straight path of his logic. The recompense which Christ has made, namely, the giving of God himself, is of infinite worth; it far more than compensates for all the wrongs of disobedience in every sinful act of man which has been or can be. It is justice that God as Father should requite God as God-man for a gift of such infinite worth. But there is nothing which God can give to God which is not God's already. Therefore, that justice shall be maintained, the requital which the Father owes to the God-man is, at the God-man's request, bestowed on those of his fellow-men, *quicunque* (to use the analogy of the story in *Cur Deus Homo,* II, c. 16) *vel ante vel post illam diem confessi fuerint, se velle per illud opus* (i.e., the sacrifice of Christ), *quod ea die fiet, veniam impetrare, et ad pactum ibi constitutum* (i.e., the moral requirements of Christ) *accedere.* For those who profess Christ, the guilt of their sins is reckoned against the infinite worth of Christ's sacrifice, and cancelled; and this is the atonement.

But as an account of the atonement this is manifestly defective. It is true that man is freed *per fidem* (*Cur Deus Homo,* II, c. 18 a) from the guilt of his sins, and this is no little matter. But if this is all, then he is left as much as ever in the power of sin, and his will is as little able as ever to render the " honor " of perfect obedience to God. Would this atonement, if this were all, have been any comfort to Paul, when he cried, " Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?"? (Romans vii, 24). Yet there is no doubt that if sin is defined solely as disobedience, Anselm has described an atonement which does in fact amply atone for such sin. We are compelled to question whether sin has been rightly defined.

So we come to the place where the argument shows clearly that sin has not been rightly defined; where it demonstrates its own defectiveness. The place is at the account given of the sinlessness of the Virgin, the Mother of Jesus. (*Cur Deus Homo,* II, c. 16.) Boso raises the question, how the God-man can be born without taint of original sin: *qualiter de massa*

peccatrice, i.e., de humano genere, quod totum infectum erat peccato, hominem sine peccato, quasi azymum de fermentato, Deus assumsit. For his mother *cum originali peccato nata est, quoniam et ipsa in Adam peccavit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.* To this Anselm replies that the Virgin is one of those *qui ante nativitatem eius per eum mundati sunt a peccatis.* That is to say, the wrongs she had done God in acts of disobedience were counted against the great compensation later made by her Son, and so had been cancelled. But this answer, the only answer Anselm can give upon his premises, does not meet the question. For the cancellation of guilt does not abate the power of sin in the soul. But it is the power of sin, corrupting human nature, that makes the will unable to render its due obedience to God, and so compels it to sin. This point is explicitly stated in the *De Conceptu,* c. 23. Adam sinning in his own person, corrupted human nature; infants, inheriting a corrupt nature, cannot help sinning in their own persons: *facit natura personas infantium peccatrices.* Therefore, although the guilt of the Virgin for all her sins has been cancelled, she would none the less pass on a corrupt nature to her Child. But it is just this hereditary corruption of human nature that she needed to be rid of, if her Child was to be born without taint of it. Boso has fairly stated a fair question; Anselm has answered it in the only way that, with his definition of sin, he could answer it; and his answer out of his own mouth, so to speak, is shown to be defective.

There remains one point of Anselm's doctrine to clear up. The infinite merit of the God-man's sacrifice is, at his wish, bestowed on all men who signify their desire to benefit from it and who observe his requirements.

> " Boso. *Videtur enim mihi, quod nullum hominem rejiciat Deus ad se sub hoc nomine accedentem.*
>
> " Anselm. *Ita est, si accedit ut oportet. Quemadmodum autem sit ad tantae gratiae participationem accedendum, et quomodo sub illa vivendum, nos ubique sacra scriptura docet."* (*Cur Deus Homo,* II, c. 19.)

Anselm is well aware that in order to enjoy the benefit of

Christ's work of atonement men must live according to Christ's standard. But he conceives this as being an arbitrary condition, if one may say so, imposed by Christ. There is no objection in principle, according to his doctrine, to Christ's extending salvation indiscriminately to all men. The infinite worth of his sacrifice is ample to have enabled him to do so. But Christ has willed otherwise. Whether Anselm conceives that Christ admits to the benefit of his sacrifice all men who sincerely try to live up to his standard, even if they fail through the corruption of their human nature, or whether he believes with Pelagius that men really can attain to that standard in their own strength, or how he would treat the question of qualifying for salvation, we cannot tell, as nothing is said about it.

SOME RECENT FRANCISCAN STUDIES[1]

By EDWARD HUTTON

It is generally said that we must date the " rediscovery " of St. Francis from the publication of Karl Hase's book *Franz von Assisi* in 1856. It was in 1865 that Matthew Arnold published his essay on *Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment* in which he compared the *Canticle of the Sun* with an idyll of Theocritus and spoke too of St. Francis. Then in 1884 came Renan's exquisite essay on St. Francis[2] on the French translation of Hase's book. But it may be doubted whether St. Francis needed to be " rediscovered " or had ever been lost sight of or forgotten in Catholic Europe. Racine writing to Vitart in 1662 casually recalls in the heat of Versailles how the *cigale* sang to St. Francis, and he is not alone. However that may be, if St. Francis was rediscovered in the nineteenth century the honour surely belongs not to Hase so much as to Paul Sabatier, whose famous *Vie de Saint François* appeared at the end of 1893 and took the sceptical *fin de siècle* by storm.

Paul Sabatier had been destined by Renan to be the modern biographer of St. Francis. Born in 1858 the son of a Protestant pastor in the Cevennes, in 1880 he became a student

[1] *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis of Assisi.* By John R. H. Moorman, B.D., with Foreword by A. G. Little, D.Litt., etc. (Manchester University Press, 1940).

La Vie de St. François d'Assise par Omer Englebert. (Paris Plon, 1947).

St. Francis of Assisi: The Legends and Lauds. Edited, selected and annotated by Otto Karrer, translated by N. Wydenbruck. (London, Sheed and Ward, 1947).

[2] E. Renan: *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire Religieuse.* (Paris, 1884), pp. 323 *et seq.*

in the Protestant Faculty of Theology at Paris. It was here he came under the influence of Renan and it was Renan who entrusted him with the biography of St. Francis of Assisi. Sabatier himself tells the story, how in 1884, Renan, talking to some of his pupils, said "When I began to work I dreamt of devoting my life to the study of three periods. Blessed be the illusions of youth! Three periods! The origins of Christianity, the French Revolution and the marvellous renewal of religion realized by St. Francis of Assisi. I have only been able to carry out the first third of my programme. You, M. Leblond, must write the religious history of the Revolution and you", he said, putting his hand on Sabatier's shoulder, "will be the historian of the Seraphic Father".[3]

Renan's beautiful and sympathetic study of St. Francis had been reprinted in 1884.[4] This had won the author of the *Vie de Jésus* indulgence in certain quarters. A Capuchin who had read the article in the *Débats* (Renan himself tells the story), said to the Princess with whom he often spoke of Renan: "*Il a écrit sur Jèsus autrement qu'on ne doit, mais, il a bien parlé de Saint François, Saint François le sauvera.*"

Sabatier records that during the eight years from 1885 to 1893 he worked on the printed documents, visiting Assisi and sometimes living and writing there, till the famous work appeared at the end of 1893. The book made a great sensation, it was everywhere translated and universally discussed, as certainly no life of a saint had been since the invention of printing. After being blessed by Pope Leo XIII it was put on the Index; but no reason I believe is ever given for the appearance of a book on the Index.

Three other fully documented lives of St. Francis have appeared since Sabatier's: that of the Danish man of letters Johannes Jörgensen in 1908 (English translation 1912), that of

[3] See Sabatier's *Vie de St. François*, pp. xxiii *et seq.* and *cf.* Little: *Franciscan Papers, Lists and Documents.* (Manchester, 1943), p. 180.

[4] The essay on St. Francis by G. K. Chesterton (1923) is as beautiful as Renan's earlier and, of course, more sceptical essay.

Fr. Cuthbert the Capuchin in 1912 and that of Arnaldo Fortini in 1926. The chief importance of this last is the original unpublished documents it deals with. Signor Fortini was Syndic of Assisi, and well placed to obtain access to them. Fr. Cuthbert's " Life " is an admirable accumulation of facts, but not a work of art; while Jörgensen's *St. Francis of Assisi* is perhaps too much a work of art, but certainly a most vivid, accurate and sincere achievement, which many prefer to Sabatier. As the first documented life of the saint, though all Sabatier's documents were printed sources, the *Vie de St. François* will probably always hold its own, especially as it is supported by a remarkable psychology and the great literary gifts of the author, who devoted his whole life to Franciscan studies and to whom we probably owe more in this matter than to any other scholar.

Still, one cannot deny that Sabatier's book is now more than fifty years old, that a great deal of work has been done and many discoveries made since it and the other biographies mentioned above were written, and therefore there is probably a place and an opportunity for a new life of St. Francis which, if it should not rival Sabatier's masterpiece as a work of art, will have taken account of all that has been achieved in this matter by scholarship in the last fifty years: the sources and the new points of view as to the value of the sources, which have been published, notably by Fr. Lemmens, Fr. Delorme, Dr. A. G Little and by Signor Fortini and Mr. Moorman.[5]

This presumably is the reason for the Abbé Englebert's new *Vie de St. François*, which, though it is a volume in a new series, is a fully documented work written by an experienced writer. It is in fact an admirable achievement, generally aware of the most recent studies, though apparently ignorant

[5] For example: Fr. F. M. Delorme, *La " Legenda Antiqua S. Francisci "* in *Arch. hist. franc.* XV. 1822. A. G. Little: *Some Recently Discovered Documents* (London, British Academy, 1926) and *Description du MS. Canon Misc.* 525 in *Opuscules fasc.* V, 1903, and *Description of a Franciscan MS.* in *Collectanea Franciscana* 1 (Brit. Franc. Soc. St.), 1914. J. R. H. Moorman, B.D., *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis.* (Manchester, 1940).

of Mr. Moorman's important volume. The author, too, has not understood, it seems, the legal position of St. Francis when he refused to obey the summons of the Consuls. This is explained by Fortini,[6] whose book threw a new light on the matter. Since 1018 the Bishop of Assisi had possessed an imperial privilege of jurisdiction over those dependent on the Church, and Innocent III had enlarged this in 1198 to include any inhabitant of houses or territories belonging to the bishop. Francis, by giving money to the priest of San Damiano, had bought the right of a *dimorante* and a tenant of the bishop. This is not the only *lacuna* in the abbé's book. The bibliography is far too exclusively French if the book aspires to be as universally accepted as was Sabatier's. Many of the illustrations are wrongly attributed, e.g. those entitled as by Giotto are all well known works from the *Accademia* of Florence by Taddeo Gaddi. In spite of these blemishes the book is an admirable attempt to assemble in a readable and even popular form, yet fully annotated, all that is known of the life and work of one of whom it has been said that "after Jesus he was the only perfect Christian",[7] the *poverello* of Assisi.

P. Otto Karrer's book is the opposite of the Abbé Englebert's. Here the sources form the main body of the book and the commentary is confined to introductions and notes. The idea of making an anthology of original Franciscan sources is not altogether new. Fifty years ago Fr. Joseph Fratini, a Conventual friar, sometime Minister Provincial, published in Assisi a somewhat similar anthology from Thomas of Celano, the Legend of the Three Companions and St. Bonaventura. The new book adds selections from the *Fioretti*, the *Speculum Perfectionis* and the *Legenda Antiqua*, the *Laude*, the *Testament* of St. Francis. The selection is excellent but the letter of Fr. Elias and several of St. Francis's letters might well have

[6] Fortini: *Nova Vita*, pp. 163, 425, 432, 446. Sabatier appears to be mistaken when he maintains that the attitude of the saint proves that he was already a cleric.

[7] Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 334. *Cf.* also Pope Benedict XV as quoted by Englebert, *Vie de St. François* (Paris, 1947), p. 11, note 2.

been included. The Commentary and Notes are very well done, but here, too, we find that Mr. Moorman's book on the sources is not referred to and is apparently unknown.

Mr. Moorman in his book on *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis,* published in 1940, re-examined all the materials now available and sought to establish their origins and their relations to one another. He also dealt with the problem of the *Legend of the Three Companions* and its relation to Thomas of Celano's *First Life.* He maintains that "the *Legenda* represents the earlier tradition and Celano the copy." This is a new and original idea, which Sabatier may have glimpsed, but which Mr. Moorman works out in detail in a piece of historical criticism which, as the late Dr. Little has said, would have delighted Sabatier. It may well be that, as Little thought, Mr. Moorman has made a discovery of the first importance and has found the true solution of the difficulties presented by these *Legendae.*

In reading these Legends one is persuaded to agree with Renan; but whether or not St. Francis was the one and only perfect Christian, like his Master he has inspired the deepest devotion and he was certainly the only Christian to take Christ quite literally at his word. No one else has ever dared to do so. For Jesus said "Take no thought for the morrow . . . Sell all thou hast and give to the poor . . . Provide neither gold nor silver nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves . . ." and again "Take no thought what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink . . . Take no thought what ye shall speak . . . Except ye become as little children ye cannot enter the Kingdom of heaven . . . Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes . . . If any man will come after me let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me . . . If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple . . . Everyone who hath forsaken father or mother or brothers or sisters or wife or children or houses or lands for my sake shall

receive a hundredfold and shall inherit eternal life." This is what St. Francis meant by the life of the Gospel. This was the substance of the first Rule.

It was on St. Matthias' day, that is February 24, probably in 1209, that St. Francis, hearing in the gospel for that day the words of Christ to his disciples that they should carry on their journey neither gold nor silver nor wallet nor staff nor have sandals nor two coats,[8] " and understanding these words more clearly afterwards from the same priest, he was filled with joy unspeakable. ' This ', saith he, ' is that which I desire with all my might to fulfil.' Wherefore committing unto memory all that he had heard he strove joyfully to do the same, casting aside without delay whatever he had two of; from thence-forward he used neither staff, sandals, purse nor wallet, but making for himself a right sorry and rough tunic he threw aside his leather belt and took for girdle a rope and applying all the anxious endeavour of his heart unto the words of this new grace he began by divine intuition to be the herald of Gospel perfection . . . "[9]

There was established in the mind and heart of St. Francis the love of Poverty, the distrust of Learning, in fact the basis of his first Rule.

Whether or no he or we are justified in taking these divine utterances literally, *au pied de la lettre*, it is for the Church to decide. No doubt it can be shown that these precepts were subject to special circumstances and not of general application. St. Francis, however, thought he was justified in making them the rule of his life and of his company; and he believed he had divine assurance for this and constantly said so. Indeed in regard to Poverty he appears to have thought that the Church would imitate him and embrace Poverty, or so it is reported in

[8] The command is found in three gospels, Matt. x, 9 *et seq.* Mark vi, 8 *et seq.*, and Luke ix, 3 *et seq.*

[9] *Leg. Trium Soc.*, Ed. Faloci-Pulignani (Foligno, 1898), par. 25 (Eng. trs. Temple Classics, p. 47-8).

the *Mirror of Perfection*: "Holy Church will imitate our Poverty".[10]

Far from it, the Order itself even in the lifetime of St. Francis was divided fundamentally upon this very thing. The anger and the despair of St. Francis were of no effect. Sick in body and sick at heart the Saint might threaten: "They shall know the difference and my will when I return", but bodily weakness to which a certain clairvoyance no doubt added itself, prevented him. The Rule he desired to make for his Order was not sanctioned.

Let us for a moment try to follow him struggling for years to have his way about the Rule—for what was after all his own foundation, his own Order.

1210. Rome. *Regula Primitiva.* Verbally confirmed by Pope Innocent III.

1217. St. Francis meets Cardinal Ugolino in Florence. (Possibly met him in Perugia in 1216.)

1218. St. Francis goes to Rome where he sees Cardinal Ugolino. St. Dominic in Rome. (The Dominican Rule (St. Augustine) described in Papal Bull Dec. 1216.) Chapter Meeting: at which St. Francis refuses any Rule but his own. "Brothers, brothers, the Lord hath called me by the way of humility and He has shown me the way of simplicity, and I do not want you to speak to me of any other Rule neither that of St. Augustine nor of St. Benedict nor St. Bernard. The Lord told me that He wished me to be a new fool in the world and that He did not want to lead us by any other way than by that wisdom; for by your learning and your wisdom God will confound you."

[10] *Spec. Perfect.* 78: Renan, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-8, says: "The principal idea of St. Francis, this idea that to possess is an imperfection, that it is nobler to be poor than rich, that mendicity is a virtue, needs to be more deeply considered . . . I should certainly be accused of paradox if I began to maintain that the ideas of St. Francis of Assisi are the remedy for the evil of our time . . ."

1219. Chapter Meeting: St. Francis sets out for Damietta on June 24. Absent till July 1220; during absence changes in life of the community. (1) Cardinal Ugolino imposes regulations on Poor Clares based on the Benedictine Rule. (2) At the Chapter 1220 new regulations about Fasting imposed on the Friars contrary to intentions of St. Francis, so that Fr. Stefano rushed off to Acre to implore St. Francis to come home.

St. Francis hurries home arriving—

1220. Venice July-August 1220. Gets to Bologna where he finds Friars in substantially built house. Turns them out, including the sick. Chapter Meeting: summoned for Michaelmas, but on September 22 Pope Honorius issues Bull *Cum Secundum* in which a year's novitiate is enjoined for all postulants, thus bringing the Rule more in line with the usual monastic Rule. St. Francis abdicates.

St. Francis retires to the Portiuncula for the winter where he revises the Rule to be presented to the Chapter at Pentecost 1221, goes to Rome and consults Cardinal Ugolino. Result is the *Regula Prima.*

This *Regula Prima* is a compromise. There is much in it which is contrary to St. Francis's intentions. For example, "if a man cannot give his goods away without hindrance and yet has a spiritual desire to do so that shall suffice." "Let him have one tunic with a hood and another without a hood." "Let him have such books as are necessary for the Offices."

1221. Cardinal Ugolino absent from the Chapter, St. Francis presents the *Regula Prima.* This Rule was never officially approved by the Pope. What became of it no one knows. It was a compromise and satisfied no one.

From this Chapter on, everything that was done to the Order was done either against the will of St. Francis or without his knowledge. In fact St. Francis, more and more a sick man, gradually ceases to take any active part

in the affairs of the Order. Elias became head of the Order when Peter of Catania died.

We find St. Francis wandering about from small hermitage to hermitage, seeking refuge more and more in a contemplative life, while out of his knowledge Ugolino and Fr. Elias transform the Order into the community they desired.

1223. About 1223, St. Francis again sees Cardinal Ugolino to discuss a new Rule which was demanded at the Pentecost Chapter. St. Francis goes to Fonte Colombo to compose it. He produces this Rule and the next thing we hear of it is that Elias has "lost" it. St. Francis returns to Fonte Colombo to rewrite the Rule, but according to the *Legenda Vetus*[11] he went to Rome to consult Ugolino and Honorius who prevailed upon him to modify it even to omitting the Chapter in the *Regula Prima* about taking nothing for a journey. In this Rule of 1223 much of what St Francis most valued has disappeared. It was confirmed by the Pope on November 25, 1223, with a Bull and is the *Regula Bullata,* it might seem to reflect the minds of Ugolino and Honorius at least as much as the will of St. Francis: but a further Bull excommunicated any who left the Order.

St. Francis retired to Greccio. It is clear that he has no authority at all in the Order apart from the fact that he is what he is. He does not command. He can only exhort.

What he really wished and desired he writes in that most moving document his Testament, which beneath its calm surface is full of pleading and even despair. This at least and at last must persuade, nay bind the Brethren, he thinks.

1226. St. Francis dies, aged 44. Canonized by Ugolino (Gregory IX), 1228.

1230. On September 28, 1230, Ugolino, now Pope Gregory IX, published his Bull *Quo Elongati,* in which he declares

[11] Ed. Sabatier in *Opuscules de Crit. Hist.*, fasc. III (1902), cap. 2.

that the Testament of St. Francis is not binding on the Order because St. Francis had no right to lay any rule upon the Brethren without the consent of the Chapter General.

The Bull *Quo Elongati* may be said to have brought the Franciscan adventure, as launched and understood by St. Francis, to an abrupt end. The Order was to have a great career—in exactly those things which St. Francis most wished his Order to avoid, that is in Learning, in which its sons were to rival, and not least at Oxford, their Dominican brothers, and in wealth and magnificence of buildings, such as the triple Basilica of San Francesco and the Sacro Convento at Assisi, Santa Croce in Florence and, for the matter of that, the Grey-friar's Church in London crowded with royal tombs. But on these lines, alas, it soon decayed and within a few generations of St. Francis's death had become a byword. We have only to consult Boccaccio and Chaucer to be assured of that.

Whether, indeed, the ideas of St. Francis, the marriage with Lady Poverty and the desire and precept to know nothing but Christ crucified were possible or tolerable when practised by any but a tiny company of men, who shall say? At any rate Cardinal Ugolino thought not, and by means of Frate Elias guided the Order into a very different path. Both these men had known and loved St. Francis. It is a sad story. Our hearts are indignant, but our heads? Rome after all is a universal rather than an absolute. And who shall say the Pope was wrong? Nor if we consider *The Canticle of the Sun* can we believe St. Francis in his last years was an unhappy man—in fact, his story of "Perfect Joy" had almost happened to him.

But indeed the ideas and the spirit of St. Francis were so vital that they could never altogether disappear or be silenced. After years of persecution and trouble the Spirituals, under later leaders, were recognized and established as Observants, that is as an Order which wished to observe the Rule of St. Francis according to the spirit of the Saint and the letter of the Rule, and finally in our own time under date October 4,

1897, Pope Leo XIII established three Franciscan families with the Bull *Felicitate quadam*: the *Observants* who have the primitive title and style of *the* Friars Minor, the Conventuals and the much later founded Capuchins. But how unfortunate that a similar solution could not have been found by Gregory IX so that those who wished to follow the Rule and Testament with St. Francis "to the letter without gloss, without gloss, without gloss" might have been permitted to do so; while those who wished to mitigate the Rule could have established themselves, as they did, as Conventuals.

For the singularity of Francis of Assisi was to have undertaken with a boundless love the imitation of Christ; to conform himself and his company to the precepts of Galilee, to live the life of the Gospel.

CHRISTIANITY OR POLITICS?

By LENNOX RUSSELL

In a letter[1] published in *The Times* of November 25, 1947, we were told of the formation of a "Parliamentary Christian Socialist Group". By their announcement in the Press, the group appear to invite examination of their aims and objects. The ideological current of the moment is with them; and it is an ungrateful task to run counter to that current. But discussion is an aid in the search for truth; and to set out certain suggestions and conclusions which their letter prompts seems to call for no apology.

At the outset it may be noted that the combination of the words Christian and Socialist suggests a certain confusion of thought, which is not only liable to react on those who design or use the phrase, but also to mislead men and women who accept, without critical examination, ideas which carry the suggestion that they are based on Christian teaching.

Christ gave full recognition to the different spheres of the secular and the spiritual. "Render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's and to God the things which be God's".[2] He himself paid tribute to Caesar,[3] and this he did "lest we should offend the kings of the earth". There was no suggestion that the wielder of temporal power was "the Deputy elected by the Lord."

The essence of Christ's social teaching was: "A new

[1] Letter from Mr. T. C. Skeffington Lodge, M.P., and Mr. C. W. Dumpleton, M.P.

[2] St. Luke xx, 25.

[3] St. Matthew xvii, 25-27.

commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another ".[4] " Charity[4a] seeketh not her own ". The essence of Socialism, on the other hand, is that, at the bidding of a self-seeking majority, it uses the secular power of Caesar's Government forcibly to restrict or deprive one citizen for the benefit of another.

Of the five objects of the group, as stated in their chairman's letter, the first three and the last are entirely admirable. The fourth item seems questionable. " To help others to see ", it runs, " that, even if they are called on to make sacrifices for it—as so many in the middle and fixed income groups are doing—a more abundant life has been brought nearer for many who never knew it before, with the consequential provision of conditions for the development of those spiritual and moral forces so weakened in the past by war, poverty, ill health and unemployment ".

It may be Christian to bear with resignation sacrifices believed to be unjust and in some cases detrimental to the future of the community. But the exhortation to do so comes ill from Members of Parliament who, calling themselves Christian Socialists, have used the powers of Caesar's Government to inflict those sacrifices in pursuit of a policy which finds no sanction in the teaching of Christ.

If the chairman's letter fails to give prominence to the distinctively Socialist features of the group's policy, the omission is made good by a supplementary letter[5] from a member of the group, who writes: " I hope I am interpreting the views of my colleagues aright when I say that most of us who joined the Christian Socialist Group in the House of Commons, did so because we believe the best way to apply the principles that Christ came to teach, to the complicated world of to-day, is by means of what we call socialism. In my view socialism gives form and meaning to the Christian ethic and makes possible

[4] St. John xiii, 34.

[4a] It is sometimes overlooked that in the authorized version the word love and the much maligned word charity are variations in translation from the same word, ἀγάπη, in the Greek text.

[5] *The Times*, December 3, 1947 from Dr. Somerville Hastings.

what without it would appear to me as a wonderfully beautiful, but to a large extent impossible, dream".

The letter makes no express mention of force, coercion or compulsion. The word used is socialism. But where, up to date, is the Socialist who has limited his objectives to those which can be obtained by consent and without the help of compulsory powers or penal clauses in Acts or Orders?

The Socialist seeks to excuse his reliance on coercion by the reply that there is no law without the exercise of force. Income tax and conscription are cited as examples of what is generally regarded as the legitimate use of the powers of the State. The suggestion follows that, if force be admissible in these cases, there can be no objection to its extension to other spheres. To use force to suppress crime or to counter wrong or aggression, whether by individuals within the State or by other nations, has, throughout the ages, been recognized as a duty of the secular government, in fulfilment of which it is entitled to call for the pecuniary or personal aid of its citizens. Such action is widely different from the use by the State of aggressive force against unoffending individuals. "Violations of liberty", wrote Lecky,[6] "do not lose their character because they are the acts, not of kings or aristocracies, but of majorities of electors." We call it neither an act of love nor a social act when a burglar makes provision for his wife and family out of the proceeds of a successful haul. "Aggression", wrote Herbert Spencer,[7] "which is flagitious when committed by one, is not sanctified when done by a host".

How easy it is to be caught in the pitfalls of thought on this question, is shown in a Christmas message from the Archbishop of Canterbury, published in the *Radio Times* of December 19, 1947. "Over many years", he writes, "the duty of the State not merely to rule but to love has been increasingly recognized. The Education Act, the various Social Service Acts, the Criminal Justice Bill now before Parliament are all essentially acts of charity in its proper sense, acts of love".

[6] *Democracy and Liberty*, by W. E. H. Lecky.
[7] *Justice*, by Herbert Spencer.

The Criminal Justice Bill falls within the sphere of State duties interpreted in the most rigid sense. To seek to humanize criminal law and procedure and to mitigate, as far as possible, the use of force by the temporal power, may well be called an act of love. If in such a case it may be accounted an act of love to endeavour to diminish or civilize the use of force by Caesar's Government, the same cannot be said of deliberate plans to increase the use of that force in spheres where there is no question of crime or wrong done by the individuals against whom the force is brought to bear.

Of Education Acts it may be said that certain measures of compulsion are expedient to secure the education of those who in due course are to be entrusted with a vote on the affairs of the nation. But such measures can hardly be regarded as acts of love. Much less can that term be applied to forcible exaction from the citizen of the funds required to finance a lavish expenditure on the education of children not his own. As for the various Social Service Acts of which Dr. Fisher writes, their expediency in many cases is more than doubtful; while their claim to be regarded as acts of love seems, in a majority of cases, to be entirely inadmissible.

When, under a system of majority rule, with high differentiation in individual taxation but not in vote value, laws are made conferring benefits on the many, to be paid for under coercion and in large and disproportionate measure by the few, such decrees may or may not be politically expedient. But it cannot be pretended that enactments, which in their essence are primarily the product of the self-regarding instincts of the majority, are acts of love or represent the fulfilment of any Christian ideal.

Nor is the true nature of such enactments altered by the fact that, among those who support them, are some who do so on purely altruistic grounds, and are prepared themselves to make sacrifices in order to achieve what they believe to be beneficent reforms. In their zeal for immediate benefit to individuals or classes, philanthropic Socialists are apt to over-

look the fact that, in resorting to coercion of non-offenders, they are doing evil that good may come, and that the secondary effects[7a] of evil done are no less certain because they are less present to the minds of would-be reformers.

When one set of citizens is forcibly deprived of its possessions in order to confer benefits on another set, there may or may not be grounds for regarding the transaction as being in the interest of the State. It will be time to speak of it as an act of love, when the compulsory element is eliminated, and when the benefits are financed out of voluntary offerings to the Exchequer from citizens who are convinced, not only that the service should be rendered, but also that it can be rendered better by State action than by any privately organized plan. It is surely a travesty of the true meaning of love to suggest that it can be found in an Act of Parliament which is based on the organized force of the community operating on behalf of a majority to despoil a minority.[7b]

The State is no more than an aggregation of individuals. It is vain to attribute to the State virtues other than those possessed by the individuals of whom it is composed. If we are to believe that, in enacting social service legislation, the State is actuated by love, we must first make sure that this love is to be found in the hearts of the electors and of those whom they choose as rulers of the State.

Words no doubt have different meanings. But if social services enforced by Parliament are acts of love, let it at least be realized that they are not acts of love as understood in the teaching of Christ or of his apostles, St. Paul or St. Peter, St. James or St. John. Nowhere in their words is there any suggestion that one citizen should be forcibly deprived for the benefit of another. The Socialist sometimes claims that his policy is that of Christ's discourse recounted in the fifth, sixth

[7a] An excellent popular statement of such effects is to be found in *Economics in one Lesson*, by Henry Hazlitt.

[7b] That in time of peace certain ranges of income should be subject to a tax of nineteen and sixpence in the pound suggests a regrettably low standard not only of economic but also of moral sense.

and seventh chapters of St. Matthew. Those chapters will be searched in vain for any suggestion that Christ had in view the use of force to secure the adoption of the principles he taught. "Ye seek me", said Christ elsewhere in reproof of short-sighted materialism, "not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves and were filled".[8]

"Bear ye one another's burdens" wrote St. Paul.[9] But, as if foreseeing that the "busybodies" of whom he wrote[10] to the Thessalonians, might find in the injunction the basis of a claim to convert the human kindness of free men into a forced requirement to subsidize their neighbours, he hastens to add: "But let every man prove his own work . . . for every man shall bear his own burden". Enjoining self-dependence on others, he was no less insistent in his own case. "Neither", he writes,[11] "did we eat any man's bread for nought, but wrought with labour and travail night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you".

St. Peter definitely discountenances coercion. "Feed the flock of God which is among you", he wrote,[12] "taking the oversight thereof not by constraint but willingly . . . neither as lords over God's heritage but being ensamples to the flock".

"Who art thou that judgest another?" wrote St. James;[13] and again[14]: "The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God."

As for St. John, the mystic who taught that "God is Love", it is difficult to see how the love which he enjoined can be imagined as bound up with, or dependent on, a preceding act of spoliation.

Is there any real ground for the belief that the Christian Socialist, who advocates a policy of forced transfer of property,

[8] St. John vi, 26.
[9] Galatians vi, 2.
[10] II Thessalonians iii, 11.
[11] II Thessalonians iii, 8.
[12] I St. Peter v, 2.
[13] St. James iv, 12.
[14] St. James i, 20.

is wiser, more far-seeing or better qualified to develop the moral and spiritual sides of human nature, than were Christ or his apostles? When Christ and his immediate followers enjoined submission to the temporal power, they made no suggestion that the faith or the virtues they sought to propagate could be fostered or promoted by aggressive force either as a temporary expedient or as a permanent policy.

The chairman of the Parliamentary Christian Socialist Group holds that a material foundation is desirable for the development of spiritual and moral forces. The proposition is one which is frequently advanced, but which inverts Christ's teaching. "Seek ye first", he said,[15] "the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you". "Increase of material comforts, it may generally be laid down, does not in any way whatsoever conduce to moral growth", was the view[16] of the Indian teacher, Gandhi, whose recent death was the occasion for a world-wide recognition of the value of his spiritual appeal and of his doctrine of non-violence, a non-violence which the Christian Socialist would do well to make his own.

If to the Christian Socialists the method laid down by Christ and his first disciples seems inadequate and to offer only, in the words of the letter to *The Times*, "an impossible dream", have they, before turning to the unchristian way of force, considered what has been said on morals in politics by secular thinkers of the past?

The following seem worth noting[17]:

"More good", was the view of Aristotle as summarized by Jowett[18], "will be done by awakening in rich men a sense of the duties of property than by violation of its rights".

[15] St. Matthew vi, 33.

[16] See the *News Chronicle* of January 31, 1948.

[17] Others, no less weighty, were quoted in my article, "Coercion or Voluntarism", published in the April, 1944, issue of the *Church Quarterly Review*.

[18] *The Politics of Aristotle.* Jowett.

"People despotically governed", wrote Confucius[19] some 2,500 years ago, "and kept in order by punishments may avoid infraction of the law, but they will lose their moral sense. People virtuously governed and kept in order by the inner law of self-control will retain their moral sense and moreover become good".

"The one pervading evil of democracy", wrote Lord Acton,[20] "is the tyranny of the majority".

"We know", wrote Bryce,[21] "that power does not purify men in despotic governments, but we talk as if it did in free governments. . . . The taxation of the rich for the benefit of the poor offers the greatest temptation to a majority disposed to abuse its powers".

"Parliament itself", wrote Lecky,[22] "is unlimited, and Parliament, on financial questions, means simply the House of Commons. The constituencies are the only check, but a vast proportion of the expenditure of the State is intended for the express purpose of bribing them".

"When", wrote Herbert Spencer,[23] "a Legislature takes from the worthy the things they have laboured for, that it may give to the unworthy the things they have not earned,—when cause and consequence, joined in the order of nature, are thus divorced by law makers—then may properly come the suggestion: 'Cease your interference'."

"The electoral programme", wrote the Committee on National Expenditure in 1921,[24] "of each successive Party in power, particularly where it was formerly in opposition, has usually been prepared with more regard to attracting electoral support than to a careful balancing of national interests. When the times comes to put that programme into force, matters which had formerly appeared easy and attractive are found to

[19] *The Sayings of Confucius.* Lionel Giles.
[20] *The History of Freedom and other Essays.* Lord Acton.
[21] *The American Commonwealth.* Bryce.
[22] *Democracy and Liberty.* Lecky.
[23] *The Study of Sociology.* Herbert Spencer.
[24] Cmd. 3920.

involve grave questions, as whether the proposals are administratively possible, whether they will have the desired results, whether the country can bear the cost; whether in short they are really in the national interest".

"And the multitude of them that believed", wrote St. Luke,[25] "were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things in common". The communism depicted in these words was a voluntary expression of love in the early days of the Church. Are we to regard the coercive adoption of Communism by the State in Russia as an "act of love", despite the fact that it involved[26] the execution or massacre of over 1,750,000 priests, professors, peasants and persons in various other walks of life, not to speak of a heavy continuing[27] toll of oppression and misery?

The reply may be that Russia is not Britain; that in this country the use of force does not extend to the mass destruction of life, but only to the mass seizure of property with widespread restriction of liberty, and that the paternal State regards all its citizens with equal love. It was no doubt to substantiate this latter thesis that the late Minister of Fuel and Power evolved his doctrine of The Tinker's Curse; that the President of the Board of Trade[28] announced that his political opponents "have so much to lose, if we remain in office"; and that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, by way of assuaging class feeling, went out of his way to declare[29] to a meeting of Durham coal miners that "he had no sympathy with those who pay 19s. 6d. in the pound".

Is it sheer human kindness which has so affected the Treasury that, to use the words of *The Times*,[30] it "has not been able to resist the temptation, in fixing the basis of the

[25] Acts iv, 32.
[26] *Impressions of Soviet Russia.* Sarolea.
[27] *I Chose Freedom.* Victor Kravchenko.
[28] *The Times.* October 16, 1947.
[29] *The Times.* May 6, 1946.
[30] *The Times.* January 2, 1948.

terms of the new Transport Stock, to try to browbeat the market"? "The Treasury", *The Times* adds, "cannot even make out a mathematical case for the terms, of a moral case there is no question".

If such is the attitude of Ministers of State, what is the aim of the electors who put them in office? I have before me a printed communication from the National Federation of Old Age Pension Associations, addressed to a Member of Parliament, with 43 pages of signatory names and addresses. "We, the undersigned", it runs, "being electors within the Constituency of . . . believing that we have an inalienable right to command and expect unconditional obedience from our Parliamentary representative to our clearly expressed will, Hereby declare that we will not vote for any present M.P. or future candidate who does not—and will vote for one who does—unconditionally undertake to press and keep on pressing the Government, whatever the opposition, party or other, until our reasonable demands are secured. We demand:

"That the basic rate of pension be 30/- per week;

"That it shall be given to all on reaching the age of 60;

"That it shall be granted as a right; and therefore not subject to a means test of any kind;

"That it shall increase as the cost of living increases;

"That our representative obey our expressed will".

Whatever view may be held as to the expediency of State provision for old age, such a document cannot be regarded as an appeal to love, reason, justice or morality. The method is not new, and it is not confined to those who seek benefits to be enjoyed in old age. It may be remembered how Coriolanus summed it up[31]:

"We did request it;

"We are the greater poll, and in true fear

"They gave us our demands".

If it be held that the forced transfer of property is the

[31] Coriolanus. Act III. Sc. i.

expression of a Christian ideal, is it to be understood that the aim is the spiritual or moral good of the deprived or the material good of the beneficiaries? Or is there a dual objective? The days are surely past when it was believed that spiritual good could come from coercion. The quality of mercy is not strained. No one was ever made moral by Act of Parliament. Coercion was never the best means of stimulating the finer instincts or of rooting out the worse traits in human nature. Possession of wealth, moreover, is normally a sign of service rendered to the community. Forcible transfer to less competent hands cannot ordinarily be expected to promote the general good.

To the recipient of the benefit there may appear to be immediate advantage. But whether, in the long run, either moral or material advantage will accrue to the recipients of benefits taken by force from their fellow citizens, is by no means certain. *Self Help* was the title of a well known book[32] which, in the days of our expanding prosperity, ran into some fifty editions. To speak of it to-day is thought to be a jest. It was in the days of decline that the public provision of food and entertainment became a feature of Roman life. Our moral development has not yet reached a stage at which we can afford to dispense with nature's checks. One act of force leads to the need for another. The Socialist appears not to see that peace-time conscription of labour is a normal sequel to social services not earned but taken by force.

Internationally preeminent to-day among those who have made a special study of the human mind is C. G. Jung. "The increasing dependence on the State", he writes,[33] "is anything but a healthy symptom, for it means that the people are in a fair way to become a herd of sheep, always relying on the shepherd to drive them on to good pastures. The shepherd's staff soon becomes a rod of iron, and the shepherds turn into wolves. . . . The citizen's instinct of self-preservation should be preserved at all costs, for when man has once become severed

[32] *Self Help,* by Samuel Smiles.
[33] *Essays on Contemporary Events,* C. G. Jung.

from the nourishing roots of his instincts, he is simply the shuttlecock of every wind that blows".

Recent experience has shown that it is not always necessary to look to a distant date to find the ill results of lavish expenditure on social services. "The central group of social services", said the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his budget speech of 1946, "will cost the Exchequer some £500,000,000 in 1946-7, and this total is likely to rise to some £700,000,000 in 1948-49." It was not many months before this display of love was followed by White Papers[34 & 35] pointing out:

that "At present there is too much money chasing after too few goods";

that "Subsidies and family allowances alone amounted to £450 millions in 1946 which meant a substantial increase in purchasing power";

that "The effect of this heavy purchasing power has been very apparent in consumption of services. This is shown in the very high figure of passenger travel and in the level of expenditure on entertainment which, even adjusted for the increase of prices, is over 50 per cent. about pre-war. In a similar category is the consumption of tobacco now 30 to 35 per cent. above pre-war";

that "At least part of the shortage which now exists results from the unprecedentedly high level of purchasing power of the mass of the population".

The Chancellor's thoughtless extravagance was thus not only responsible for hardship to those from whom were exacted the funds necessary to finance it; but also, by diverting to the provision of superfluities effort which should have been devoted to the production of necessities, was a principal contributory to the reduced food supply and other hardships to which the nation has already been subjected, to the misuse of the dollar loan of 1946, to the threatened exhaustion of our

[34] *Statement on the Economic Considerations affecting relations between Employers and Workers.* Cmd. 7018.
[35] *Economic Survey for* 1947. Cmd. 7046.

gold reserve and to our being again forced into dependence on external help. Is this the policy which Mr. Skeffington Lodge commends as promoting "conditions for the development of spiritual and moral forces"?

Had half the money forcibly taken from the taxpayer and spent on social services during the last forty years been devoted to providing up-to-date equipment in our mines and factories and foreign balances in the shape of oversea investments, and had the thought and energy which accompanied the expenditure been devoted to the improvement of industrial efficiency,[36] the people as a whole might to-day be rightfully benefiting by an appreciably higher standard of living than that which they now enjoy at the expense of others; a definite step forward would have been made in proving the simple truth that honesty is the best policy; and our power of recovery from the strain of the war would have been very different. It is no easy transition from despoiling others to a recognition of the rights of property and of the need for each to "bear his own burden". It is strange indeed that professing Christians should think it right to delay this process by claiming to find in Christian teaching approval of the predatory habit.

There are those who pride themselves on the fact that this country has instituted a system of compulsory social services more complete than that of any other nation. In considering this claim, it is of interest to note that, of the country to which we have had to look for relief in the crisis of our finances, Bryce, in his great work on the American Commonwealth, wrote: "In works of active beneficence no country has surpassed, perhaps

[36] Compare (1) *The Secrets of Industry*, by Lewis Orde; (2) Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the Government Advisory Committee on Science and Production, as reported in the *News Chronicle* of February 6, 1948. (3) White Paper on the Cotton Trade, 1944, showing that lack of up to date machinery made British efficiency less than American by 18 to 49 per cent. in spinning and by 56 to 67 per cent. in weaving. (4) Report on Labour Redeployment in the Mosgrave Mill Cardroom, Bolton, 1948. The report tells of a reorganization resulting in a thirty per cent. rise in wages combined with a ten per cent. in profits.

none has equalled, the United States. Not only are the sums collected for all sorts of philanthropic purposes larger relatively to the wealth of America than in any European country, but the amount of personal interest shown in good works and personal effort devoted to them seems to a European visitor to exceed what he knows at home." Some at least may think that, despite the thousand millions now spent annually on social services and food subsidies, this simple record of voluntary effort in the U.S.A. suggests a more Christian attitude than is to be found in the forced measures which the Christian Socialist attributes to love.

Men of science tell us that mankind is still in his cradle and that his future extends for aeons ahead. The century just past has shown how rapid his material progress can be. That progress has been the result, not of Acts of Parliament, but of freedom and goodwill, of thrift and skill, of prudence and research, of enterprise and inventiveness. Let the State but refrain from thwarting the expression of these gifts bestowed by Providence for human use, and there is every reason to suppose that the years ahead will see material progress no less rapid than that of the past.

With so fair an immediate prospect and so ample a period for further advance, have Christian Socialists no higher mission than to urge the people to seize by force that which, after some few short years, were theirs without offence? Do they not realize that such depredations must delay, even if they do not preclude, the achievement of the bright promise of material progress, to the promotion of which, by way of force, they appear at times to devote their efforts, to the exclusion of all moral and spiritual values?

Christ's appeal was to the hearts of men. If it were possible to discredit his message, no more effective means could be devised than to associate it with State plans of coercion and spoliation organized in the interests of a majority of the electors, to whom, at the polls, the main appeal has been through their hopes of material benefits to be provided at the expense of others.

LINCOLN

By ARUNDELL ESDAILE

(Lincoln Cathedral, dedicated to the Blessed Virgin, first seen in time of "the Conversion of England.")

LINCOLN, a crown
Cliff-based, herself a cliff, looks down
Over the endless fen,
Seeing ride on it, like ships,
Hamlet and town,
Farmsteads and field-ricks of the fenland men.
Or what similitude shall she be given ?
Relic of elder time
And of the world's great prime,
A couchant lion in an Apocalypse,
A Titan stair built for the assault of Heaven?

On Lindum cliff no more the eagles meet,
No more the legionary trumpet calls;
The stones the Roman raised for tower and street
Are footings and foundations of her walls
Or dust beneath her feet.
Rome, that great city, is fallen; shall there be
A day when she,
She too, city of Christ and Mary, falls ?

Daughter of either city,
Rome's and the invisible Jerusalem's,
For Christ and Mary or Caesar deified
So long she queened it in her pride
From Humber bank to Thames,
Shall we not reverence her, shall we not pity ?

Reverence and pity her, queen our fathers knew,
Now half-unqueened. Though from her royal place
She calls her children, few
Leave at her call the world's unresting chase
To gather at her knees,
Leave the dream-chase which leads them onward, through
The dark wood, to pursue
Still, still their phantom quarry of vanities.

Adeste, oh faithful few ! Climb to her, up ways
You know so well.—But when has this sufficed ?
Nay, not enough is it, not this alone,
Not even this, that the most sacred words
Of their Lord Christ
Be uttered where the few and faithful kneel,
As here, lit by this many-sapphired blaze,
Here, under these wide angel-wings of stone.
Oh ! not enough ! The birds,
Of which there is not one to God unknown,
Of God forgotten or of God unpriced,
Hark to them, as they wheel
Around these towers, how they too in their own
Small kindly fashion raise
For joy of life their eucharist of praise.

Oh! not enough!
If more than many a sparrow our value be,
More by that more we owe,
More than that such as we
Should stand at gaze here at the steep steps' end,
Nor ever in spirit down them go—
Steps hard to climb, but oh!
How harder to descend,
Being as a great gulf, fixed
Already on earth, betwixt
Our Dives, on his wind-washed stones above,
Our Lazarus, at the gate of brick below.

What shall be said of us, if this be so?
What but that, though we sell not sheep nor dove
In the house of prayer, we blind see not nor know
Looking on us the Face of pity and wrath,
And, to compel us forth,
The small cords knotted in the hand of Love ?

Not in Lincoln alone, but everywhere
Where dwelling on the heights, the few disdain
The many in the plain,
And nurse their faith and loyalty from of old,
Or, prizing most the rare
Treasure, are fain
To make of long, laborious, manifold
Learning their gold,
Or, breathed by few and therefore breathed in vain,
Pure out of heaven although it be and cold,
Beauty their mountain air,—
Dust that we are, behold,
Look we in our own hearts, Lincoln is there.

REVIEWS

THE PARISH PRIEST AT WORK. By CHARLES R. FORDER. pp. xix and 404. (S.P.C.K. 1947.) 12s. 6d.

MR. Forder, who has been Vicar of St. Clement's, Bradford, since 1940, is certainly to be congratulated on a very thorough and comprehensive piece of work. It would be difficult to find any aspect of parochial life upon which he does not at least touch. He also seems to have a very wide, in fact as far as I can see, exhaustive, acquaintance with the very large number of books which have appeared during the last twenty years or so and aim at instructing the parochial clergy how to do their work. Some of them are by very distinguished hands. But the captious critic may feel inclined to think that if most of them were really worth writing the methods by which candidates for Holy Orders are selected and trained leave a great deal to be desired.

"Business Efficiency" and "Planning" both fill a very large place on Mr. Forder's horizon, and certainly the existence of this book shows that he knows how to manage his time. But the reader may feel (as I must confess I do) that they are a little overdone. Is it really desirable that the parish priest should carry about with him the atmosphere of successful commerce, as he must if he lives surrounded by filing cabinets and "folders" (whatever the latter may be), as Mr. Forder clearly thinks he ought? I do not pretend to understand his system of filing, but when I compare it with the less full and formal records which I used to keep when I was in parochial work I feel sure that it must take up more time and trouble than it can be worth.

The book contains a number of shrewd observations. For instance, when speaking of Church finance he calls attention to the risks attendant on the appointment of a business man to keep the Church accounts:

> It is a mistake to suppose that the business man is necessarily quicker at figures, or can grasp a financial situation more readily than the parson. The reverse is often the truth (p. 111).

Again, on pp. 115-6 he recognizes the value of bazaars and "socials" because of the way in which they bring people together and enable them to offer their time and skill for the service of God.

On pp. 226-34 he has some useful things to say on the subject of parish magazines. He thinks that they really count for more than is sometimes supposed, and that they might without much difficulty be made a good deal better than they usually are. Perhaps he does not always recognize the financial difficulty where small country parishes are concerned.

It is significant of the general outlook of most of the clergy that only some fourteen pages out of four hundred are devoted to country work—though he does recognize that it is important. When he writes, on p. 383, "The country church should be open daily; too often in the past the House of God has been locked from Monday to Saturday", no one will quarrel with him in theory. But many country clergy have found out (especially during the last five years) that unless someone (sexton or whoever it may be) is in the church or the churchyard during the whole time that the doors are open (which is usually impossible to secure), robbery and desecration are almost inevitable.

Like many people he finds it difficult to decide what is the best age for Confirmation. A good many years ago I was one of a number of clergy deputed by the bishop of the diocese to consider the question and to report to him. We were all agreed that while no fixed age can be laid down (the "years of discretion" of the Prayer-book probably mean not more than "over seven", seven being the age at which children were regarded as having become *capax doli*) as near as possible to the candidate's thirteenth birthday was as a rule the best time.

On the subject of the "parson's freehold" when referring to the "square peg in the round hole" and of the aged and

infirm incumbents, he, like many people, attributes these evils to "the system" which fails to move men along at the right time and to put the right man in the right place.

But when all is said and done no "system" which does not include murder among its activities can ensure that vacancies will arise "at the right time", and if the clergy are to be allowed to retain the least vestige of independence no one can be compelled to move from one parish to another against his will. Every patron who has several livings in his gift must have discovered again and again that men whom he would like to move prefer to stay where they are. The expense of the move is often a deterrent—and neither of the parishes which would be affected by it is as a rule prepared to contribute. Also—no patron can ever be an infallible judge of character. An individual is likely to be better than a board of any kind. But he is bound to make mistakes sometimes.

Sometimes Mr. Forder becomes almost grandmotherly. I find it very difficult to believe that there really are incumbents and assistant curates who need the instructions as to their mutual relations which appear on pp. 50-2. It is fair to say that Mr. Forder does not call them more than suggestions, and no doubt he knows more about the younger clergy than I do. Under this heading he omits one piece of advice which might well be tendered to all incumbents: "Never require your curate to preach on the Sunday after he returns from his holiday. It will spoil his last week entirely if he has to prepare a sermon during it". This is a matter of real importance, and may easily be ignored.

Many clergy, most perhaps, will find a good deal which is both interesting and useful in Mr. Forder's book. But it could be reduced in bulk very considerably without losing any of its value. At times the level is really childish and seems to be designed for readers who not only know nothing about their work, but are also unfamiliar with the manners and customs of civilized society.

Several books on the work of the ministry, written by men who have been ordained from about the year 1925 onwards,

have come my way of late, and it is quite impossible not to be impressed by the sincerity and zeal of the authors. But across them all lies, as it seems to me, the shadow of a self-consciousness of which the writers are presumably unaware. It may be due to the fact that they have grown up in a world which puts rights before duties. It may therefore be worth while to emphasize that the ministry is not primarily a work to be done (some people to-day actually refer to it as a "job") but a life to be lived. Much depends upon recognizing the difference between the two. And that life cannot be self-centred or self-conscious, because it must be lost before it can be found.

R. H. MALDEN.

THE RUSSIAN IDEA. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. 1947. (Geoffrey Bles. The Centenary Press.) 18s.

THE title is important. Russia, as her spokesmen constantly remind us, is a people of two hundred million souls, but only an infinitesimal fraction of these has ever been capable of conceiving a "Russian idea". It is, in fact, of this little band of thinkers, the Intelligentsia of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that Berdyaev here gives an account. Westernizers and Slavophils, *narodniks,* nihilists, anarchists, Christian philosophers, Marxists, they pass before us in procession like visitants from another world. And that is the point. The Russian world is not and never has been ours. Berdyaev underlines the essential points of difference; the elemental semi-mystical sense of community, brotherhood, *sobornost;* the distaste for Western "bourgeois" culture and democracy, for private property and capital punishment; the hatred of the State and the Church as wielding authority over the People (a symptom of the general dislike for law in any form and of the inextinguishable longing for a social life grounded in love); and, not least but rather all-pervading, the sense of a "messianic" vocation for Russia whether the goal be the Kingdom of God or the classless utopia.

Berdyaev's account of Russian thought on these subjects is written with his usual brilliance and powerful critical acumen. A reader who is not well-versed in Russian history and literature may find it a little bewildering to begin with, and this feeling may even persist through a first reading. Nevertheless, the picture which emerges in the end is one of such interest and importance that he will be driven back again and again to study its details. He will come to see then why this extraordinary people seems to have accepted so easily its own peculiar branch of Marxism; and the "messianic" vocation of the Cominform will cease to be wholly a mystery.

"Wholly"; for while some things are clear enough, Russia remains in the end a dark enigma; and it may be permissible to doubt whether Berdyaev himself appreciates the depth and nature of that darkness. As a Russian, he naturally commends the community-sense of his people as against the violent disruptive individualism of the West; yet one has the uneasy feeling that he has not recognized this for what it plainly is, the survival in Europe of primitive herd-collectivism. The proof of its being this can be found on page after page of this book. The sense of guilt, for example, felt by the *narodniks* in the presence of the "People" has well-known anthropological parallels: it is a sign of the emergence of true individuals from the collective, whose mystical elemental power still over-arches their consciousness of newly-found freedom. (The "confessions" so often heard of in the course of Soviet purges may be deemed to have this origin, when they have not been extracted by torture.)

Consider again the mentality of the Slavophils as described by Berdyaev (p. 146) in relation to the Tsardom: "The authority of the State is evil and vile. Authority belongs to the people, but the people refuse to have it and transfer the power in its plenitude to the Tsar. It is better that one man should be besmirched with power than that the whole people should". This echo of the words of Caiaphas (John xi, 50) is of extreme significance: for Caiaphas was precisely one of those Jews who denied the resurrection of the individual because he believed only in the immortality of the people; who preserved, in other words, the

primitive collective consciousness so familiar to readers of the Old Testament. The Slavophil mind is, in fact, the prehistoric mind; the mind that still yearns for the mystical " co-consciousness " which has departed for ever and in default of it constructs a theory which will save the " people " from the burden of moral responsibility. It is odd that Berdyaev, who (rightly) makes so much of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor should have failed to notice this.

So again with Bakunin (pp. 148-9) whose " anarchism is an extreme form of *Narodnichestvo* ". " Like the Slavophils he believes in truth hidden away in the elemental mass of the people ". But he goes much farther. " Above all he believes *in elemental nature, and not in conscious thought* " (italics mine). Hence " Personality is left in subjection to the collective body and it is drowned in the elemental mass of the people ".

It is not surprising after this to find the idea of corporate consciousness creating what Berdyaev calls " a corporate Church gnosiology ". The supreme exponent of this is Khomyakov (pp. 161 ff.) with his idea of *sobornost,* " the organic union of freedom and love, community ". Here, too, we find the same revulsion from any kind of authority, whether ecclesiastical or individual. Even the authority of the episcopate is denied. All must be done by the Holy Spirit operating in the whole body of the faithful.

It is in the same context that we must place that " religion of the soil " which according to Berdyaev is typical of the Russian people. " The land is the final intercessor. The fundamental category is motherhood. The Mother of God takes precedence of the Trinity and is almost identified with the Trinity. The people have felt the nearness of the interceding Mother of God more vividly than that of Christ " (pp. 6-7). All this is, of course, simply primeval; and it helps us to understand the fascination which Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, " the eternal feminine principle ", has exercised over Soloveev and other Russian thinkers. The old Earth Mother refuses to be dethroned.

So Russia looms before us, that teeming land which has never known the Roman or the Greek (except in a decadent

Byzantinism); which has "escaped" the Renaissance and the Reformation; and which has remained as a consequence in a state of arrested development. Were there no more than this, the fact would still constitute a spirited challenge to those countries of the West which have sustained for centuries the burden and the privilege of individual freedom. But the situation as we face it to-day is one not of promise but of menace. We who with many failures and back-slidings have scaled those perilous heights and have it in our power to lend a helping hand to the more backward peoples of the world, now find ourselves confronted with the herd-complex in its most dangerous form and on the most colossal scale, a blind giant whose "mission" is to save mankind by devouring it. This is not Berdyaev's conclusion but it emerges with appalling clarity from his book. He is indeed himself a living proof of it; for he is one of those true individuals who has rescued his spiritual freedom from the Muscovite horde. He can only write in exile.

Postscript. Since the above was written, we have had to mourn the death of this great Christian philosopher. I have thought it best to leave the review as it stands.

W. J. PHYTHIAN-ADAMS.

THE POEM OF JOB. By WILLIAM BARRON STEVENSON, D.Litt., D.D., LL.D. The Schweich Lectures, 1943. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.) pp. 123. 7s. 6d.

PROFESSOR Stevenson's expert, thorough and original study covers practically all the problems raised by this difficult book. In Chapter I he examines the relation of the poem to the whole book of Job, and insists that this poem should be studied by itself in the first place to avoid preconceived ideas due to unconscious harmonization with the prose prologue and epilogue. Chapter II deals with Job's enemies and misfortunes. His physical sufferings are considered to be due, not to leprosy, but to the hardships of life in the desert and to the ill-treatment he had suffered from his enemies, a class of men who are called in

Hebrew *Reshā'im,* which the author translates as "Miscreants". Chapter III examines the speeches of the three friends, and concludes that they regard Job as a good man suffering from misfortune, and do not attack his character. The third speech of Eliphaz, which does not seem to bear out this view, is addressed not specifically to Job, but to "Everyman". In Chapter IV the development of the poem is traced through Job's speeches and the divine speech to its culmination in Job's last words. Here the Job depicted is not the patient sufferer of the prologue but a "rebel against God". Chapter V deals with the literary qualities of the poem. In Chapter VI the author gives a valuable summary of the traditions that influenced the work of the poet, presenting the comparative material in an easily digestible way. A valuable feature of the book is the prose translation of the poem (excluding secondary matter such as the eulogy of Wisdom in chapter 28 and the speeches of Elihu) embodying such emendations of the Hebrew text—not unduly numerous—as are considered necessary by the author. As his book is addressed to the general reader no less than to the Hebraist, details of a more technical nature are confined to a number of excellent appendices, of which one (II) consists of a discussion of key passages and another (VI) of notes on the new translation.

Attention may be drawn to a few debatable points. On page 62 the author says: "Job by repeating a line from Eliphaz (9.10=5.9) indicates his agreement with him on the point of God's greatness." It would seem possible, in view of what follows, that this is rather to be taken as another example of the frequent use in the poem of irony, commented on by the author on page 64.

Perhaps the most famous passage in the whole book of Job is that which, according to the usual exegesis, celebrates God as Job's ultimate Redeemer (19. 25-6). Here Professor Stevenson has a startlingly novel suggestion. As emended by him these sentences, generally admitted to be textually extremely corrupt, run as follows:

I am sure that my Gōēl lives and will yet stand forth
on the sod,
By Shaddai's leave I shall see it and the want in my
breast shall be stilled.

According to the professor there is nothing in this passage to support the view that the Gōēl is God himself. "The paradox that God was to be Job's vindicator against God is not to be accepted without plain proof, which is wholly wanting." (Page 94). The Gōēl therefore is someone other than the Almighty, who will deliver him from God's injustice. The mention of Job's vision of God in verse 26b is dismissed as inconsistent, and the author accordingly emends the designation of the deity ("Eloah") in this verse to "it" (lit. "these things"), omitting only one letter in the process. The obscure idiom of verse 25b, if such it be, is somewhat dubiously explained as equivalent to the English "take the field". MT. "from (or, without) my flesh" is changed on the basis of the LXX reading to "with Shaddai" (i.e., with Shaddai's help or leave). But to extract this meaning from it the rendering of the Greek version itself requires emendation. Moreover, the passage as emended is unconvincing—Job's expectation to be vindicated against his powerful foe *by the latter's permission* simply leaves us with another paradox. One is reminded of a recent *Punch* cartoon in which opponents of the present Socialist régime are displaying a huge poster with an anti-Labour slogan which they hope to set up shortly *with the Government's permission* !

The professor's explanation of the surprising 22nd chapter is perhaps one of the most illuminating parts of his study. It may be said to contain the crux of the whole problem of "Job". How was it possible for Eliphaz to deliver his scathing attack on his friend in terms of deliberate prevarication ? In the words of the author "the falsity and extravagance of the charges brought, and Job's silence regarding them in his next speech, are grounds of serious doubt." On the customary interpretation of the meaning and purpose of the book Eliphaz is an extreme orthodox doctrinaire rooted in the dogma of strict divine retribution as taught, e.g., in certain portions of the book of Proverbs.

We are asked to believe that in his reasoning he has become guilty of the logical fallacy known as the "undistributed middle": all sinners suffer; Job suffers, therefore he is a sinner. But in reality, as Professor Stevenson points out, Eliphaz is well aware of the fact "that misery is part of God's ordering of human life"; it is sometimes "God's way of 'correcting', or training, human lives". Moreover, in chapters 4-5, Eliphaz explicitly admitted Job's goodness and piety. The author accordingly comes to the conclusion that in this chapter it is not specifically Job but rather more generally "Everyman" that is addressed, the whole speech summarizing the three friends' philosophy of life. Whether or not this interpretation is found convincing, it does at least represent a consistent and reasonable attempt to overcome real critical problems. It may be pointed out in passing that vv. 6 ff. sound surprisingly like a reversal of the frequent asseverations of moral conduct made by Egyptian nobles in their funerary inscriptions (cp., e.g., Breasted, *Dawn of Conscience*, p. 125). This fact may be of some significance, for in his discussion of chapter 31 the professor proves the poet's dependence on the so-called Negative Confession of the Egyptian Book of the Dead and his acquaintance with the proto-type of the Last Judgement. This obviously implies knowledge of the theory of moral retribution in the netherworld, and Professor Stevenson seriously considers the possibility that the poet may have embraced this doctrine as his own solution of the problem of innocent suffering. The suggestion is an attractive one, but it must be admitted that there is no cogent indication of such an attitude on the part of the poet, who, at least nominally, held to the Hebrew conception of Sheol. It can therefore only be regarded as a stimulating and provocative conjecture.

While it is not always easy to agree with the conclusions reached by the author, especially where based on (necessarily) uncertain textual emendations, the book nevertheless constitutes an important contribution towards the critical study of the poem of Job, presented in an extremely attractive and readable form, and which can be very warmly recommended.

MANFRED CASSIRER.

THE MAKING OF SERMONS. By S. P. T. PRIDEAUX, D.D., Canon of Salisbury. pp. 99. (Mowbray.) 3s. 6d.

THIS little book is an expansion of lectures which Dr. Prideaux has been delivering to the students at the Theological College at Salisbury during the last twenty years. It is full of sound and shrewd advice, and might be read with advantage by many people whose theological college days are a long way behind them. One much-needed counsel which Dr. Prideaux gives is that the preacher should keep to fundamentals. That is to say, he should set himself to preach the Gospel—and nothing else. He should not go off after side-issues (all no doubt quite praiseworthy in their way) which are, at best, particular applications of the Gospel and no more. Yet the temptation to do so is often strong and great pressure is sometimes brought to bear by well meaning lay-people. They would like to hear a lecture about something in which they happen to be interested at the moment: the United Nations, cancer or whatever it may be.

We have all heard complaints about the introduction of " doctrine " into sermons, on the ground that " conduct is what matters ". Dr. Prideaux deals very thoroughly with this attitude of mind on pp. 12-13. He points out that the two words *Our Father* are full of doctrine; or, if we prefer so to say, are dogmatic in the highest degree. Most people to day, even many regular church-goers, have very little idea of what the Christian religion even professes to be about. Its great fundamental truths, its conception of the nature of God, the nature of man and its relation between God and man, need repeating again and again. But the technical phraseology of the Church is beyond most people now. Christian truth must be translated into language which people can understand. This is no easy task. No one who does not visit diligently is likely to discharge it with success.

A new factor in the world to-day is broadcasting. Of this Dr. Prideaux writes:

> There is a large fringe of people who listen in to services on the wireless. The help of the B.B.C. is always

> sympathetic and considerate in its amount, and a good deal of coherent and consistent teaching is provided at times, for all of which we ought to be grateful; but the probable and unfortunate effect of the wireless services is that those who listen in to them receive a mild introduction of a somewhat vague Christianity which ministers to their emotions in such a way as not to take them very far, and to prevent them from going farther. (p. 38.)

I think that this is a very just judgement. To many people the emotional faculties count for more than the intellectual, and what are commonly called "the pictures" tend to increase this disparity among the millions who frequent them. This does not make the task of the preacher any easier. Alone perhaps among Christian communions the Church of England has always refused to put the Ministry of the Word above or below the Ministry of the Sacraments. It always brackets the two together. If either is emphasized unduly at the expense of the other the outcome is always mischievous. There are grounds for wondering whether this fact is fully realized in many of the theological colleges to-day. It is certainly difficult to believe that the average level of English preaching has ever stood lower. It is much to be hoped that this book will do something to raise it.

In what he has written about *The Making of Sermons* and by the sample sermon to which chapters VII and VIII are devoted Dr. Prideaux allows us to see something of his own method. That is really as much as anyone can do because it is unlikely that any two people could adopt exactly the same method. I doubt whether in this connexion it would be possible to improve much on the advice given to me by Bishop Knox of Manchester just before I was ordained priest: "Never try to preach like anyone else. Experiment until you find out what method of preparation produces the best results in your case. Whatever method you finally adopt be careful to take enough trouble over every sermon". Important as preaching is it must always be of the nature of a by-product. A preacher may be a parish priest, a schoolmaster, a man of letters or a number of other things. That must be his principal occupation, and his

sermons must come out of it. If he tries to make preaching his sole, or even main, work he will soon find that no one is very anxious to hear him.

R. H. MALDEN.

B. K. CUNNINGHAM — A MEMOIR. By JOHN R. H. MOORMAN. (S.C.M. Press Ltd.) 12s. 6d.

THIS is a faithful portrait of a man who came very near to being the ideal Principal of a theological college. Happy at home, undistinguished and already suffering from ear trouble at Marlborough, he became a care-free undergraduate at Trinity (Cambridge), where he developed a good prose style and took an honours degree in Theology. A powerful sermon in the college chapel persuaded him to join the staff of St. Stephen's College, Delhi, as Professor of English. After three years, ill-health and increasing deafness drove him back to England in 1896. He was ordained by Edward Talbot, Bishop of Rochester, and served under Norman Campbell as assistant curate of St. Anne's, Wandsworth, for two years. The parish was partly "residential" and partly "slum". Then at the bishop's bidding he went to start a little theological hostel at Farnham. Over a hundred men passed to ordination through "the Farnham Brotherhood" before the hostel came to an end during the first World War. Towards the end of the War a Chaplains' School was opened in France, and B. K. was appointed the head of it in March 1917. His sympathy and understanding and never-failing humour gained him the warm friendship of the chaplains who passed through the school to the number of nearly nine hundred.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the council of Westcott House invited him to reopen the House in the spring of 1919; which he did, with a vice-principal and eight men. Here he remained for twenty-five years, till Easter 1944, when he retired to Scotland, where, on September 10, in a nursing home he very peacefully died.

B. K. had two watchwords constantly in his mind from his first day at Farnham to his last at Westcott House: "Unity in diversity" and "Keep the common life strong". In no theological college in England did men of such wide differences in ecclesiastical outlook live in such unconstrained fellowship with one another. And as for the happy common life, the centre and secret of it was B. K. himself. He was such a true, and such an accessible, friend to the younger men under his care. It was marvellous how he triumphed over the great handicap of deafness. He was so shrewd and kindly, and *human*.

The word "gentleman" is ambiguous nowadays and somewhat out of fashion: but we must be careful not to lose the ideal for which it was meant to stand. B. K. loved that ideal and embodied it. His native countryside in Scotland was very dear to him. He delighted in shooting and fishing, though his opportunities for them were very restricted. He made the plain living of the theological college gentle living; and, like so many people born north of the Tweed, he was a thorough Englishman.

B. K. had such a boyish cheerfulness that it was easy to forget how disciplined his own personal life was. He was always on his guard against "weakening thoughts". Temperamentally he disliked too many religious services, but silent prayer was with him a constant habit of thought. "Clergy and ordinands, as it seems to me", he wrote in 1919, "need to realize that the one devotional exercise which is fundamental is the Practice of the Presence of God, and in comparison to that nothing else matters much".

In the university it was sometimes thought that B. K. did not set a high enough value on academic studies. Perhaps not, but he certainly wanted to preserve all that was natural and human in each man and allow him to develop in his own way according to the Will of God. One of his favourite sayings was: "There is a name which God has in His mind for you to become: yes, and which He will help you to become, . . . the name which you do not as yet know yourself. But Christ knows it". Then he would add: "God has His name for each of you. Be-

lieve in your best self; know that Christ will help you to become it, if you will keep yourselves as His disciples in His presence". (p. 97.)

These words are the answer to any who may have thought that the discipline of Westcott House could well have been tightened up. B. K. had a dread of clericalism, and he sensed a perpetual danger in the Church of the annihilation of the natural in the supposed interests of the supernatural.

This brief review may fitly end with a couple of examples of the wise counsel which B. K. could be relied upon to give to those who consulted him—and they were very many. (Would that the Memoir contained more of his letters!) The first is advice to ordinands as to the choice of a first parish: "It is a *duty* to practise a 'higher selfishness' in choice of first parish. Please God, you have some forty years' ministry in front of you, and for the sake of thirty-seven of them you must go not necessarily where you are most needed, but where you will get best training". The other example is taken from one of his wartime letters (September 10, 1939): "War is sinful. It is right to fight this war. Both true: difficult for the preacher: but to fight Christianly we must fight in penitence. . . ."

This last quotation should be read in the context of his further notes on this subject. For these (pp. 169-171) and for many other points of the greatest interest, reference must be made to Dr. Moorman's admirable Memoir—a true and worthy *pignus amoris.*

J. W. Truron:

The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204. By George Every, S.S.M. (S.P.C.K., 12s. 6d.).

The converging of "Western" interest to-day upon Byzantium from so many different quarters and independent angles (theological, artistic, sociological, historical) may suggest that there is indeed to be found, in this cultural world from which for nine centuries we have been virtually cut off, an element needful for completing and co-ordinating our own shattered Christian

culture. We badly need help to see the intersignificance of these different interests in the light of this other Christian world. Meanwhile, a book like the present is to be welcomed as a manageable and stimulating aid where handbooks are all too few.

Too much must not be expected of it. The author makes no claim to original research save for the last chapters. Nor does he claim any first-hand experience of Byzantine Church life beyond the occasional glimpses open to him in this country. Nor does he attempt to cover too wide a field—his title enables him to focus attention on a particular aspect of this world, while keeping us aware of the rest. What he can claim is (within certain limits) a very real and valuable appreciation of the character of Byzantine Christianity, and a proper awareness of the importance of those other cultural aspects with which his book cannot deal fully.

We suggest that, to grasp the principal theme of the book, it is best first to read the preface and the first and last chapters whole (they are in the main excellent), and the last paragraphs of the intervening chapters. It then appears as an essay on the question of the plurality of Christian cultures. This is summed up at the end of the first chapter—" In one corner of the earth at least a Christian culture was born within an empire, and this may be so again. No one would claim that Byzantine civilization is the only Christian one. For us in the West it is not on the line of our own ancestry. We can learn from it only as we learn from more exotic cultures, Indian, Malayan and Chinese. Englishmen will never decorate their churches with mosaics, or talk metaphysical theology on the way home from the baths. They can learn from the plurality of cultures that it is not necessary to be Latin in order to be Christian, and that it is necessary for every Christian civilization to grow a culture of its own."

We propose to reserve this vast and vital subject for a separate essay, only remarking here that we feel that the interplay of Christian cultures needs to be stressed at least as much as their plurality. No Christian culture can afford to live alone. And an imperial culture (this is, we believe, the book's big failure) is not just the same as a national culture. New Rome had, at first, we believe, a unique vocation to gather to herself, as far as possible, all Christian cultures of the time, and still not to become exclusive. Did she fail because she failed to prevent entirely the

nationalist schisms, or because in the end her Empire came to nought? She has not failed, because her aspiration and her inspiration remain: and our isolation from them has been our calamity. We shall never understand Byzantine Christianity so long as we treat the City as just "one corner of the earth", or are dominated by the need to find an excuse for not being Latin.

Our author appreciates well the diversity of cultures which can be, and is, included within the present-day Eastern Orthodox Churches. Does he realize that these local and national Churches have been in many ways far more narrowly Byzantine since the days of the City's diminution than they ever were in the days of her imperial glory? The statement at the end of the chapter on Justinian ("If the nations were to remain in one church, the church must be distinct from the culture as she had not been since before the conversion of Constantine") does not appear to us to do justice to the international character of the Orthodox Church of those centuries.

Perhaps what is most needed in order to bring this out properly is a thorough study of the Church of Jerusalem during these and the following centuries—especially the time, under the Henotikon, when an essentially international Orthodoxy in Jerusalem is seen ready to stand up for Chalcedon against a Monophysite Emperor Anastasius.[1] But indeed, we believe that, throughout, it is only possible to understand rightly the character of the Orthodox Church if we see her moving about these two foci—first when both are within the Empire, then when Jerusalem, in the eighth century, is able to stand as a bulwark of Orthodoxy independent of the Empire in the times of the Iconoclasts. For the latter period, and for the Crusades, our author is not unaware of the importance of Jerusalem, although I doubt if he fully realizes what a spate of literary activity was centred in the monastery of St. Sabbas at the time of St. John of Damascus—both original

[1] In the light of such a study, the evidence collected by Dr. Wigram and other apologists of the nationalist churches may need to be reassessed. Here we should mention a defect in our author's bibliography. He quotes Cyril of Scythopolis' *Vita Sabbae* in Cotelier's edition (1686). The complete works of this author—and his other biographies are just as important—were published by Schwartz in Leipzig in 1939 (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, 48, 2), and this edition is in the British Museum and the Bodleian.

work, and translation from many sources (not all Chalcedonian)—or of what primary formative importance the Judaean monasteries were in the whole liturgical and monastic development of the Byzantine Church. No picture of Byzantine culture can be really complete which does not draw out the contrast between the contributions of the two cities in these matters, especially on the point of hymnography — Constantinople with the magnificent poetry (of originally Syrian inspiration) of the kontakia, culminating in the Great Akathist: these gradually almost ousted (though again Constantinople itself is responsible for the final fusion) by the more ascetic and scriptural, but less poetic, " canons ", which derive from the monastic office of the Judaean Wilderness.

Reference to the Crusades brings us to the last chapters of the book, which contain a valuable and interesting study—though probably more complete consultation of Russian and Modern Greek works on the period is necessary before we can be sure of having marshalled all the available evidence.[2] The general picture given of the gradual development and realization of the Schism corresponds with what we should expect. But we would suggest that the date when the East finally accepted the fact of the Schism is only important if we take the Papist point of view that the Eastern Church was fundamentally altered thereby. If we believe that it was the West and not the East that was so affected by the Schism, 1054 can fairly continue to stand for one of the culminating points of the internal revolution wherein the Western Church, under the leadership of Humbert and Hildebrand, burnt her boats.

We may wonder whether it was wise to attempt to deal with the cultural issue by means of a short historical outline wherein the character of the cultures involved can only be skated over very rapidly, and described in broad terms which may be necessary for clarity, but are dangerous for historical accuracy. And while recognizing that such a curtailment of subject is implied in the title, we feel that the cultural issue cannot be adequately treated without both the first and last centuries of the Christian

[2] For instance, Chrysostomos Papadopoulos' *History of the Jerusalem Church* does not appear to have been consulted, although it is in the British Museum Library. This is a most important work for the subject, although it is not always easy, owing to defective references, to trace the sources for its assertions.

City, or without an account of the character and influence of the two great Churches of the Holy Wisdom and of the Apostles.

The book should be pruned before a second edition. But the criticisms we propose to make must not be given disproportionate importance, as the book is worth improving. Apart from some failures of proof-reading, some carelessnesses and obscurities of style, there is a regrettable tendency to quote from secondary sources (probably with a view to the accessibility of books for English readers), which sometimes gives rise to historical inaccuracies. The dangers of cumulative error here, on the lines of the game of "Russian Scandal", are too great.[3]

A slightly different kind of tendencious interpretation is found in regard to the Ravenna mosaic illustrated as "Christ's Spherical Body". Here we seem to see a plain globe supported in the top of a vault by four angels. But on a careful inspection of the plate as published, the globe appears unmistakably as a simple roundel framing a Chi-Ro monogram — hardly a representation of Origenistic heresy![4] Moreover, there seems extremely little ground for the "probably" with which our author links this heresy, by way of "the school of Severus, and such 'Origenists' as Leontius of Byzantium", with the Iconoclasts—neither Syrian nor Egyptian Monophysitism appears to have been iconoclastic. But, in general, we would hesitate to accept unreservedly our author's artistic interpretations. We rather

[3] Compare a footnote in Dr. Wigram's *Separation of the Monophysites* with the sentence based on it in our author. Dr. Wigram: "That township (Tanis), the ancient capital of the Hyksos, was then, and is to this day, obstinately Chalcedonian, or 'Melkite'. These 'unclean invaders', who came in about the time of Abraham, or rather before it, remain unassimilated to this day". Our author: "The region of Tanis, Egypt's Ulster, renowned for its obstinate *loyalty to the memory* of the Hyksos or 'Shepherd Kings'." (the italics are mine). Again, is there any evidence for an actual Council of the Five Patriarchs in February, 907, to dispense the Emperor? While this was the solution that the Emperor had suggested, the actual occurrence of such a unique event at such a date (one thinks of the purely physical obstacles to its accomplishment) would surely have created more of a stir than it appears to have done even in the mind of our author, who passes it over in a cursory sentence.

[4] This was pointed out to me by the Rev. J. Perret on the basis of a better photograph.

suspect him of starting hares with his "Mystical Hunt". While not denying the force of his corroborative evidence, we are not convinced that every decorative representation has a conscious symbolical meaning. Moreover, we doubt if he is quite emancipated from that attitude which delights in Byzantine Art only as the forerunner of El Greco or of Epstein. Whatever may be true of them, or of later Byzantine Art, it is not true of the great types of the period covered by the book (it is not true, for instance, of the examples illustrated) that they "sacrifice bodily proportion" beyond the degree reasonably attributable to craftsmen's conventions—this is not the means on which they depend to "answer problems of human destiny beyond the normal range of classical enquiry". Incidentally, we might refer here to an anachronism in the reference (p. 95) to the "sanctuary behind the *iconostasis*" in an account of the Eighth-Century Byzantine Church: the screen was not yet developed into an *iconostasis*. Also, is it quite a happy expression (p. 196) to suggest that Byzantine worship is *focussed* upon the icon of the ascended Christ in the cupola? It would be truer to say that he, the Pantokrator, the All-Ruler and the All-Holder, so reigns over the worship that it needs no such focus. Entering a Byzantine church, we enter a whole Heaven of worship—we do not need to concentrate our worship on any particular point.

But the broad picture of art and worship is not unsatisfactory. On dogma and dogmatic history, our author is perhaps less surefooted, though often illuminating. He has followed the red herring of "Enhypostasia"—a word invented, I think, by Loofs, and not used by Leontius of Byzantium, the importance and originality of whose use (in one passage) of the word "*Enhypostatos*" has been grossly over-estimated owing to a mistranslation.[5] Dr. Prestige (*God in Patristic Thought*, pp. 174,

[5] Leontius, Adv. N. et E., P.G. 86, i, 1277D, interpreted by Loofs, Tixeront, Relton, etc., to mean "*Enhypostatos* shows that it is not an accident, *but* has existence in something else and is not seen in itself". So Dr. Relton (*A Study in Christology*, p. 71): "A nature which receives its hypostasis from another, or which has its hypostasis in another". On p. 78, without apparently noticing the inconsistency, Dr. Relton gives the correct translation of this passage, with acknowledgements to the Rev. G. W. Butterworth—"*Enhypostatos* shows that it is not an attribute, *which* has existence in something else and is not seen in itself".

270, 274) has sufficiently shown Leontius' use of the word to be the same as that of Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, etc.—" objective ", " having an objective individual existence "—" the two natures are *enhypostatos* (find their objective expression) in a single hypostasis ". Whether or no we agree wholly with Dr. Prestige's scathing account of Leontius, we should avoid attributing too great originality either to him or to the Homologia of Justinian, which is surely just a legal " Novella " on the subject of dogma. Valuable as Justinian's harmonizing work certainly was, and important as Leontius' contribution to it may have been, we do not find here any " *new doctrine* of the hypostatic union ", or any legacy in the sphere of theology " of greater value than the contributions of St. Leo and St. Cyril ".

On p. 90, the statement that St. Maximus " *revived* an idea of the Cappadocian Fathers that the Christian doctrine of God stands between the extremes of pluralism in the Greek worship of a pantheon and monism in Islam and Judaism " (we need not delay over the anachronistic reference to Islam, or the dearth of commas) suggests imperfect understanding of the degree to which the Cappadocians never ceased to dominate Eastern theology, and of the centrality of this idea in their doctrine.

Towards the end of the book, the author recognizes that there are dogmatic issues involved in the Filioque dispute, and shows some penetration into their character. We would not demur to the view that the addition to the Creed was probably more the cause than the effect of defective teaching on the Holy Spirit in the Western Church. On the other hand, we feel a lack of clear thinking in the statement that " The *filioque* is not important in itself, except as a sign of the subordination of the Holy Spirit ". After all, could we not equally well say that " The *homoousios* is not important in itself, except as a sign of the coequal Godhead of the Son "? Is not the attempt still to minimize the importance of the clause yet another instance of the long-standing effort of Anglicans to avoid admitting that, sooner or later, the Filioque must be faced by our Church as a real issue? The history of the insertion makes it in any case the badge of schism. And the cause of false or defective doctrine is surely to be avoided at least as much as the effect.

Is it true that " Englishmen will never decorate their churches with mosaics, or talk metaphysical theology on the way home

from the baths"? The latter statement is at least proverbially untrue of Scotsmen, and we doubt if either statement is true of Brother George Every. Again, is he true to the facts or to his own mind when he speaks of a veering of popular interest in the sixth century from theological to liturgical issues? He supports this contrast with one of those brilliant but misleading aphorisms of Dom Gregory Dix: "Theology is . . . always the professional preserve of the clergy and the interest of a comparatively small educated élite of the laity. Liturgy is a . . . universal Christian activity, and so a *popular* interest."

This distinction is not valid in the Byzantine world, as anyone who has discussed theology with a Greek cook will know. The two meanings of the word "Orthodoxy" ("right glory" and "right opinion") are here known to be inseparable. If some minds may be said to be more "theological", some more "liturgical"—and some more "moralist"—the boundaries are in no case identical with those between clergy and laity. Already in the fourth century, the Arian controversy expressed itself in a difference over the form of the Doxology: and in the fifth, the addition to the Trisagion summed up the Monophysite assertion. It is the *seventh*-century controversy, over the "Two Wills" which seems the least concerned with liturgical issues. Our author is nearer to the truth when he keeps more strictly to his own insight, as in a striking passage in the preface with which I will close this review:

> "The Byzantine people, and those peoples who inherit their tradition, stubbornly remain responsible for the maintenance of dogma, of a mystery which they understand through the order of the liturgy and the pattern of the icons on their church walls. Dogma with them is not only an intellectual system apprehended by the clergy and expounded to the laity, but a field of vision wherein all things on earth are seen in their relation to things in heaven, first and foremost through liturgical celebration. Therefore they can endure political changes that would gravely embarrass Western churches, because the power of the clergy to speak their own mind matters little, if the rite is preserved. Religious freedom in the East is freedom for the liturgy, not for preaching, or education, or youth organizations. Yet 'all these shall be added,' for the church is a sermon, a school, and a family."

DERWAS J. CHITTY.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE. By FLORENCE HIGHAM. (S.C.M. Press 1947). 6s.

IN a recent lecture on Ruskin Lord Samuel suggested that a great man sometimes resembles a delayed-action bomb whose impact is felt and understood some time after its descent. There are signs that this is true of Maurice, for while he created intense antagonisms and gathered some devoted disciples during his own lifetime, it seems that aspects of his teaching which were obscure to his contemporaries have become luminous in relation to the needs of the mid-twentieth-century. Small as it is, Miss Higham's book fills a quite distinctive place in the literature about him. The Life, in two large volumes by his son, tells the story mainly in the father's own letters and gives a wonderful picture of his thought and character: but it is constructed so completely upon the letters that occasionally an important event, not reflected in the letters, is omitted or obscured. The short Life by C. F. G. Masterman (1907) presents Maurice's theology and socialism with a masterly touch, but Masterman viewed his subject a little too much through the spectacles of the Christian Social Union and of a "progressive" ideology foreign to Maurice's own thought. The sketch by Bishop Collins in *Representative English Churchmen*, published for the Church Historical Society, is almost confined to the theology. What Miss Higham does is to trace the life and to indicate the main features of the theology in such a way that Maurice himself is presented vividly to the reader; Miss Higham's admiration is ardent, and in her pages Maurice's personality, friendships, family life, religion, passion for truth and pastoral spirit are apparent.

I think Miss Higham's tribute would have been the stronger if she had included a fuller acknowledgement of some of Maurice's weaknesses. Not only obstinate and obscurantist people, but people with a real desire to understand sometimes found him exasperating. There was truth in Mozley's complaint: "He has a bias against all existing forms of opinion, all doctrines in the way in which they are actually held and received, and seems to consider it his special vocation to assail them. But

allow him to construct the doctrine himself, and to put it out in his own formula, and it will be not so very unlike the original one" (*Essays Historical and Theological*, Vol. II, p. 272). Mozley makes some fair points in his admittedly unsympathetic essay, but perhaps the shrewdest criticism from one who knew Maurice as a contemporary is to be found in Julia Wedgwood's *Nineteenth Century Teachers*. I am surprised that Miss Higham makes no reference to this work, for Julia Wedgwood yielded to no one in admiration of Maurice. But she had interesting things to say about his underrating of some of the significance of the *individual* in religion on account of his emphasis upon the corporate, and about his habit of turning an awkward corner in an argument by an irritating appeal to the hypothetical "bed-ridden woman".

Miss Higham describes with understanding the various elements in Maurice's theology: his conviction of the doctrine of the Triune God as the guiding principle, his emphasis upon the doctrine of creation ("Christ is in every man"), his belief in eternal life as the state of union with God and in eternal loss as the state of separation from him—with his insistence on the distinction between eternal and everlasting, his devotion to the Creeds as the means of deliverance from "systems". The reader will get a good idea of each of Maurice's controversies, together with some interesting judgements upon the relation of the doctrines to the man himself. "Maurice was a man of exquisite sensibility, and it is not too fanciful to suggest that the agonies his shyness caused him and his consequent sense of failure in those very human relationships which he believed to be the most important thing in life, enabled him to envisage as few others could have done the desolation of being shut out from God's love by one's own deliberate act" (p. 91). "He remembered above all John Sterling . . . slipping ever further away from the firm ground of the knowledge and the love of God". "It was in the bitterness of heart that the thought of Sterling always brought him that he turned to assail Mansel" (p. 109).

But I think that Miss Higham is less successful in setting Maurice's theology in its *perspective* in the history of theology,

and it is here that Mr. Reckitt's Scott Holland lectures *Maurice to Temple* give a more discriminative picture. It is a little naïve to say: "Hort and Westcott, Scott Holland and Gore and the late Archbishop Temple continued to expound and amplify his interpretation of the Christian faith in the light of S. John's Gospel". The legacy of Maurice has by no means so simple a story. Hort was Maurice's most direct and complete disciple. Westcott complained of Maurice's obscurity (the pot calling the kettle black ?) and once said that he avoided reading Maurice as he knew his own thought was on similar lines and wished to develop it independently. Holland and Gore owed a debt to the synthesis of Mauricjan teaching and Tractarian sacramentalism already made by Stewart Headlam, but evidence of their conscious dependence upon Maurice as a theologican seems to be lacking.

Archbishop Temple once told me that he had never read Maurice's *Gospel of S. John*, and he and Maurice would have differed profoundly on the subject of democracy. I feel that by giving a rather exaggerated picture of Maurice's legacy to the decades which followed his death, Miss Higham obscures the significance of the rediscovery of Maurice in recent years. Maurice was in a sense a parent of the general tendency to emphasize the immanent logos in the created world and to translate the Christian faith into terms of social action; but he was himself free from the naïveté which made too easy a synthesis between being Christian and being "progressive". To-day those who are dissatisfied alike with the immanentism of the past decades and with the "Barthian" reaction from it, are able to find in Maurice's Biblical teaching some light upon the way to hold together the doctrine of a natural order in creation and the doctrine of a unique redemption in the Biblical history. Maurice's rare grasp of the unity of law and Gospel is something which has been widely missed, even among those whom he influenced, and is now being perceived afresh.

Miss Higham well describes the differences between Maurice and the Tractarians, but I am not sure that she does justice to Maurice's treatment of the Church as a divine society with

divinely-given signs of its catholicity. A reader who turns from her pages to a first reading of *The Kingdom of Christ* may be surprised to find how much Maurice claimed for the episcopate. Some words of his about the mutual debt of Catholic and Protestant, and the role of the English Church in reunion, are worth quoting often: "I then proceed to consider the position of the English Church as enabling us, if we will, to unite ourselves with any part of the Eastern or Western Church which will meet us on the ground of our Catholic institutions, provided it recognizes the true centre of unity [i.e., Christ]; as enabling us, on the other hand, to unite with any Protestants on the ground of our recognition of that true centre, provided they do not refuse to adopt the Catholic institutions which connect us with that centre, and with each other". (*Life of F. D. M.*, Vol. I, p. 326).

It is a pity that, with the possible exception of *The Kingdom of Christ* in the Everyman Library, none of Maurice's works is in print; and it will be difficult for most of Miss Higham's readers to test for themselves these few correctives which seem to me to be needed, and to discover at first hand how true to the man and the teaching is her vivid narrative of a life at once tempestuous and at peace.

A. M. Ramsey.

Portrait of Horace. By Alfred Noyes. (Sheed & Ward.) 16s. net.

Of translations of Horace's Odes there is no end, by scholars and versifiers, but here is a study of the man and the poet by a poet. In anticipation, therefore, we had great hopes. Further there might be special novelty here in that Mr. Noyes could hardly help (as those who read his *Unknown God* will agree) being influenced by his Christian beliefs. The book ought not to disappoint us, but there are defects, small but pervasive, of which we had best dispose at once.

Mr. Noyes does not give his book a consecutive, biographical form, yet he introduces scattered passages as though he were

hesitatingly copying Lytton Strachey's manner of biography. For instance, he rightly wants to enlarge upon Horace's own tributes to his father's self-sacrifice and influence. But we do not want a page or two about their looking at shops in Rome, and "the little boy would squeeze his father's hand. . . . It was the bookshops that interested them most . . . and when the bookseller's back was turned, father and son would unroll a little of that volume. . . . Both the boy and his father had a curious presentiment that one day the works of a young poet from Venusia would be added to that treasure house". Then there is an elaborate account of the first visit to the Sabine Farm, Mæcenas' gift, where the words of welcome of the slaves are mixed with descriptions of pieces of furniture, culminating in Horace's library with books, neat rolls, carefully arranged for him (by whom?) as he liked to find them. Apart from other absurdity, Mr. Noyes ought to know that no man would have more jealously arranged his own books himself. Then, though we welcome Mr. Noyes's own verse translations (excellent in his care and understanding of metre), and could grant much licence to a poet, they are too free and occasionally, we suspect, miss Horace's point. Yet we are grateful to him for quoting that still freer translation, Sir Henry Wotton's *Character of a Happy Life*. When writing illuminatingly on the Golden Age as described in the XVIth Epode and in Virgil's IVth Eclogue, he seems unaware of the versions of the Hebrew prophets then current in Alexandria. Mr. Noyes too often quotes without references, which is hard on those who want to look up the context and do not know every Ode, Epode, etc., by heart. Further, the book is worthy to be referred to after a first reading; therefore it is worthy of an index, for the absence of which we blame the publishers. Lastly, Mr. Noyes shows a bad prejudice against Augustus who is scarcely mentioned without a sneer or blame. We grant that he ought to have saved Cicero from Anthony's proscription, *if he could*. We do not blame him too harshly because we do not know the circumstances well enough. Apart from that, the world owed an untold debt to Augustus for his wisdom and moderation when his young head might so well have

been turned by more power than any ruler had exercised. No successor came near him in these virtues until Marcus Aurelius. And there are implied inconsistencies in Mr. Noyes's strictures. He praises Horace for never offering unqualified flattery; for more than once unnecessarily reminding Augustus that he had fought for Brutus. Yet Augustus was always ready to welcome him with favours, and Mæcenas could say confidently to Augustus in his will, *Horati Flacci ut mei esto memor.* Mr. Noyes praises Agrippa and Mæcenas. Is there then no credit to the younger man for choosing such admirable men as his chief advisers?

Having done with these grumbles, let us acknowledge that a book by such an enthusiastic admirer and lover of Horace is very welcome. Incidentally, too, there are many delightful references to Virgil. He deals faithfully with many critics and amuses too, as when, after trouncing Professor Saintsbury for finding fault, he adds, "It is a pity, for Horace would have so thoroughly enjoyed the *Cellar Book*". His quotations from Ste. Beuve, Montaigne and Fénélon illustrate well the continuous appreciation of French men of letters. Most interesting, too, are the examples of Horace's influence upon early Christian writers, such as Prudentius, St. Gregory and, later, Urban VIII.

Mr. Noyes naturally dwells chiefly upon the matter and artistic excellence of the Odes, but he gives satisfying weight to the other books; indeed one of the best chapters, on "The Fortunate Isles", draws out the full beauty of the XVIth Epode and enlarges ingeniously upon its application to the times. Other chapters deal with Horace studying at the schools of philosophy at Athens, and campaigning at Philippi. Another is concerned with his debt to Lucilius, and two chapters with style, *The Labour of the File* and *Ars Poetica.* They are rather disjointed, like separate essays, but taken together give a "Portrait" which is informative, original, in parts controversial, and welcome to lovers of the poet.

Mr. Noyes does not definitely or solemnly treat of Horace's religion (as we expected). Horace did not substitute, as many

educated Romans did, any school of philosophy for the paganism which was dying. He took what he liked from Stoicism and Epicureanism, the chief substitutes of the day. He did not believe that "the gods" were careless of mankind and "lie beside their nectar and the bolts are hurled". He believed in what he called Jupiter for lack of a better name, a supreme supernatural power which could and did punish ὕβρις; he also had a firm belief in the local spirits of the countryside which protected him and were to be propitiated in a personal, almost a friendly way.

We will leave our readers with a puzzle. On p. 239 Mr. Noyes writes, "Tennyson, on one side of his genius, is the most Horatian of all English poets". Among the other poets, he writes on p. 241, "in some ways Cowper is the most Horatian of them all". These opinions are not so worded as to be necessarily contradictory, but our pundits may like to enlarge upon them.

CASTOR.

THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS. By L. H. MARSHALL, B.A., B.D. (Macmillan.) 15s.

THE author of this book opines that critics of Christianity often write in a clear and trenchant style for all to understand, whereas the works of its defenders are only intelligible to theological students. No doubt there is an element of truth in this; and Mr. Marshall may be congratulated on treating his subject not only thoroughly and systematically, but in an eminently readable way. The earlier chapters deal fully with the ethical teaching both of our Lord and St. Paul, and two follow on "The Ethics of Social Relations" and "The Ethical Approach to Christology". The last chapter provides a key to the whole. When the New Testament writers used such terms as "Logos" or "Son of God", "they were simply trying to give expression to the conviction born in their souls that Jesus had come from God". (p. 352). This minimizing of the Johannine Logos doctrine presupposes a Prophet who is before all things a great ethical Teacher, and that is the emphasis which we find here. The

Master was not thinking of the future course of civilization, as this world was rapidly approaching its end, but he laid down principles upon which the welfare of mankind in every age depends. The author's strong objection to Roman Catholicism and Pacifism receives considerable emphasis. The Roman Church "has shed more blood than any other institution" (p. 57). It has lapsed into legalism. Its Mariolatry is demolished by Mark iii, 31-35 alone. Monasticism and its "futilities" is swept aside as escapism, "seeking only the salvation of one's own soul". (p. 180).

St. Paul's celibacy was "non-ascetic". It is a "childish error" to suppose that non-resistance provides a solution to the task of peace-making. Pacifists are "sentimental idealists".

The book contains some fine writing. As an example of this we may quote Mr. Marshall's summing up of St. Paul's conception of a good man. "He is one who is a great active lover of mankind, who cherishes the joyful conviction that goodness is always infinitely worth while, who displays the serenity of mind and heart that comes from a clear conscience; who is long-tempered, full of the milk of human kindness, rich in goodwill; who can be absolutely relied upon in word and deed, in fair weather or in foul; who is considerate of the feelings and interests of others, who has gained such mastery of all his instinctive passions and impulses that he has himself completely under control; one who occupies his mind with the things that are straightforward, worthy of honour, right, undefiled, high-toned, in short, with all that appertains to moral excellence and all that is deserving of praise; one who is always ready to temper justice with mercy, to make whatever allowances he can, and never to act from mere unreasoning prejudice and passion." (p. 308).

F. H.

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MATTHEWS, A. G.—*Walker Revised; Being a Revision of John Walker's "Sufferings of the Clergy during the Grand Rebellion"* 1642-60, 416 pp. (Oxford University Press). 40*s.*

REYBURN, H. A.—*Nietzsche : The Story of a Human Philosopher*, 500 pp. (Macmillan). 21*s.*

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NUTTALL, G. F.—*The Holy Spirit and Ourselves*, 81 pp. (Basil Blackwell). 5*s.*

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ART AND RELIGION*

By H. A. HODGES

I NEED not try to convince the members of this association that there is a connexion between art and religion. Your very existence implies that there is a real, positive, and important connexion, at least in the sphere of public worship. It is indeed obvious that public worship makes use of some of the arts: of architecture and its associated arts, for instance, to provide a building, and of verse-writing and music to shape and adorn the worshipping activity itself. Your title and your statement of aims direct attention especially to this side of the question, and no doubt there is enough here to set us all thinking. If a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing well: that is mere horse sense. The Christian will go deeper and say that, if we are going to make a public offering to God, we ought to offer the best we can.

My theme, however, in this opening address, is a wider one. I was invited here to speak about the relation between the arts and religion, and I propose to begin by considering that aspect of religion which is not public worship and that aspect of art which is not explicitly religious. Despite the paradox, it is here that we shall find our first points of comparison between these two great fields of human activity. To begin with, there is a likeness of aim and structure. Art imposes on all who take it seriously a severe discipline of mind and soul, which has no little in common with the religious discipline of mental prayer. The artist and the art-lover perform their service to God, their distinctive *leitourgia*, by putting themselves under this discipline and letting it shape their view of things, whether the themes and objects with which they are concerned are specifically religious in

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character or not. But besides their common structure, the two activities share a common weakness. Both claim to apprehend and express reality, and both are apt to project human fantasies instead of the reality they claim to find. Even the Christian religion is not free from this danger, and any claim on its part to stand as judge over the artist while itself evading judgement must be rejected. When the two activities meet as allies, as they do in the worship of the Church, their combined strength and their combined weakness are alike manifest, and the need for constant vigilance is at its greatest.

I.

Collingwood remarks in one place that art which is produced expressly in the service of religion is not often among the best of its kind. He is not thinking of those periods in the past when the finest artistic capacity available was directed by social conditions into the service of the Church. He is thinking of to-day, and of the popular religious art of to-day: the average place of worship, the words and tune of the average hymn. These are probably no worse than popular art which is not religious, such as the public statue or the patriotic song. None of these things make any notable contribution to the artistic history of our time. It is natural that this should be so; for popular art is mostly utility art, art produced with a minimum of vision and inspiration, with an eye chiefly to entertainment, or convenience, or edification, or the like. The sole purpose of an organ voluntary is to cover people's movements in and out of a building. The real purpose of some hymns is to give the congregation something that will keep them interested while the priest is doing something that they do not know or care about. If the hymn selected can be one which puts across an idea or a sentiment of which the priest (or the choirmaster) approves, all the better. But for these purposes we can make do with any words that will scan and any tune that is easy and congenial. There is no motive to seek for more, and if we do we are felt to be highbrow.

The inferiority of such art is intrinsic, and has nothing to do with the way it is rendered. No doubt a choir which can sing and an organist who can play are better than those who cannot; but if what they sing and play is utility art and no more, then

what has been said will still hold good. This, however, is not the art which interests us in this gathering. Art which wins consideration on its merits as art, and not merely as a convenience, has a different quality, and it is this quality that we must study.

Rossetti had a name for it. He called it "fundamental brainwork". Art is indeed an intellectual activity, involving discrimination and judgement in a high degree. So far Rossetti was right. But his guidance fails us when we ask how art is distinguished from other activities of the intelligent mind, from science, for example, or from historiography. The answer to this lies not in the subject-matter of art, and not primarily in its form, but in the underlying attitude to the world which finds expression in it.

One cardinal feature of the artistic mind, both in the artist himself and in the public who appreciate his work, is its persistent drive towards clear apprehension and vivid realization of things. It runs counter to the prevailing tendencies of ordinary life, tendencies in which the artist himself has been educated, and which for ordinary people constitute the norm of sound thinking. The ordinary man in ordinary circumstances is guided in his approach to things by practical considerations. Every object around him represents primarily a potential help or hindrance in the fulfilment of his purposes, in his pursuit of comfort and satisfaction. He looks at it and thinks about it from that point of view; if it proves to have no practical significance for him, he ignores it, and if it has a practical significance, he does something about it. In neither case does he regard the object as interesting in itself. In neither case does he find "time to stand and stare". This is true not only of our strictly pragmatical thinking, but also of the pursuit of knowledge in scientific research. This, too, is a kind of action, and the end in view is the solution of certain problems, the answering of certain questions, and perceived facts are judged and utilized in accordance with their relevance to the question before us. When one question is answered, we do not stand and contemplate the answer, but go on to the question that arises next. Both to the ordinary man and to the scientist (who sets the intellectual fashion) the disinterested stare of contemplation is a distraction and a waste of time. But all art-activity finds its centre and meaning in just this stare. This alone is enough to

explain why people find it puzzling and a trifle disreputable.

Contemplation is hard work. It means a concentration of all one's powers on one point, and a constant struggle against distractions. In this struggle the artist is perpetually involved. To him it comes as a struggle for clear vision and precision of statement. In so far as his work is a representation of an independently-existing subject-matter, he must see and show the subject as it is, undisturbed by what he or others may think or feel about it. In so far as his work is the expression of an idea or feeling which springs from his own mind, he must express just that idea or feeling, not a rough approximation or a conventional substitute. Whether he looks inwards or outwards, his business is always to rid himself of conventional images and stock attitudes, to receive the full impact of the object or idea which concerns him, and to react to it naturally, honestly, without disguise. It is to this end primarily, and not for the sake of communication, that he gives his vision outward expression. He paints in order to see, he writes in order to know just what he thinks. But he knows, of course, that if the expression succeeds in clarifying his own vision and stabilizing his own reactions, it will also have the power to transmit a similar vision to others and evoke similar reactions in them. This, too, is not without its importance for him; for, whatever professions of independence he may make, the artist like all the rest of us is dependent on society for more than physical necessities. He cannot keep his vision clear and untroubled unless there are at least a few who share it.

The artist, then, is a contemplator and a teacher of contemplation. Unlike the practical man, who uses things, or the scientist, who explains them, he makes it his business to realize and savour them to the full. His gift to society is vision and the power of vision; for not only does he enable us to see something of what he has seen, but he trains us to see and realize things for ourselves. Is this a thing worth doing? Does society welcome the gift? To the practical men of business and politics it seems pleasant enough as the occupation of a leisure hour, but for that very reason no part of the serious substance of life. The secular humanist regards it as a central element, perhaps *the* central element, in culture; but what reasons can he give why his beloved culture-pattern itself should be taken seriously? The Christian

on the other hand can welcome it on two levels. The artist is the human vehicle of the *Benedicite;* it is he who trains human minds to be the channels through which all the works of the Lord may bless the Lord. And further, if opening blind eyes is one of the works of Messiah, the artist has potentially a place in the work of redemption, whether he knows it or not. All this he has, be it noted, not by virtue of choosing religious themes, nor even by virtue of being personally a religious man, but just by virtue of being an artist at all. He redeems our sensuous nature by opening our eyes and ears to the glory of colour and sound. He chastens and purges our imagination by forcing us to look honestly at the world around us, to see human character, human actions and relationships, as they are.

This is the office and work of the artist. There is always a doubt whether he is in fact discharging it. But before considering this, let us turn from the artistic activity to the religious.

The central aim of religion, or at least of the Christian religion, is the glory of God, which we promote by worship and service. In our fallen state, however, we are so scattered and disorganized that we need a thorough overhaul if our worship and service are to be more than conventional appendages to a life whose substance is otherwise constituted. Accordingly there has grown up in the bosom of the Church a discipline or *askesis* whose purpose is to unify the mind and will by focussing them together on God. One who submits himself to this discipline will, of course, learn much that he did not know before; but, what is even more important, he will come to know in a new way even the things which he knew when he began. What he used to know notionally, he will now come to know existentially. Where he used to assent to certain truths, he will now come to realize what they mean, he will feel their impact and transforming power. There is a story of a man who went to a religious house and asked to be taught how to meditate. They gave him some instructions, then set him a theme and left him to it. After some time he announced that he was no good at this sort of thing; he could not rub two ideas together; all he could do was to tramp up and down the room, thinking of the theme he had been set and repeating to himself, " damn it, it's true; damn it, it's true ". He was told, of course, that that was just what was wanted. He

had achieved a vivid realization of the truth in question. He had seen it, felt it, surrendered to it. Such realization, and the discipline leading to it, has a central place in Christianity; for it is out of such realization that the more mature forms of prayer arise, and it is around such realization that the mature Christian character is built up. On the one hand, it is the key to contemplation, being itself already a contemplative type of act and a precondition for acquired contemplation properly so called; on the other hand, it is the key to that "perfection" which is both commanded and promised to Christians, and which consists in an undeviating attachment of the whole soul to God.

The Christian who takes upon himself this discipline is, like the artist, moving in a different direction from the practical man and the scientist; and as in the world the artist has to go his way amid the indifference, if not suspicion and hostility, of these other types, so in the Church the contemplative has to live in proximity to the church worker, the institutionalist, and the theological wrangler, who often fail to understand what he is about. The parallel between him and the artist is, however, not exact. The artist, after all, is one who deals in images. True, they must be the right images: not the conventional symbols which serve the plain man as a substitute for seeing, not the stock gestures which express the ready-made reactions of the unreflective, but records of true vision and honest feeling. Still, they are images. But the religious contemplative, though he may start with imagery, will normally pass beyond it, first to a kind of pregnant glance, seeing much in little, like what philosophers have sometimes called "intellectual intuition", and then to an imageless apprehension of the modeless reality which is God. Here the natural development of the prayer life reaches its term, and here not only the senses and the imagination, but also the intellect falls silent, and the affections lose their distinctness and their changeful interplay before that Object in which they all alike find their rest. God is best known by way of unknowing; the contemplative reaches his Object and finds himself without eyes. And therefore he is also without voice. With the artist, to see is to express. The religious contemplative may, indeed often does, give literary expression to the earlier stages of his vision and to the incidents of his journey along the road; but the ultimate confrontation he

cannot utter, and does not commonly wish to. He is the true iconoclast, who rejoices to see himself stripped bare of images which, being his own, must always involve some danger of idolatry; and it is here, in the recesses of the worshipping soul, and not in the public worship of the Church, that iconoclasm is properly in place.

Art and religion, then, are alike in that they discipline the mind to contemplation. But do they contemplate the same thing? Initially, at least, they do not. For art begins with sensible objects, of which God is not one, and it may, and often does, exhaust its impetus in the exploration and appreciation of these. Religion, on the other hand, is concerned with the contemplation of God, and for it the sensible world is either a ladder to be scaled as quickly as possible, or else a rival attraction to be passed by without heeding. It is true that art and religion, starting thus from opposite ends, may converge upon a middle point. In the beauty of the sensible world the mind may come to see a reflection of something immeasurably deeper. "Is there any man so inactive of wit and so unstirring that, when he sees the multitudinous loveliness of this world, the universal symmetry and the vast cosmic order, and the remote revelation of the stars, it shall not set him thinking, overtaken with awe, 'If this be the image, what must be the original?'" On the other hand, religion, or at least the Christian religion, cannot really see God without going on to see the world in him and to love the creature for the sake of its Creator and Redeemer. Yet even here, on this middle ground, art and Christianity may not so much meet as shoot past each other in opposite directions. The movement upwards from created things to God, if taken alone, can lead only to idolatry, even though it be the magnificent intellectual idolatry of Platonism. It can be redeemed only by being absorbed as a subordinate element into the Cross-centred thought of Christendom, as Platonism is redeemed and transmuted in the Franciscan vision of a St. Bonaventura.

But while we recognize this abiding possibility of reconciliation and synthesis, we must set against it the abiding presence of dangers on both sides, to which we must now turn our attention.

II.

Every art has its own form-language, a language of symbols and gestures by which ideas and feelings are expressed. These symbols and gestures can be regarded from various points of view. We may consider their formal properties and interrelations; how they enhance one another by likeness or by contrast, how they oppose or neutralize one another's effects and so on. In this way we come to formulate the principles of design. But we are led into far deeper waters when we remember that these sensible forms and movements, in addition to their purely structural properties, have also a suggestive and evocative power, and can play upon the emotions with great effect. There is an international language of expressive and evocative symbols, which is used and exploited not only by art, but by religion and by magic, for good or evil ends.

One of the deepest drives in human nature is the love of security and the fear of the incalculable. This finds expression in sensible symbols. Simple and regular forms, such as the straight line, the right angle, the square, the circle, are natural symbols of the intelligible and the safe, while wavy lines, irregular figures, and indefinite outlines are equally natural symbols of the incalculable, the dangerous, and the evil. Such symbolism, with a moral connotation superadded, finds verbal expression in many languages: the good man is "upright", he goes "straight", he gives a "square deal"; the bad man is a "crook", and to follow a "tortuous" course is felt to be discreditable. We may recall the interpretation given to the Cross, i.e., the right angle, in the Valentinian *gnosis*, or in the Acts of John. Natural objects fall easily into the same categories: forests and trackless wastes and turbulent waters are sinister phenomena, while the sun and stars are dependable and friendly. Yet again, mythological symbols repeat the same theme, with the sinister principle represented by ghosts, demons, dragons and the like. The recurrent story of the combat between the hero and the dragon is especially instructive here. Not only are the combatants themselves embodiments of good and evil, but this fact finds iconographic expression in the attitude of the hero, standing or riding upright, thrusting a straight

spear into the jaws of a writhing dragon, from which proceeds a shapeless ever-shifting blast of flame and smoke.

Such symbolism on all levels, in abstract form, in natural objects, and in mythological creations, is a perpetual element in the arts. The attitude of a civilization to life and the world finds clear expression in its use of these symbols; for the symbols themselves and the underlying themes are universal, but each age and country makes of them what it will, according as its fundamental attitudes are self-confident or fear-haunted.

There are yet other symbols which express the crucial experiences of life and death, joy and sorrow, power and weakness, and the impact of fate. These, too, are universal experiences, and the symbols are universal too. They consist in typical stories or plots for stories, which appear again and again in dreams, in folklore, in mythology, in popular art and religion, and exercise a perpetual fascination. One such theme is the story of the unattractive or insignificant person who turns out to be of royal birth, or who achieves power and splendour by wisdom, or bravery, or by the favour of superhuman powers: cf. the ugly duckling, Cinderella, the youngest brother in *The King of the Golden River*, and numberless other figures of this kind. This is just the expression of the infantile day-dream from which none of us ever get quite free. Another recurrent theme, expressing a more adult experience and a deeper understanding and sympathy, is that of man at grips with doom, which he cannot avert, but which he can meet in such a way as to make his very downfall glorious. This is the fundamental theme of tragedy. Another version of the idea of doom is seen in the familiar Greek theme of *hybris* and *nemesis*. We all know how rich a fruit these themes have borne in drama and novel. We also know how history itself seems to provide us with exercises in tragedy in real life, so that the historian becomes a dramatist in spite of himself, as Herodotus in his story of Persian pride and overthrow, or Thucydides in his record of Athenian *hybris* at Melos and the *nemesis* which followed.

When the facts of history seem to present us with tragedy in action, to illustrate and document the themes of mythology, or when the phenomena of nature seem to contain a deeper

meaning which imaginative interpretation can elicit — as the romantic movement believed—we are faced by a problem. Are we finding something in the facts which is really there, or are we merely projecting into them a meaning which has no basis outside ourselves? Is the romantic view of nature a real insight, as Wordsworth believed, or is it literally a "pathetic fallacy"? Or shall we say with Coleridge that the mind of man is an aeolian harp, and nature is the wind which plays upon it, and the sound which comes out (i.e., our experience) is the joint product of both?

However this may be, a similar problem confronts us in the sphere of religion. For here, too, we impute to natural objects and historical processes a meaning which does not lie on the surface. Ethnic religion is based on the tacit assumption that the greater facts of experience—birth and death, the process of the seasons, human prosperity and mischance—are manifestations of quasi-personal powers which can be named and with which reciprocal relations can be established. But since we have all experience to start from, and no authoritative guidance to follow, the conclusions reached this way, and the mythologies in which they are expressed, are various and perplexing. Nowhere has the standpoint of ethnic religion found fuller development than in the great religions and mythologies of antiquity, in the cycle of rites and myths connected with Osiris, with Tammuz, with Attis, with Dionysus, in the fertility cults, the coronation rites and sacred marriages of the kings, and the rest of that complex of ideas and practices. It is a bewildering mixture of personal and impersonal, of gods who are natural powers and rites which are worship and magic all in one. It is a vivid and unforgettable picture of what the religious imagination can do when given its head.

Revealed religion takes a different road. It moves from the nature of God as we believe it to be made known by God himself to an interpretation of his works and deeds in the light of this. Here is the typical "wisdom" of Jewish and Christian thinking. At its heart is the consciousness of the presence of God, confronting us in every event and every situation with a demand and a promise, and executing judgement in justice and mercy through the course of events. One chief aim of the Christian *askesis* is

to awaken this consciousness and to make it govern every moment of the individual life. The Christian is to see everything as coming from God to him, to find God in every situation and respond to him in every thought and action. But the same applies, of course, on the wider plane of world history. The prophetic standpoint is that nations and churches, as well as individuals, are confronted by God with demands and promises, and that for them too the course of events is the working out of judgement. In a different sense from what Schiller meant, *die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.* This did not cease to be true when the canon of Scripture was closed, and the power to interpret contemporary events prophetically has never been withdrawn from the Church. We therefore, or some of us, claim to find in the events of history a meaning which is invisible to the secular historian and sociologist.

In practice we do not stop here. Following the lead of the psalmists, we find the attributes of God shadowed forth in the forms and processes of nature, and we go beyond the letter of Scripture in their interpretation. Some have gone very far indeed. Let us remember the mediaeval bestiaries, which found a moral in every fact of natural history. Still more striking, though less typical, let us remember the doctrine of signatures, borrowed from alchemy, which Boehme was to place in a theological context, and thereby to project the drama of the Fall and Redemption upon the vast screen of nature. And if we are very proud and stiff, and say that Boehme, as a Lutheran and an occultist, is doubly beneath consideration, let us consider the more orthodox doctrine of signatures in St. Bonaventura, according to whom nature is full of the *vestigia Dei.* Or let us pass from the phenomena of nature to the accidental circumstances of history, and see how often in the Bible the working of divine providence or judgement is accompanied by circumstances which seem designed to symbolize and interpret its meaning. The attendant circumstances of the Incarnation, for instance, or of the Crucifixion, as recorded in the tradition, seem to have more in common with the work of poets and dramatists than with that of the hard-headed historians of our time. Are we to go hard-headed ourselves, and dissolve the tradition in doubt? Or are

we to recognize that God is indeed a dramatist, and open our eyes to similar significant conjunctions in our own circumstances?

In different terms the same question which was addressed to the artist comes home now to the believer. He sees in the world around him meanings and manifestations which the methods of science and historical research cannot detect or deal with. The habit of seeing such meanings and manifestations is connatural to the religious mind in all its varieties, and Christians are no exception. To the believer as to the artist the question comes: are you finding something which is really there, or are you projecting something out of your own mind into the world? But to the Christian the question comes in a more complicated form, since he, in common with the Jew, cannot agree to treating all religions as species of one genus. He draws a radical distinction between ethnic religion, which is false in principle however it may occasionally stumble into truth, and revealed religion, which is not merely true, but the truth itself. Thus he hands over all the religions of the world, except his own, to the opponent, and reinforces the criticisms of the unbeliever by a theologically-grounded criticism of his own. To him then the question comes in an altered form: are your own proceedings exempt from the criticism which you bring against others?

III.

I shall not discuss this question. I merely point out that the artist and the Christian believer are in the same position of having to face it. But all of us here in this room have faced it (at least, I hope "faced" and not "dodged" is the word) and have made our decision. All of us are Christians, and believe that in the last resort the Christian view of God at work in nature and in history is a vision of reality, however much we may hesitate about the details as seen by the more imaginative Christian writers. The fact, however, that we are Christians, adherents of this particular religion and not of another, brings in a further complication for us, because Christianity itself has a point of view about the human imagination. This we must now examine.

A strong trend in modern aesthetics, represented by such writers as Coleridge and Collingwood, lays great stress on the

creative power of the imagination, and the dependence even of the intelligence upon its work. In Coleridge the imagination is itself an organ of insight into reality. Collingwood is more circumspect. His description of the corrupt imagination and its consequences is a profound and moving account of the way in which cowardice and the fear of reality can pervert the working of the mind. But Collingwood, recognizing this as a morbid condition, writes as if most people most of the time were healthy, and makes it the special responsibility of artists and all concerned with art to watch over the integrity of the imagination in the interests of intellectual and moral health.

The Bible seems to take Collingwood's diagnosis of the corrupt consciousness and declare that for man in his fallen state this has become usual and habitual. "Imagination" is never mentioned in the Bible without some note of condemnation or contempt. "The wickedness of man was great in the earth, and every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." "The nations rage, and the peoples imagine a vain thing." "He hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their heart." These, indeed, are English translations, and the Hebrew and Greek words behind them are not exact equivalents of one another or of our word "imagination": they cover the activities of reasoning and contriving as well. That only makes more emphatic the judgement of the Bible on the natural faculties of man in the unnatural condition to which the Fall has reduced them.

It is worth our while to reflect on the literary form, or rather formlessness, of the Bible itself. Hebrew, a language poor in vocabulary and in syntactical subtlety, and with a rough unpolished system of versification. Greek of a popular and even debased kind. Books unfinished, or put together by scissors and paste, and often falsely ascribed. Textual corruptions, obscurities of language, lack of logical arrangement, and frequent misrepresentations of history (to judge by the canons of present-day historiography). Such is the uninviting medium through which the Holy Ghost has chosen to transmit to us the truth which matters more than all that the literary and philosophical genius of mankind has been able to create. It is hard to resist the

conclusion that this has been deliberately done, and that the literary character of the Bible is of a piece with the humble circumstances of the incarnate Lord. It is partly an act of humility; but we must remember that God's humility is at the same time a final and irreversible judgement on all human pride of achievement.

If we examine the content of the sacred tradition in Bible and Church, we find another revealing circumstance. We are in the presence of a continual, deliberate, and drastic criticism and refashioning of the religious myth-patterns which are common to mankind. No nature-deities, no divine king, no sacred prostitution, no sacred animals, no images: but everywhere the assertion of the One God who is above all creation, who has no equal or rival, the Living God who never dies, who cannot be searched out by wisdom or swayed by magic, but makes himself known where and as he chooses, whose law is righteousness. Nature has now no inherent godhead, and the true Deity is without form or mode, his very name a challenge and a puzzle. He is the author of justice first, and only secondarily of the ritual law and the sacrificial system. The order of nature is to be understood in the light of his justice and constancy, and not treated as a primary source for the knowledge of him. Some of the traditional images and practices are forbidden altogether. Only so could the people of God be emancipated from their fascinating power. Others are turned upside down, like that of Adonis, where the pagan myth of the amorous goddess and her human favourite is transformed into the canticle of the divine Lover and Israel his bride.

At one central point, indeed, the Israelite iconoclasm went too far. The career of Christ as the Divine King who dies and rises again is a brilliant reconstruction of the Osiris theme. It is the divine Mythologist's masterpiece. But so strongly was Israel conditioned against this particular myth-pattern that when the Divine King actually appeared, his claim was judged to be blasphemy and was rewarded with death. The King died his sacrificial death in consequence of not being recognized as King at all; and when he rose again to claim his bride, he was still rejected and is still denied by the solid body of those in whom the Israelite iconoclasm lives on. It was the pagan world which recognized in him the reality of what it had so long been vainly

dreaming. And when the Church was launched upon her career in the pagan world, it was not long before the whole question of the traditional myths and images came up afresh. In her public worship and in her devotional language the Church had to find ways of redeeming what was sound and excluding what was morbid in this ever-living tradition.

To-day the great myths in their ancient form may seem to be dead and forgotten. But in view of the popularity of predestined leaders it is hard to be sure that the figure of the Divine King may not secure a fresh lease of life in some altered form; and the ancient myth of the Saviour who comes through suffering to his triumph has lost none of its force in being applied to the world proletariate instead of to an individual figure.

Apart from these survivals of the primitive pattern, a more recent and yet very ancient set of ideas finds increasing currency in more sophisticated circles: the age-long doctrine of the *pseudonymos gnosis,* which claims to reveal the inner divinity of the human spirit and its identity with the One Self which has no other. Where the Christian says "I am his", the *gnosis* says "I am he", and in that difference is concealed the whole wide gulf between heaven and hell. The *gnosis* is never-dying, and it wars against the Church both from without and from within. The symbols of the Faith, the words and imagery of Bible and Creed, are taken and twisted until they lose their meaning, and the Word of God itself is made a vehicle for the sophistries of the Serpent.

Yet again, where the subtleties of false wisdom do not penetrate, ordinary human worldliness can find its way in, and the symbols of the Faith are depraved by being interpreted in terms of human follies and the unregenerate passions of the soul. Take one instance: the psychological phantom of the Arbitrary Father is foisted upon the Church and accepted by Christian people instead of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Lord himself is played off against this "Father" as the indulgent Son who placates his anger or takes the punishment in place of mankind. We all know how deeply this abominable travesty of the Atonement has been burned into the Christian mind, so that the outsider has every excuse for mistaking it—as he usually does —for orthodox Christian teaching. Some of us probably know

what deep psychological disturbances have been set up in Christians and non-Christians by this diabolical doctrine, which is itself a product of psychological disturbances, and asks to be diagnosed rather than controverted. This is just one example of the ways in which the Church herself is swept by floods of error. Take one more: the way in which the Christian doctrine of the rivalry between flesh and spirit persists in assuming, in many people's minds, a Manichean shape.

In face of all these tendencies the Church has to play the same part to-day as the Jewish community and the prophetic movement within it played in their time. She has to be the perpetual breaker of idols and the setter-up of true icons, the destroyer of all that comes out of the unregenerate soul and mind of man, and the exhibitor of the living image of God in Christ. In fulfilling this role, she is committed to a perpetual critique both of art and of religion, not excluding their manifestations in her own life. Christianity has to stand on guard against the errors of Christians, and where art and religion meet and join hands, as they do in liturgy and in all public worship, there the danger of error is all the greater, and all the greater must the Church's vigilance be.

IV.

Public worship lives and moves in an interaction between the individual participant and the group. While the group is composed of its members, and its spirit depends in great part upon what they each and severally contribute to its life, yet at the same time the group is more than its members, and the corporate worship of the Church is different in kind from the sum of the private devotions of Christian people. The Eucharist, for instance, is a public function and cannot be a private act at all. Yet it is here, and in the other sacraments and in the proclamation of the Word, that the Church is most herself, ministering Christ to the world; and her own members, taken as individuals, are part of that world to which her words and actions are addressed. In speaking to them she uses all forms of expression. She appeals to every faculty, and first and foremost to the imagination. She fills their minds with imagery of various kinds, poetical and musical, visual and dramatic, all charged with Christian meaning.

But when such imagery is brought to bear upon a group of people in the course of a public function, it acquires a peculiar power. Each mind is doubly affected, not only by the impact of the imagery directly upon itself, but also by the contagion of the rest; for men in groups are more highly suggestible than the same men in isolation would be. The effect of ecclesiastical rites and ceremonies is to establish in the participants a condition of light hypnosis, and so to imprint on them the character which the Church intends. It is the same technique which is used in public functions of other than a religious nature, and whose highest efficiency has been seen in our generation at the Nuremberg party rallies and in the Red Square.

If those who superintend our religious ceremonies were both infallible and impeccable, we need not worry about this. Since in fact they are neither, we are bound to worry. Here, in fact, we touch again the roots of that iconoclastic tendency which has never been wholly absent from Christendom, and which has shown itself so strongly in the West since the Reformation. It is a distrust and fear of the Church's pageantry, based on a true recognition of its power. It is true that this fear may have an unworthy motive. It may be a fear of God, a reluctance to have one's defences against his claims broken down. Beyond doubt it is so in many whose "faith" consists in a long list of articles against which they "protest". But can this be the whole story?

We have met this iconoclastic tendency before, in the life of the worshipping soul, and there it was in place. What shall be said of it in the life of the worshipping Church? The worshipping soul, having climbed the ladder of meditation and contemplation, falls dumb at last in the presence of him who is beyond thought and expression. But the public worship of the Church does not climb that ladder. It is governed by different laws, and at its highest moment, in the Eucharist, it reaches its highest eloquence. That is because the Church is speaking a language of word and action which was taught her by the supreme Artist and Worshipper himself, a language which says all that there is to say, and more than the Church herself at any given moment understands. No human reflection can improve on this language, and no human criticism can justly depose it from its place at the head of all that

the Church is and does. But the Church at any given moment is always in some measure failing to speak it and to understand it, and this failure is constantly needing to be pointed out and corrected. Here is the place of criticism, not to destroy but to implement, and to keep the divine Icon full in view by removing the idols with which we perpetually surround it. Liturgical criticism and liturgical reform are always in place, and will be so long as the Church remains *in via*. They go hand in hand with the perpetual overhaul of her dogmatic expressions, which are also in constant danger of losing their balance and acquiring illegitimate nuances. Dogmatic reform and liturgical reform together are an expression of the Church's vigilance and the Church's penitence. They are the cleansing of the Temple to make it fit for the offering of the perfect Sacrifice.

And while the Church as a body, in the person of her theologians, submits her imagery to continual scrutiny, the individual Christian must play his part by scrutinizing his own use and interpretation of that imagery, his own attitude to the public worship in which he takes part. For it is in the minds of individual Christians, in the body of the congregation, that many false interpretations are born and many false emphases are made. The congregation are not passive recipients of an influence playing upon them from the sanctuary, but active participants in a corporate act, which they can do something to make or mar. They have a responsibility for seeing to it that their contribution is sane and healthy, and to that end they must bring their own thoughts and imaginations under criticism.

If we as individuals accept this duty, then our attitude to the Church's imagery will develop through three stages. First, acceptance of it as it comes to us, and willing surrender to its suggestiveness. Second, critical reflection, testing the imagery we meet, and still more testing our own reactions to it, by our knowledge of the true proportion of faith, by Bible and tradition and the wisdom of experience. Third, renewed acceptance of the imagery, but this time with a certain tacit reserve; acceptance by a mind which can now afford to expose itself to the moulding influence of the imagery because it has acquired a resistance to any unsound tendencies, whether in the imagery itself or in its own reception of the imagery.

Thus once more we find that iconoclasm is a necessary stage in the life of the individual soul. It is the purgation and reshaping of the soul's attitude to the Church's modes of expression. Everyone, perhaps, should pass through such a stage on his way to spiritual maturity. But maturity itself means fullness of life, and the consecration of every faculty in the act of worship. It means a body of worshippers who are individually in accord with what they corporately say and do, and who collectively and severally bring the tribute of sense and imagination to the altar of God. Criticism, iconoclasm, the purgation of the imagination, is a stage on the way to this. But to keep it up permanently and make it the rule for the conduct of public worship is to despair of ever reaching maturity at all.

AN ANGLICAN MANUAL

Some Reflections on Canon Mortimer's "The Elements of Moral Theology"

By THOMAS WOOD

I

"JANE Wigsky is a bad girl," said the priest to the suffragette in one of Stella Benson's novels, "one must draw a line between good and bad." To which the suffragette replied: "One may draw a line, but one needn't build a barrier. And even to draw a line, one should have very good sight."[1] Perhaps the moral theologian could not have answered more pertinently. That there is an absolute distinction between right and wrong, moral and immoral, virtue and vice, every Christian would affirm; and that there is imposed upon us, as rational and responsible creatures, an obligation to make particular moral judgements or to "draw the line", every Christian would allow. Yet even a brief reflection upon the varied motives, intentions and circumstances, which influence and qualify the morality of our actions, or upon those arbitrary judgements deriving solely from "intuition" or some "rule-of-thumb", is sufficient to show with what difficulties and dangers this moral draughtsmanship is fraught. If we are to grow sensitive to all the issues involved in particular cases, if we are to perceive with a high degree of accuracy exactly where the line should be drawn and to draw it in a confident and consistent manner, then we require both a comprehensive and systematized body of sound moral principles and also a well-tried method of procedure.

To provide us with the principles and the method requisite

[1] *I Pose*, Macmillan, 1915, p. 329.

for this task is perhaps the most distinctive,[2] though not indeed the only, aim of the science of moral theology. The subject is, therefore, a severely practical and highly important one, and we may recall that there was at least one period in the post-Reformation history of our Church when it was generally recognized to be so. " Moral theology is a collective body of all wisdom ", wrote Jeremy Taylor[3] in the Preface to a great work of almost fourteen hundred pages designed to demonstrate the truth of that dictum. Ten years before, on March 29, 1650, Joseph Hall, who was then Bishop of Norwich, had asserted with all the composure of one stating a truism: " Of all Divinity, that part is most useful, which determines Cases of Conscience."[4] And seven years earlier still, the recalcitrant Calvinist William Ames, during his residence abroad as professor of Divinity " in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland ",[5] had com-

[2] " The simplest way of describing this distinctive characteristic of moral theology is to say that it is concerned not so much with the highest standards of Christian conduct (that is perhaps the special province of Christian ethics) as with the *minimum* standard to which conduct must attain if it is to be adjudged worthy of the name ' Christian ' at all." K. E. Kirk, *Moral Theology,* Essay X, p. 363, in *The Study of Theology,* 1939.

[3] *Ductor Dubitantium,* 1660. Vols. IX-X of Taylor's *The Whole Works,* ed. by Bishop Heber, revised and corrected by C. P. Eden and A. Taylor, 10 vols. London 1850-59. Vol. IX, Preface, p. xiv.

[4] *Resolutions and Decisions of Divers Practical Cases of Conscience, in Continual Use amongst Men, in Four Decades, To The Reader,* p. 371 of Vol. VII. *Collected Works,* Ed. Peter Hall, 12 vols., Oxford 1837.

[5] From the title-page of Ames's *Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof* 1643, being the E.T. of his *De Conscientia, eius Jure et Casibus* 1630. For his indiscreet pronouncements while preaching at Cambridge in 1609, Ames was suspended by the Vice-Chancellor from the exercise of all his ecclesiastical functions and from all degrees taken or to be taken. After moving to Colchester he was also forbidden to preach by the Bishop of London. Financed by a party of opulent merchants, he moved to Leyden where he remained engaged in controversy until his appointment as Professor of Divinity at Franeker in 1622. He occupied that chair for ten years. See Art. *William Ames* by J. Bass Mullinger, in *D.N.B.,* Vol. I.

mented forcibly upon the especial usefulness and importance of the subject to the conscientious Christian minister charged with the care of souls: "Furthermore if such as are addicted to the Ministery were first instructed in these things, and were seriously tried in them at the Examination, before they were ordained, one might well hope, to have as well Preachers as Churches, more according to Gods heart and Christs, than now we have."[6]

In some respects that last remark has a curiously modern ring about it. Yet the problem in the seventeenth century was not primarily that of convincing men how *desirable* it was for at least the clergy to be "instructed in these things, and seriously tried in them", for it was then *assumed* that the diligent town or country parson, while paying due regard to every other part of his theological study, "greatly esteemes also of cases of conscience, wherein he is much versed."[7] The problem was rather that of producing moral or *casuistical* treatises which, while incorporating all that was valuable in the traditional teaching, would be fitted to the peculiar needs and discipline of a reformed Church and also comprehensive enough to terminate that reliance upon Roman books which had perforce grown all too common. It was with this objective that the three English moralists already cited—and to their number must be added the names of William Perkins, Robert Sanderson, Thomas Barlow and Richard Baxter—laboured so strenuously and so patiently.[8]

[6] *ibid., Address to The Reader.*

[7] George Herbert, *A Priest to The Temple, or The Country Parson, His Character, and Rule of Holy Life*, 1652 (posthumous), c. V. *The Parson's Accessory Knowledges* (p. 223, Everyman edition)—"And, indeed, herein is the greatest ability of a parson, to lead his people exactly in the wayes of truth, so that they neither decline to the right hand nor to the left. Neither let any think this a slight thing. . . . Now if a shepherd know not which grass will bane, or which not, how is he fit to be a shepherd?" *ibid.*

[8] When urging his ordinands to "read the best writers", the late Dr. Hensley Henson once remarked: "It is very distressing to observe how rare it is to find any knowledge of the great English Divines among English clergymen." He added: "You owe it to the Church of England, from which you are receiving your ordination, to give respectful attention to what her great teachers have to

As the comments made by these writers upon their own work plainly show, they were conscious of being pioneers in a noble endeavour. Nor had they any illusions about the magnitude of the task to which they had set their hands, realizing well enough that it was an enterprise far beyond the time and capacity of any one man to accomplish. At the very beginning of the seventeenth century William Perkins remarked, with reference to his *The Whole Treatise of The Cases of Conscience,* that the subject is very large, " like unto the maine sea ", and " I will onely (as it were) walke by the bankes of it, and propound the heads of doctrine, that thereby I may at least, occasion others, to consider and handle the same more at large."[9] Towards the end of the century Richard Baxter was saying very nearly the same thing: much has been accomplished, he declares, yet " still men are calling for more, which I have attempted; hoping that others will come after and do better than we all."[10] They were resolved, according to their several abilities and opportunities, *but each working for the most part independently of the rest,* to lay what they believed would be a firm foundation upon which others might continue to build.

What the result might have been, in the shape of a distinctively Anglican manual of moral theology, had this aspiration of

say." *Church and Parson in England,* 1927, Ordination Charge VI, pp. 189-90. To follow that advice would be not only to study the doctrinal works and sermons " of her great teachers " but also their casuistical divinity. In this connexion the present writer has sometimes wondered whether there is not room for a small book of carefully selected and arranged passages from the works of the seventeenth-century casuists, with a critical introduction and brief notes, which would be used for class work in our theological colleges alongside the lectures on moral theology. Quite apart from the practical advantage to be derived from scrutinizing the methods and teaching of past masters, such a book might open the way to a body of literature at present unknown to many students and not easily accessible, but worthy of study for its own sake.

[9] *Op. cit.,* 1606 (posthumous), Book I, p. 2.

[10] *A Christian Directory,* 1673, Preface II (p. 5 in *Chapters from a Christian Directory,* Edited by Jeannette Tawney, Preface by Bishop Gore, Bell, 1925, o.p.).

the seventeenth-century casuists been increasingly cherished by English Churchmen in the century which followed, it is now idle to speculate. The fact is that for a variety of reasons, the enormous labours of Richard Baxter which issued in his *Christian Directory,* published in 1673, proved monumental not only in their proportions but also in their significance. That great *Summ of Practical Theology and Cases of Conscience* had no successor, and from the last decade of the seventeenth-century the study of moral theology in the Anglican Church, and even more among non-Roman Dissenters, fell into a rapid decline.[11] From that date moral theology gradually became and, despite several notable attempts to improve her status, still continues to be the Cinderella of Anglican Divinity.[12]

[11] It is true that the two short tracts *Discourses Concerning Conscience* by John Sharp (Archbishop of York 1691-1714) appeared in 1685, twelve years after Baxter's *Directory,* and some of the works of the casuists continued to be reprinted, nevertheless serious interest in the subject had already begun to wane and no extensive new works of this kind were forthcoming. Mention might perhaps be made here of Nathaniel Marshall's *The Penitential Discipline of The Primitive Church, for the First* 400 *Years after Christ: Together with Its Declension from the fifth century downwards to its present State, Impartially Represented,* which first appeared anonymously in 1714 (L.A.C.T., 1844), not so much because of the value of its contents but as a work standing in marked contrast with the ecclesiastical interests of the age in which it was produced.

[12] In his brilliant lecture "The Church of England in History and To-day" in *The Genius of The Church of England,* S.P.C.K., 1947, p. 25, Canon Charles Smyth has used a similar description in respect of Church History: "But there are also certain technical improvements in the teaching of Church History which are long overdue, and without which it is likely to remain the Cinderella of the syllabus." One may perhaps allow that this is a fair statement of the situation in the theological colleges while also recognizing that the term Cinderella would hardly describe the status of Church History in Anglican Divinity as a whole. But the situation with regard to moral theology is more serious: not a few clergy can still be found who would hesitate to recognize the subject as a legitimate branch of study for Anglicans at all; it finds no place as yet in the theological

It is of course true that the "wide restoration of private confession"[13] which followed upon the Oxford Movement, and the renewed appreciation of its value[14] both as a means of sacramental grace and as a unique pastoral opportunity, could not fail to draw some attention to the importance of the systematic study of penitential theology. But penitential theology forms only one part of moral theology, and even in this restricted field the energy expended in stimulating a widespread but untutored practice far exceeded that devoted to theoretical inquiry and sound instruction.[15] In an article published in 1912, and important for other reasons, C. J. Shebbeare observed: "The Angli-

departments of most of the modern universities; while the teaching of it as a technical subject which goes far beyond the broad principles of "Christian Ethics" is hardly assumed by the General Ordination Examination. Perhaps the present writer may be permitted to record, for what it is worth, that only a very few years ago he found the Morals Paper in G.O.E. regarded by ordinands as a standing joke and one for which no serious preparation was required. It is only fair to add that an admirable course of lectures on moral theology was in fact provided for the students in this particular case, but prefaced by an explanation that the lectures were given solely because the subject was important and not at all as an aid to passing G.O.E.

[13] Dr. Pusey in the Preface to his edition of Abbé Gaume's *Manual for Confessors, Advice for those who exercise the Ministry of Reconciliation, through Confession and Absolution,* London, 1878.

[14] Cf. H. Hensley Henson, *Moral Discipline in The Christian Church* (*Westminster Abbey Lent Lectures* 1904), Longmans, 1905, pp. 2-3: "The practice of private confession, which appears to have been fairly frequent among strict Anglicans in the seventeenth century, and perhaps never died out altogether during the eighteenth, has been revived in the course of the nineteenth with such effect, that at the present time it is probably the case that it is more general in England than at any previous period since the Reformation."

[15] F. G. Belton records that his well-known *A Manual For Confessors,* which first appeared in 1916, was published "at the request of several brother priests who lamented the fact that there was no Anglican work of practical guidance for confessors," and adds that despite an interval of twenty years "I think it can be fairly claimed that it has not been superseded by any other work." Preface to 3rd Edition, 1936.

can ' director ', however, is commonly an entirely untrained man. He has no systematic knowledge either of moral theology or of moral philosophy. If anyone doubts whether this charge can be substantiated, let him call on those of his clerical friends who are in the habit of hearing confessions, and let him attempt to engage them in a discussion on the relations of the Roman Moral Theology to any other systematic moral theory he may choose to name. They will decline the discussion with perfect good humour, and give their reasons for declining it with admirable candour."[16] To the same effect, though less caustically and with a change of emphasis, the present Bishop of Oxford was able to note still more recently (1920) first that " The Church of England affords her clergy singularly little expert guidance in this matter of the direction of souls ", and secondly that " within the last fifty years, apparently, only three books have attempted to present the whole content of moral theology in such a form as should guide the theory and practice of the Church of England ",[17]—all of them, significantly enough, out of print and difficult of access.

Of these three books, special interest attaches to the first, namely James Skinner's *Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theology,* not only because of its intrinsic merit but even more because " the Committee at whose request it was compiled had in view the further possibility that it might serve as a basis for the ' construction of a " Manual of Moral Theology " suited to the growing needs of the English priesthood '."[18] That was in 1882.

[16] Art. " Probabilism ", *Church Quarterly Review,* No. 148, Vol. LXXIV, July 1912, p. 344.

[17] *Some Principles of Moral Theology,* 1920, p. vii.

[18] *ibid.*, p. viii. Dr. Kirk remarks that Skinner's *Synopsis* " remains an indispensable book for the student; and if ever the study of moral theology in the Church of England reaches a point at which the task of compiling a ' manual ' becomes possible, the value of Mr. Skinner's vast researches will be widely recognized." The other two books are: J. J. Elmendorf, *Elements of Moral Theology based on the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas,* New York, 1st Edition 1892; 2nd Edit. 1895; W. W. Webb, *The Cure of Souls,* New York, 1st Edition 1892.

But, once again, the hope was not to be realized: Skinner died before his book was published, and very nearly the whole edition of what might have proved an epoch-making work was destroyed by a warehouse fire. After this misfortune no similar conspectus of the whole subject was again attempted and, as the years passed, the task of any would-be Anglican exponent of moral theology grew increasingly forbidding. For while, on the one hand, the need for sound teaching in this field became ever more evident, yet, on the other hand, the continued neglect of the subject in the training of the clergy, both at the universities and the theological colleges, made it impossible for any prospective writer to assume any considerable acquaintance even with the most general principles and terminology of the subject, except in those who (mistakenly but perhaps in desperation) had committed themselves to the teaching of Roman manuals. It was in the face of this disconcerting situation that Dr. Kirk published his *Some Principles of Moral Theology* and the more detailed studies[19] which grew out of that general introduction.

In producing these distinguished works, Dr. Kirk expressed himself well aware of the vast amount of work to be accomplished before a satisfactory Anglican text-book on moral theology could be produced, remarking that his own *Some Principles* was no more than " a tentative scheme for the development and teaching of moral theology in the Church of England ",[20] and that his *Conscience and its Problems* " does not aspire to be a text-book."[21] It was not to be expected that the neglect of a century and a half could be made good in one generation, and progress was bound to be slow and difficult. For this renaissance of Anglican studies in moral theology had to be achieved in conditions far less favourable than those obtaining during the seventeenth century. As then, so now, the primary need was to

[19] *Ignorance, Faith and Conformity,* 1925; *Conscience and its Problems,* 1927; *The Vision of God* (Bampton Lectures, 1928), 2nd Edit. 1932.

[20] *Conscience and its Problems,* p. xi.

[21] *ibid.,* p. xxii.

lay sound foundations upon which others might profitably continue to build; but, unlike that earlier period, it was now also necessary to persuade a large proportion of the clergy that the subject was important and should form an indispensable part of their pastoral equipment. The magnitude of the task may perhaps be gauged by noting two opinions given at different stages of this development by Dr. Kirk himself. Encouraged by work already afoot, he wrote with a measure of optimism in 1920 that "it is not too much to hope that conclusions of sufficient cogency will be reached to make the compilation of a *manual* of Anglican moral theology such as Mr. Skinner wished for, a practical possibility."[22] But in 1927 he did not feel able to go beyond saying: "We are still in our pre-scientific stage, exploring the possibilities, noting the phenomena and comparing results, not merely one with another, but also with the data provided by history and by other Christian systems of the present day. And some measure of agreement on the prolegomena is a necessary preliminary to that detailed scientific treatment of Christian duty and sin, apart from which a text-book (unless it were to be a mere *ex parte* statement) could do no more than repeat the generalized aspirations of conventional ethics."[23]

In the twenty years which have since elapsed, and owing more to the inspiration and guidance of the Bishop of Oxford than to any other single influence, steady if unspectacular progress has been maintained in various aspects of the subject: and there has been an increasing recognition of its importance even among some who, on account of its long neglect, had been tempted to consider the whole subject alien to the best traditions of our Church. It still remains true, however, as the Archbishop of York has declared recently, that "we have few books on moral theology, and the clergy are taught little about it."[24] There is still a very long way to go before the Church of England can be described as "moral theology minded" or, in par-

[22] *Some Principles*, etc., p. xiii.
[23] *Conscience and its Problems*, p. xx.
[24] *The Claims of the Church of England*, 1947, p. 141.

ticular, before the long cherished hope for the compilation of an Anglican manual can be realized. Yet, with the re-opening of the theological colleges after the war and the avowed concern for improvements in the training for the ministry, the time is surely ripe for increased efforts and a further step forward towards this worthy objective. The publication of Canon R. C. Mortimer's volume *The Elements of Moral Theology,* dedicated to Dr. Kirk, is therefore an important and timely event. For, as Dr. Mortimer explains in his Preface, his more ambitious object in writing it has been that it " may afford a starting point, if only of disagreement, for the compilation of an Anglican manual." " This book ", he adds, " is not in itself a manual, or anything like it "; he would describe it rather (in words reminiscent of those quoted above in reference to *Some Principles of Moral Theology*) as " a tentative sketch or framework. As such I offer it to the Church of England in the hope that it may prompt and help the production of something greater."

II

It is very much to be hoped that Canon Mortimer's book will receive the careful study it deserves and the kind of detailed scrutiny that its author invites. Here we would offer no more than seven general observations[25] prompted by what Dr. Mortimer has already done and relevant perhaps to any discussion about a prospective Anglican manual.

(1). A fundamental difficulty in compiling an Anglican manual will be that of securing agreement about the most convenient and logical arrangement of the great mass of material to be presented. In this respect little help is to be derived from an examination of Roman manuals since, despite a superficial impression of orderliness conveyed by their numerous divisions, these are in fact characterized by precisely that kind of repetition, overlapping and confusion, which it would be the aim of any newly conceived text-book to avoid. This difficulty was commented upon by Dr. Kirk at the conclusion of his essay

[25] A few of these points were made very briefly in my review of Canon Mortimer's book in *The Guardian,* January 9, 1948.

on " Moral Theology " in the volume *The Study of Theology.* There (pp. 401-2) he listed the headings of what he described as " one of the best of modern text-books ", pointing out that even here the scheme " has suffered considerably from deference to traditional material ", more especially in the confused and repetitive treatment of sins, and the virtues and vices. He remarked that when faced by such a book the beginner " will wonder from time to time whether it would not be better to simplify the treatment by jettisoning some of the traditional classifications, and starting on a new and more logical basis." And he confessed his own belief " that this both could and ought to be done; but it would be a labour of great magnitude."

The arrangement of the material in Canon Mortimer's volume, therefore, is itself a matter worthy of study, since it is clear that he has been at pains to secure, as far as possible, a logical and simplified order without doing unnecessary violence to traditional presentations. Like St. Thomas on the one hand, and the typical modern Roman moralist on the other, he starts with an account of man's final end *objectively* and *subjectively* considered, which places the whole subject in its true setting. But immediately afterwards he parts company with them. For instead of following the more customary order, that is *Human Acts, Conscience, Law,* he turns at once to an exposition of *Law* which, in all its forms, " provides the objective, external, norm and criterion of human action " (p. 37). From this he is able to pass smoothly to an examination of the nature of *Human Action* and of the main factors which give to particular actions their moral quality, and so on to *Conscience* itself which is " the subjective norm for each individual . . . the standard for each man of morality " (pp. 75-76). This clear sequence of *objective* and *subjective* commends itself by following logically upon the equally clear two-sided treatment of man's final end in the opening chapter. The subsequent classification is especially interesting. Ordinarily the sequence from this point has been (with slight variations) something like this: (a) *Sin,* (b) *The Capital Vices and Contrary Virtues,* (c) *Virtue,* (d) *The Cardinal and Theological Virtues,* (e) *Precepts of the Decalogue,* (f) *Precepts of The Church,* (g) *The Duties of Particular States*

and Offices, (h) *The Sacraments,* (i) *Censures and Irregularities, etc.* (the repetition and overlapping referred to above is abundantly evident even from these brief major headings). It is hardly necessary to observe that Canon Mortimer does not attempt, within the remaining hundred and thirty pages of his book, to treat of all the matter contained in these divisions. Yet, when allowance is made for the large proportion of this teaching which can have no counterpart in an Anglican manual, as also for certain significant omissions to be commented upon later, it is remarkable how much he has found it possible to compress within the simple scheme he has adopted. Quite briefly, his method is to treat, in eight chapters, first of the virtues in general and then of each of the theological and cardinal virtues in turn, dealing as he proceeds with the particularized virtues subsumed under these general titles and with the vices opposed to them, and bringing back the reader in a final chapter on *Prudence* to the all-important point from which he started—since " it is the mark of prudence that it considers all things not in the light merely of our life here on earth, but in the light of our life here on earth as preparatory to our citizenship in Heaven " (p. 231). The absence of sub-headings belies the very wide range of material compressed within these chapters and, more particularly, the admirable way in which Canon Mortimer has reduced to some kind of order the substance of the expositions represented by the more traditional headings (a) to (c) noted above, with their numerous sub-sections (which in one well known Roman manual amount to no less than 129!). Tentative and incomplete though it may be, here is a stimulating contribution to that " labour of great magnitude ", as Dr. Kirk justly describes it, something definite and solid for positive criticism to work upon in determining the anatomy of the Anglican-manual-to-be.

(2). In the absence of an Anglican manual and in the task of preparing the way for the compilation of one, there is no alternative but to utilize the technical language and modes of procedure which lie to hand in the medieval and post-Reformation Roman Catholic moralists. In doing so Canon Mortimer relies mainly upon St. Thomas who, with few minor exceptions

gave classic expression to, and may be claimed still to represent the main stream of, Christian moral teaching. By this means he not only steers the reader clear of some of the more questionable divergences of the post-Tridentine Roman Catholic moral theology,[26] but (what will perhaps be not nearly so obvious at least to the beginner) also remains firmly in the tradition which the seventeenth-century English casuists accepted and sought to perpetuate. Not the least impressive feature of their writings, whether formal treatises or single "cases", is the great extent to which they adopted the general principles, terminology, categories and distinctions, laid down by their medieval predecessors, and the way in which they endorsed the more typical medieval procedure in resolving cases of doubt and perplexity. Surprising though it may sound to a reader new to the subject, it can be said with confidence that the teaching of St. Thomas is, of all the great moralists, the least alien to the Anglican tradition of moral theology so far as it exists—a fact which must be given due weight in any discussion about the *substance* of an Anglican manual. At the same time it has to be admitted that from the point of view of *terminology* much scrutinizing will be called for. On the one hand, it can be said with reasonable certainty that not a few of the minute scholastic distinctions will be once for all discarded as being (even in their own day) of no more than speculative interest. While, on the other hand, considerable revision will also be required both in the light of modern psychological studies which have rendered some of the traditional categories meaningless or erroneous, and in frank recognition that some of the categories deriving from different periods now make more for confusion than for clarity. There is opportunity here for an enormous amount of hard thinking.

(3). One omission in Canon Mortimer's book which calls for comment is that of a section on the Sacraments. That

[26] E.g., pp. 21-24, interpretation of penal laws; p. 46, actual and moral awareness; pp. 51-52, problem of "double effect"; p. 192, condemnation of Socialism; p. 213, use of the principle *melior est conditio possidentis*; p. 218, on Restitution and Compensation.

some treatment of the Sacraments from the angle of moral theology must be included in any manual which claims to be comprehensive, can hardly be doubted. At the moment, however, while important doctrinal questions concerning Baptism, Confirmation and Episcopacy, are still the subject of scholarly debate, and since the Canon Law is only now entering upon a process of revision, it is perhaps a little difficult to see how much of lasting value could be offered. Meanwhile Canon Mortimer has recently made a separate contribution towards the detailed treatment of one part of this section by revising the late T. A. Lacey's well-known volume on *Marriage in Church and State*.[27] Here, however, we would draw particular attention to his omission of any discussion of the sacrament of penance and the classical problems connected with attrition, contrition and absolution. This, of course, may well be explained on the grounds either that books on penitential theology can be found which treat of the subject in greater detail than was here possible, or that a discussion of this subject is not vital to an " introduction for beginners ". But the fact that the subject is here omitted may serve to emphasize what must surely be a characteristic of a complete Anglican manual whenever it appears, and making it stand in strong contrast with its Roman counterpart. The Roman manual is avowedly intended for the exclusive use of the clergy and more particularly in their capacity as confessors. An Anglican manual, while written primarily for the benefit of the clergy, and certainly including a section on the sacrament of penance and all matters relating to the confessional, will be designed to make a much wider appeal. If the circumstances of the time will not allow us to expect of it what Baxter long ago expected of his *Christian Directory*—namely that it will be read and valued by " the more judicious Masters of Families, who may choose and read such parcels to their Families, as at any time the case requireth,"[28]—it will at least be a manual such as the educated layman can be urged to consult for himself with profit. If the

[27] S.P.C.K., 1947, 10s. 6d.
[28] *Advertisements*, II.

ideals of the greatest Anglican exponents of the subject count for anything at all, it will be a manual which, whether in the hand of priest or layman, will in no wise seek to remove from men the duty of probing and resolving their own moral difficulties, *so far as possible,* but rather seek to train them in moral sensibility and self-reliance. It is this objective which must be taken into account when determining the precise manner in which the various systems for dealing with perplexity and doubt (probabiliorism, probabilism and the rest) shall be expounded.

(4). A second important "omission" (if indeed it may be so described) in Canon Mortimer's book is that of a distinct section devoted to a detailed exposition of the concept of sin, its species and their classification and numerical distinction, which is a constant feature occupying considerable space in conventional works of this kind. Here, however, they are dealt with in a general chapter on the morality of actions and in relation to each of the virtues. It is a question for expert discussion whether this method, especially if developed in more detail, might not be the more profitable way. The matter is at any rate one not merely of speculative but of immediate practical importance. On the one hand, it will be agreed that from one angle the proper task of the moral theologian may be described as a preoccupation with sins, their scientific analysis, their precise definition and their degrees of gravity. Yet, on the other hand, it is no less evident that such preoccupation by the moralists through the centuries has produced such a welter of minute distinctions that the sympathetic may be pardoned for wondering how much real practical assistance the average pastor may hope to derive from them; while the cynical may be tempted to observe that a healthy moral detestation of *Sin* seems to have been replaced by a decadent delight in the scrutiny of *sins* as if they were only intellectual puzzles. At all events the *fact* that there is a serious confusion of terminology, as also that it springs more especially from the two venerable distinctions of mortal and venial, formal and material, cannot be gainsaid. In one place Dr. Kirk has written that "so deeply are these two traditions rooted that I doubt whether the resultant confusion

will ever be cleared up," and even goes so far as to say: "I am led towards the conviction that the best course for a moral theology which does not feel itself tied to historical terminology would be to avoid the words 'sin' and 'sinful' altogether."[29] There is perhaps little likelihood of so radical an opinion becoming widespread, but it may well be that the satisfactory exposition of sin will prove the most intractable and forbidding of all the problems to be faced in compiling an Anglican manual.

(5). The immediate practical advantage apparent in Canon Mortimer's method of presenting more than half the material of his book under the general headings of the seven virtues has been commented upon. But here it may also be observed that by doing so he has (intentionally or otherwise) indirectly anticipated and refuted the not uncommon criticism that moral theology *necessarily* instils an excessive delight in mere legalism to the detriment of the genuine Christian aspiration towards holiness; and also pointed, as it were symbolically, to what must surely be a major characteristic of any satisfactory Anglican manual. Very near the beginning of this essay it was asserted that perhaps the most *distinctive* aim of moral theology is to enable one to "draw the line" confidently and consistently between what is and what is not permissible, between what is and what is not sin. But it was also added that *this is not by any means its only aim*. This is a point of no small importance since it leads us to a serious contrast between the Roman tradition in moral theology and the Anglican tradition so far as it exists.

One characteristic of the Roman method of teaching, which can be traced back at least to the time of that new impetus given to the study of the subject by the enormous labours of the Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has been to draw a sharp line between "moral theology" and "ascetic theology" and to treat them as two distinct sciences. In this case the second is regarded as the science or spiritual discipline which leads men in the way of perfection, while the first is concerned only to make plain the very *minimum* required for

[29] "Moral Theology", in *The Study of Theology*, pp. 396-7.

the observance of the Commandments of God and the Church, and the avoiding of sin. So, for example, Fr. Davis writes: "The science [of moral theology] cannot be anything but juristic . . . . It is not a mirror of perfection, showing men the way of perfection."[30] Or again, when urging that manuals of moral theology "should not be censured for not being what they were never intended to be," Fr. Slater declared: "They are not intended for edification, nor do they hold up a high ideal of Christian perfection for the imitation of the faithful. They deal with what is of obligation under pain of sin; they are books of moral pathology."[31] In contrast with this, what we may describe as the Anglican view may be expressed in the words of T. A. Lacey: "Moral Theology is concerned with the ultimate perfecting of human life in eternal beatitude according to the will of God; in a word, with the salvation of men. The end proposed is the glory of God. What hinders this achievement is the particular kind of evil which is specifically sin. Moral Theology is therefore, on the positive side, a doctrine of holiness, on the negative side a doctrine of sin."[32] This was certainly the view adopted and defended by the English casuists during the seventeenth century and is a partial explanation of their unconcealed antipathy towards contemporary Roman moral theology generally and that of the Jesuits in particular. Robert Sanderson gave expression to this view when he remarked in a sermon: "But when all is done, *Positive* and *Practick Divinity* is it must bring us to Heaven: that is it must poise our *judgments,* settle our *consciences,* direct our *lives,* mortifie our *corruptions,* encrease our *graces,* strengthen our *comforts,* save our *souls.*"[33] Jeremy Taylor spoke of it less succinctly but to the same effect in his Prefaces to the *Unum Necessarium* and *Ductor Dubitantium.*[34] And James Skinner

[30] H. Davis, S.J., *Moral and Pastoral Theology,* vol. I, pp. 3-4, 4th Edit., 1943.

[31] T. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology,* 6th Edit. revised 1928, vol. I. Preface to 1st Edit.

[32] *Essays in Positive Theology,* 1931, chap. XI, "The Study of Moral Theology", p. 121.

[33] *XXXV Sermons,* iii.

[34] *Works,* Eden and Taylor, vols. VII, IX-X.

placed himself in the same tradition when, in the Preface to his *Synopsis,* he declared: "Whether a manual of moral theology for the use of priests in the English Church shall ever be compiled remains to be seen. But if ever it is undertaken, it must, in the largest sense, include spiritual and mystical theology . . . The whole end of our manual must be practical, not speculative; and therefore the wide field of ascetic theology must be open to us from which to draw for the building up of souls."[35]

(6). To the present writer one of the most satisfying chapters in this book is that on *Justice,* a subject of tremendous importance for moral theology since "upon the practice of justice is based all virtuous living, and the duties of love cannot be either known or performed except the humbler and less exalted concept of justice be understood."[36] Yet this chapter has one serious weakness—the all too brief treatment of commutative justice. It is this kind of justice which concerns "the exchanges which can take place between two individuals,"[37] or as Jeremy Taylor would put it "which supposes exchange of things profitable for things profitable, that as I supply your need, you may supply mine; as I do a benefit to you, I may receive one by you."[38] Canon Mortimer writes (p. 209):

> "The second great branch of commutative justice concerns voluntary exchanges, or contracts. These take the form of buying and selling, renting and leasing, loans and deposits. Hence under this heading there fall to be discussed such subjects as the nature of contracts in general, the condition of their validity, obligations ensuing and so forth; loans and interest, usury: the just price, the obligations and rights of a purchaser, the obligations and rights of a vendor: questions relating to the employment of labour, such as the contract between employer and employee, the rights and obligations of both, and the just wage; obligations and rights of a landlord and tenant, considered as the

[35] Quoted, Kirk, *Some Principles etc.,* p. xii.
[36] *The Elements of Moral Theology,* p. 223.
[37] *ibid.,* p. 208.
[38] *Holy Living,* c. III, p. 15, *Works,* vol. III.

vendor and purchaser respectively of the use of a thing." Yet, after giving this admirable summary (based on *S.T.* II, II, q. LXI, art. 3) of the extensive range of actions in which commutative justice must find expression, Canon Mortimer passes at once, without further discussion of them, to the important subject of Restitution whereby offences against commutative justice are remedied. Perhaps the times are unpropitious, and certainly much research in this direction needs to be done, but any satisfactory manual of the future will deal in considerable detail with each of the topics summarized in the paragraph just quoted, expounding them with reference to modern conditions. That is to say, it will provide us with the principles of what we may without extravagance speak of as "a Christian economic casuistry."

But, it may be said, does not this constitute part of the territory of the "Christian sociologist"? It must be admitted that at present it does; but it may also be added that the whole field of what now goes under the name of "Christian sociology" once belonged, and still rightly belongs, to moral theology under the large heading of *justice,* forming just one part of a great whole. It would be better for both moral theology and sociology if that state of things were re-established—for, without it, moral theology tends to lose its effective significance for politics, economics and the social sciences, and to become only a personal and even pietistic pursuit; while, at the same time, Christian sociologists are all too easily (though erroneously) taken to be either romantic medievalists or subversive radicals, according to the point of view of the observer. Both of these misfortunes would be avoided, and it would certainly be a more reasonable and systematic procedure, if the "contextualization of ethics"[39] which the sociologist is out to secure, were recognized to be just the *normal* and *unextraordinary* concern of the Church as she seeks to exercise and apply her moral discipline on the side of justice, both distributive and commutative, for the well-being of human society.

[39] The phrase is Karl Mannheim's, *Diagnosis of our Time,* p. 115.

(7). Point may be given to our last observation by noting the "Index of Quotations" given by Canon Mortimer at the end of his book. In all there are seventy-two, and of these only nine are from the Bible—three from the Old and six from the New Testament. Now, in a book which so ably introduces the student to the very extensive subject matter of moral theology and to the more important of its numerous technical terms, all within the brief space of two hundred and thirty pages, this fact may be of little or no significance. But it does suggest the general question: in what way and to what extent ought Scripture to find a place in the ideal manual? One cannot fail to be impressed, for example, by the constant reference to Scripture in the moral treatises of St. Thomas or the group of English casuists cited in this essay, and what by contrast seems the paucity of such references in the typical modern Roman manual.[40]

One very obvious comment would be that the presence or absence of Scriptural references is of little moment since the Bible, unlike a manual, is not concerned with (and in fact will not permit of) a *systematic* exposition of morals. To this one may fairly reply that it is as true as it is unsatisfying. There can be little doubt that the absence of any *very obvious* and *explicit* contact with Scripture, characteristic of much technical exposition of moral theology, has done not a little to maintain that attitude of suspicion with which many non-Roman Churchmen still regard the subject. And, though it may be allowed that most of their criticisms rest upon a misunderstanding, the arguments of those who insist that such teaching seems to them excessively artificial in its form, unreal in its appeal and therefore sterile in its effects, are not to be ignored as of no account. Recent developments in another branch of theological studies might here prove instructive. A widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with a too exclusively "philosophic" exposition of Christian doctrine has led to a new interest in *Biblical* theology;

[40] Except, of course, for the use of the Decalogue as a convenient framework for much of their detailed discussion of human duty and sin, which is a constant element in these books.

and, if care be taken to ensure that these studies do not lead simply to a swing from one extreme to the other, few would question that the systematic exposition of doctrine must ultimately benefit by the fruits of this new emphasis. In some degree the same is true of moral theology. On the one hand, like every other scientific study, it requires its own precise and distinctive terminology; and, since it is concerned with the *detailed* and *minute* application of the Christian moral standard to personal and social conduct, its manner can hardly resemble that proper to a statement of the general principles of "Scriptural ethics" which are among its presuppositions. Yet, on the other hand, as the writings of the older moralists demonstrate, a severely technical exposition and a rich Scriptural reference are not necessarily mutually exclusive. And one may hazard the opinion that no *Anglican* manual of moral theology is likely to command general approval unless it is *plainly perceived* to be in some respects directly *dependent* upon Scripture; in many respects *illustrated* by Scripture; and in all things *consonant* with Scripture. On this point alone, therefore, there is room for considerable discussion.

III.

"It is obvious," writes Canon Mortimer (Preface, p. vi) "that a great deal of work needs to be done before the compilation of an Anglican manual is possible." The foregoing paragraphs will perhaps serve indirectly to emphasize the truth of that remark. How, then, and by whom is that work to be accomplished? It may be suggested in conclusion that valuable contributions could be made from four directions.

(1). The first is that noted by one of the old writers quoted earlier in this essay. After speaking modestly of his own "instructions touching the power of Conscience," William Ames went on to urge that much might profitably be done "if such things were handled in the meetings of Preachers, according to the variety of Cases that fall out; and the more remarkable decisions set down in writing."[41] The idea would seem to be no less sound and practicable now than it was when first

[41] *De Conscientia*, E. T. Address to The Reader.

proposed three hundred years ago. Of course, since it is far from being the case that every priest is already convinced of the importance and urgency of such study, these "meetings of Preachers" certainly could not be co-extensive with existing deanery study-groups or Chapter meetings. Nevertheless, it is probable that in any given area there are enough interested priests—some of them already well-read and experienced in the subject, others professedly beginners but enthusiastic, *and all of them at present doing their best in isolation*—who would be willing to make such a regular meeting possible. In some groups Canon Mortimer's book, regarded simply as direct instruction, would be found a valuable basis for corporate study. Groups already well-informed might (a) turn their attention to some of the more general matters of discussion like those mentioned in the middle section of this essay; (b) apply themselves to a disciplined and thorough scrutiny of all the factors and principles involved in some of the more pressing of contemporary moral problems (devoting special attention to local conditions)[42] in an effort to secure agreement about the lines along which their solution is to be found; and (c) discuss together (while preserving all necessary anonymity) particularly instructive cases out of their own pastoral experience. That such corporate study and pooling of individual resources and experiences would, if carefully planned, be a great help and stimulus to all the mem-

[42] Here we may recall that wider suggestion made long ago by Bishop Gore: ". . . I think it would be possible . . . to form small circles of representative men in each district, where special occupations prevail, or within the area of special professions, to draw up a statement of what is wrong in current practice, and of the principles on which Christians ought to act. A central body would meanwhile be formulating with adequate knowledge the general maxims of Christian living. I do not see why ten years' work should not give us a new Christian casuistry . . . When it was done by private means it might come under more official sanction," p. 158, "The Social Doctrine of The Sermon on The Mount," pub. in *Economic Review*, ii, 145. For this reference I am indebted to W. J. Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory*, Vol. I, Pt. II (1925 edition), p. 473, note 36. If the bishop's hopes were sanguine his idea was sound.

bers, is obvious. But it might also be urged that such (monthly or quarterly) meetings would issue ultimately to the advantage of their respective congregations, and so be a means of making the Church of England as a whole more "moral theology minded."

(2). At the same time much could be done by the theological faculties in the universities. Here the contribution would be twofold—by direct teaching and by advanced research. In view of the interdenominational character of both staff and students in many theological departments, it is perhaps too much to expect that a full course on moral theology be made a compulsory part of the syllabus; but there is every reason why it should be available as one of the voluntary courses. If a student desires to be given systematic teaching in this subject at the same academic level as in (shall we say) his Biblical Studies, then it is reasonable to expect the university, considered simply as a seat of learning, to make adequate provision for him. Moreover, it would not now be difficult to compile a list of works in English of high academic distinction providing ample basic material, when used judiciously by the lecturer and supplemented by his own particular studies, wider reading and experience, to make such a full course possible, despite the absence of a satisfactory text-book. Indeed, when the time comes for the compilation of the desired manual, the accumulated experience of university teachers of the subject may well prove to be the most formative influence in determining its shape. All else apart, one very considerable advantage in opening up the subject at the universities, rather than limiting it to theological colleges, is that students who have no intention of taking Holy Orders would then have an opportunity of sharing in the course, as many already do in other branches of theological study.

An objection may be raised, however, on strictly practical grounds, namely that the subject has been neglected for so long that, on the one hand, it might not be easy to secure the services of competent teachers and, on the other, that there might not be for some time a sufficient number of interested students to

justify the appointment of a full-time lecturer. The objection is a reasonable one but not unanswerable. A similar difficulty was not overlooked when a motion was proposed and carried in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury on October 16 of last year, urging that the study of Ecclesiastical Constitutions and Canon Law be included among the possible subjects offered in the examinations for university degrees in Divinity.[43] Here too, as in the case of moral theology, the number of competent teachers available and, for some time, the number of prospective students, would perhaps prove small. But the close relationship between the two subjects would seem to point to what might be the most economical solution in some cases. Ecclesiastical Constitutions and Canon Law provide a by no means negligible part of the material upon which the moral theologian must work; and, though it would be unreasonable to expect every moral theologian to be also an *expert* canonist, or vice versa, it is probable that the majority of those who are at present capable of teaching the one would also be prepared in some degree to teach the other. As a temporary measure, therefore, in universities where at the moment there is neither, it might suffice to have one full-time lecturer responsible for both subjects, in order to establish the courses and to start attracting students.

If moral theology were opened up in this way in the theological faculties of the universities, then a real attempt could be made to promote the advanced research so urgently required in many aspects of the subject. That the extensive

[43] *The Chronicle of Convocation,* Oct. 1947, pp. 304-7. It was moved by Canon R. L. Whytehead, and seconded by the Bishop of Dorchester, "That this House would welcome the encouragement of the study of Ecclesiastical Constitutions and Canon Law by its inclusion among the subjects in which candidates for university degrees in Divinity may be examined," p. 304. Canon Whytehead said, p. 305, "He had been told by a member of the House that many of the universities would not be in a position to comply with the suggestion in the Motion because they had not the authorities capable of dealing with the matter. He thought that was a very strong argument in favour of his Motion. If there was a demand for the study of so important a subject, the supply would probably be found."

library facilities and the opportunity for professional training in the methods and technique of research make the universities natural centres for advanced studies in this as in other subjects, hardly needs to be stressed. But perhaps the outstanding advantage of the university over the theological college in this respect lies in the constant stimulus and occasional assistance to be derived from the presence of scholars working side by side in various departments. And, indeed, without placing unnecessary weight upon the point here, it might be observed that advanced studies in moral theology would seem to present a unique opportunity for establishing or considerably strengthening that close contact between theological and other university faculties which is so desirable. Contact could quickly be made, for example, with the department of moral philosophy for discussion and joint-inquiry about the more abstruse theoretical questions relating to some of the fundamental principles of ethics; as also with the department of psychology on matters relating to that sub-division of moral theology commonly known as " ascetics ". The need for close co-operation with the schools of history and law will be apparent, both for the purpose of discovering, classifying and accurately interpreting relevant documents, and also for the detailed study of the historical development of Canon Law and related topics. Moreover, if, as has been suggested earlier, the study of " Christian sociology " be viewed as falling within the wide embrace of moral theology, then the need will be evident for a long and close co-operation with the departments of economics, political science and social administration, on numerous matters of detail. This is not the place to enlarge further on the point, but it may be said quite summarily that there is an extraordinarily wide and varied scope for the researches of students trained in moral theology who are in a position to work for higher degrees.[44]

[44] If and when an Anglican college for theological research is established, presumably studies in moral theology will receive much attention; yet, for the reasons stated in the text, it seems to the present writer that such advanced studies will by no means render research along these lines at the universities superfluous, but rather the one will supplement the other.

(3). If moral theology is at present almost non-existent as a recognized course of study in the universities, the position is officially little better in the theological colleges. The General Ordination Examination demands little more than what amounts to a short course on general and New Testament Ethics; that is, only a preliminary to the technical study of moral theology proper. There are signs, however, that a change is taking place—a change reflected, for example, in Canon Mortimer's remark that "I have been told more than once by persons responsible for the teaching of Ordination Candidates that there is need for a book of this sort" (Preface, p. v). It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that in the future the theological colleges will increasingly attempt to provide for their students that kind of academic instruction in the subject described above as suitable for a university course. If this prove to be the case, it will indeed be a great step forward. But I would venture the opinion that even this improvement should not be regarded as the ideal, but only a desirable temporary measure until more can be done. It would seem preferable for the ordinand to secure a firm grounding in the principles and methods of moral theology at the academic level during his years at the university, so that the theological college might be free to make what should be its peculiar contribution to the study of the subject, namely that of setting it firmly within the context of pastoralia. The time spent at a theological college is already short enough for the many subjects to be taught there, and the staff as a whole is rightly more pastorally than academically minded. Yet, without moral theology, courses on pastoralia must necessarily become in some respects vague and lacking in substance, amounting (through no fault of the overworked staff concerned) to little more than "snippets of good advice which we pass on to try to help you in your ministry". If then it could be assumed by the lecturer that the majority of his students had already received a sound academic training in moral theology, it would be possible to *begin* a thorough and detailed study of its more direct applica-

tion in the pastoral duties of the priest—a task outside the range of legitimate university studies.

But the contribution which might be made in this direction by the theological colleges of the future is not limited to pre-ordination training. As the Principal of a theological college once remarked to the present writer, "there are many things one cannot begin to teach a man until he has been ordained several years." To these things belong undoubtedly certain aspects of the study and application of moral theology. On the one hand, there are the special problems relating to the personal discipline and spiritual life of the priest himself. On the other hand, there are many particular types of problem such as the average ordinand cannot be expected to envisage, and which can only be appreciated after some years of experience as a parish priest called to tender advice and counsel to all sorts and conditions of men. For this reason, a valuable service would be rendered by theological colleges sponsoring more systematic post-ordination courses and conferences in which these aspects of moral theology found a recognized place. It will be agreed that the laity have the right to expect and the Church has the duty to provide, as far as possible, pastors whose advice will be as expert as their sympathy is genuine. By means of carefully planned courses special assistance might also be given (most easily, perhaps, by those theological colleges in any way connected with religious communities) both to clergy whose pastoral work already includes the confessional and "spiritual direction", and to those aware of a growing vocation to exercise their priestly office in this way but without the necessary training. It is of course true that such tasks only rarely come the way of many priests, either because of the type of parish they serve or because they frankly acknowledge that they are not well-fitted to perform them. But it is also true that immaturity in age or experience, and anything akin to amateurishness in manner or knowledge, in those who are or who aspire to be regularly so employed, can do incalculable harm. There is perhaps no more striking instance

of the dictum that "merely good intentions are not enough."[45]

(4). A fourth way by which the study of moral theology might be fostered is by means of a technical journal devoted exclusively to this purpose. One hesitates to urge the founding of any new periodical when there are already so many and when, in any event, the restrictions on paper make such a venture impossible for the time being. Nevertheless, there is much to be said in favour of launching such a project when the situation permits. We are already well provided with admirable theological monthlies and quarterlies of various kinds; but, in the nature of the case, the editors of these as also of the Church weeklies, however sympathetic they may be, can only regard moral theology as one interest among many and give it space accordingly. Yet, if the subject is to be restored to that high position in Anglican Divinity which on historical and pastoral grounds it can justly claim to occupy, then some authoritative, influential and regular medium of literary expression will be required for some considerable time to come. One of the lessons to be learnt from a review of the history of the subject in the Church of England is surely this, that if a distinctively Anglican manual is ever to be produced it will be the outcome of *a great co-operative effort* extending over many years. Possibly the manual itself will be compiled by no more than a very small group of acknowledged experts, but they will be able to set about their task only because a certain unanimity of *detailed* opinion has been hammered out by the contributions, large and small, of countless workers in this field, known and unknown. Some of the more obvious ways in which that work may be

[45] The Archbishop of York has recently observed: "There are laity who go to the spiritual healer or to the psycho-analyst for help when really they should 'open their grief to some discreet and learned minister of God's Word and by the ministry of God's Word receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and strength.'" *The Claims of the Church of England,* p. 141. Cf. "Let a priest be known as an expert in prayer as in morals, and the prejudice created by his calling and his clerical collar will soon disappear among those who so urgently need what he has to give." Bishop Francis Underhill in his Foreword to *Spiritual Direction,* by H. S. Box. S.P.C.K. 1938.

done have been indicated above, but some medium is required whereby the great aspiration may be held constantly in view, and in which all work directed to this end may be at once stimulated and in a measure co-ordinated.

These offices would fall to a journal like the one here suggested. In such a journal, as envisaged by the present writer, there would be found in varying proportions, month by month or quarter by quarter, general articles giving sound instruction on those principles of moral theology which are well-nigh beyond all controversy, and presented in a manner likely to arouse, sustain and develop interest among those who would describe themselves as "beginners"; original contributions by specialists engaged in research upon some particular aspect of the subject; informative essays on any practical or experimental work in this or closely allied spheres; critical articles on those many aspects of moral theology which, though often debated in the past, are still the source of misunderstanding and controversy; authoritative reports of any relevant contemporary news items, of conferences and clergy schools, and of any worthwhile findings or observations of those smaller clergy groups suggested above; careful reviews of important publications in this field, and reliable guidance on available literature suited to parochial and general needs; and, during the long period likely to be occupied in the revision of the Canon Law, lucid reports of the progress made, and expert guidance on the many issues involved, stage by stage, in that difficult, exceedingly complicated but highly important enterprise. It may be assumed that such a journal would be welcomed in the universities and theological colleges, and in all the large libraries where similar technical publications are received; and it is surely not unduly optimistic to sense even now an appreciation of the importance of the subject, especially among the younger clergy, at least sufficient to make such an undertaking financially sound.

CHRISTIAN REUNION

By LORD QUICKSWOOD

Now that the scheme for reunion of Churches in South India has come into effect, it seems desirable, without reviewing all the details of the scheme, to set out some of the reasons why it should not be deemed a precedent for other like schemes and at the same time to consider whether a better avenue to Christian unity cannot be found.

The capital objection to the South Indian scheme is that it accepts and is based upon the undenominational theory of the Christian ministry, and sets aside and rejects what may be called the catholic theory of that ministry. The undenominational theory of the ministry is that while some orderly ministry is prescribed by the will of God, the form of it is a thing indifferent, to be arranged as may from time to time seem consistent with edification. One may compare the form of ministry to the form of clothing: men must be decently clothed, but the form of their clothes they may settle as they like. To bring the two thoughts closer together, a minister of religion must be decently dressed—but whether he must only wear black or any ordinary colour, whether he should have a Geneva gown or a soutane or knee-breeches and gaiters like an Anglican dignitary, or the ornate robe of a Russian bishop, has no spiritual significance; each local Church may appoint its own rules and customs in the matter. And in the undenominational theory, the form of the ministry may be anything that satisfies the spiritual needs of sincere Christians; and if one form of ministry is at any time to be preferred to another, it is because in the existing circumstances it is likely to prove more effectively edifying than others. No particular form of ministry is

divinely appointed: within the limits of what is seemly and pious, each Church may please itself.

This undenominational theory is really the theory of the South Indian scheme. The scheme does indeed claim that it makes a kind of synthesis of the Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregational ministries, but it ranks them all equal, and though members are expressly allowed to believe that one form of ministry is divinely appointed, the Church clearly rejects this opinion, for unless it teaches that no particular form of ministry is divinely appointed, it cannot treat them all as equal.

With the undenominational theory the catholic theory of the ministry may be contrasted. According to that theory, the ministry of bishops, priests and deacons is divinely appointed, and though other ministries have been divinely blessed and have done good work—though indeed organizations without any ministry, like the Salvation Army or the Society of Friends, have been most richly blessed—yet as a matter of obedience, the one divinely appointed ministry must always be adopted because it has been appointed, and to set it aside is to be disobedient. The grounds for thinking that the catholic ministry has been divinely appointed, are a topic for a great book rather than for this paper. Here it will suffice to say that the catholic ministry has existed in its present form from about the close of the first century, in general acceptance until the sixteenth, and by the Roman, Orthodox and Anglican communions until the present time. Further, its underlying principles are to be found in the New Testament and in the practice of the Apostles, for from these we learn that Christian ministers must be duly authorized and that that authorization is conveyed by the imposition of hands, a rite that in the New Testament always expresses the transmission of some spiritual benefit from one person to another (most often healing). Only those ordained others who had received authority to ordain, and it follows that as the ministry must be authorized and that authorization is conveyed by transmission from person to person, the principles on which the catholic ministry rests are established, and its universal acceptance is seen to be the inevitable consequence

of the teaching and practice of the Apostles. In short, from the beginning until the sixteenth century, only those who had been authorized to ordain did ordain and they ordained by imposition of hands, symbolizing transmission of grace from person to person in authorized succession. It seems to me reasonable to say that this form of ministry, based on the principles of apostolic practice and adopted by the whole Church for fourteen hundred years, is the divinely appointed form. It is appointed by the Holy Spirit, and must as a matter of obedience be used by every local Church. Other forms of ministry must not be treated as being equal to it, however richly the work of those ministries may have been blessed. The test is not one of efficiency, but of obedience.

This brings into view another principal error of the South Indian scheme. Its designers seem to have sought to ascertain the will of God less by the study of the Bible and of the practice of the universal Church than by inferring that whatever he has blessed and used he must be thought fully to sanction and approve. They seem to have reasoned from the saying, "by their fruits ye shall know them", and applied it as a test for the different Christian ministries and organizations. The test of fruits is given us to distinguish good from evil, the work of God from that of Satan. And for that purpose it is conclusive, for moral good cannot spring out of moral evil, nor *vice versa.* But no wise man supposes any Christian organization or ministry to be morally evil or satanic. No one doubts that all forms of Christian ministry are sincere attempts to serve Christ. They are holy and spiritual and we cannot judge between them like machines by their productivity.

We must recognize that all Christian organizations and all Christian ministries are blessed and used by the Holy Spirit to further his purpose. The test of fruits is not applicable as between growths, all of which are holy. But that does not relieve us from the obligation of obeying the ordinance of divine appointment, revealed to us through the Bible and the Church. Our brethren who do not see the truth may in their unconsciousness be free from sin; but if we with our eyes open accept unauthorized ministries as though they were authorized,

we act wrongly because disobediently. We who believe that God has appointed a ministry, must obey his appointment.

The Anglican designers of the scheme have confused God's mercy and loving-kindness with his approval. Because God blessed the Presbyterian and Congregational ministries like the Episcopal, they assumed that all were equally approved and, throwing overboard the belief, that only the Episcopal ministry was divinely appointed, they drifted into undenominationalism. But this is surely to underrate the loving-kindness of God. He always makes the best of us. Whatever we do for Christ's sake and meaning to obey him, God blesses and uses. But that does not mean that he approves what we are doing. He makes the best of it. We can see how richly he has blessed the work of the Salvation Army and of the Society of Friends. But are we therefore to believe that God approves of their neglect of all ministry and all Sacraments? God in his mercy blesses a great deal that is very imperfect. Perhaps it may be said that if God waited to bless us until we were achieving perfection, he would wait a long time. That is true. But we must not infer God's approval from his blessing. To know his will and approval, we must look to his revelation through the Bible and the Church, and what we so learn of his will, we must obey.

The adoption of the undenominational theory of the ministry is the most fundamental error of the South Indian scheme. But the scheme is also faulty in screening disagreement either by silence or by ambiguity. Even about the Creed an element of indefiniteness is allowed; and about the Sacraments there is an obvious disposition rather to avoid controversy than to formulate truth. It will be said that the Church of England deals in ambiguities. It does, but it has paid a heavy price for whatever has been gained. Have we not a half-suppressed schism between extreme Anglo-Catholics and extreme Protestants weakening the Church? And worse still the power of stretching ambiguous formularies has spread to those that are not ambiguous, and has so corrupted the sense of honour among clergymen, both Anglo-Catholic and

Modernist, that one wonders that they can treat solemn declarations as they do and yet remain in other relations honest men. Yet the South Indian Church is to carry ambiguity further than the Church of England, for no-one can deny that the Prayer Book clearly teaches about the Creed and about Baptism, and keeps ambiguity about the Eucharist within close limits. The greater vagueness of the South Indian scheme may bring worse evils.

But to those who have a certain outlook on reunion, ambiguity of word or statement is almost precious. These are they who regard the union of Church organizations as an urgent and peremptory duty. They want reunion without delay and if they cannot bring the different parties to agreement, they are only too pleased to screen off, as it were, the disagreement by an ambiguous phrase. Unity of organization they claim will produce agreement. The members of the South Indian Church will, they think, "grow together". It may be so, of course. But experience is not very encouraging. After all, every schism originated within the common organization of the Church; and in the Church of England there is less unity than there was a hundred and twenty years ago. In those years the Church of England has not "grown together"; it has grown apart. In the year 1820 one set of Churchmen did not celebrate the Eucharist (sometimes spoken of as the sacrament of love) in a way which led another set of Churchmen to interrupt the service with shameful and violent disorder. If there are strong currents of opinion running which divide men, common membership of an organization will not make them grow together.

But those who have carried through Church union in South India hope for growing together, notwithstanding the mischief of screening off disagreements, because they think that unity of organization cannot wait, that disagreements must be plastered over somehow, so that organized unity may be immediately achieved. Strangely they quote the prayer of Christ "that they all may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they may be in us: that the world may

believe that thou didst send me" (John xvii, 21). But surely it is perfectly plain that what our Lord prayed for is the union of his disciples in perfect love. He had already taught them to the same effect. And this union of love is indeed an urgent and peremptory duty which cannot wait while we argue and fail to agree. It is the want of this union of love that has so grievously hindered the work of the Church and the conversion of the world. But unity of organization is different. It is not so urgent nor is the want of it so mischievous. For Christians not to love one another is a sinful disobedience to Christ: division of organization is a defect and a weakness, springing doubtless from the sins of bygone times, but now to be thought of as the Church's infirmity, to be borne till it can rightly be cured. And assuredly if a perfect union of love could be realized unity of organization would in time follow. Schism is the punishment of sin and specially of the sin of uncharitableness. The Church must walk by the teaching of the fifty-first Psalm. First must come penitence, then its infirmities of disagreement will be healed, its tongue will be loosened, sinners will be converted and then (as a wise later hand added) the walls of Jerusalem may be re-built and the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving be offered by one catholic and apostolic Church.

The error of the makers of the Church of South India is that they have tried to do the right thing in the wrong way. Believing sincerely, though mistakenly, that Christ's prayer and commands related to unity of organization (whereas his words do in fact relate to union of love), they have regarded and treated organized reunion as a peremptory duty which could not wait but must be pressed through to realization. They rashly assumed that they were led and carried forward by the divine will. But such reliance on subjective feeling is most dangerous. Internal assurance should never be trusted unless it is sustained by the general consent of all Christians. If the opinion of other Christians is to be disregarded, it can only be rightly on rational argument based on God's revelation in the Bible and through the whole Church. Yet I think I am right in believing that the supporters of the South Indian

scheme have been urged forward by their strictly subjective impression that what they did was approved by the divine will. Yet history shows that there is almost no limit to the error and even the wickedness which may be followed under the subjective sense of obedience to the divine will. The murderers of Archbishop Sharpe, for example, felt quite sure that it was the will of God that they should murder the archbishop. So fearfully can human nature deceive itself. I am not suggesting that the South Indian Church belongs to the same category as murder. But if sincere men can persuade themselves that God approves a murder, how much more easily can they be convinced that he approves an injudicious scheme of Christian reunion.

It should, I think, be recognized by all that the setting up of the Church of South India, whether it has done good in India or not, has done harm in England and, I suppose, throughout the Anglican communion. For it has stimulated and exacerbated the veiled schism which has so long weakened the Church of England and uncured may still lay up that Church like a chronic invalid with one of its attacks. It is a sad truth that as between Anglo-Catholics and Protestant Evangelicals there is no true union of love within the Church of England. Between the more extreme members of each group there is rather bitterness. Upon the Protestant side this is open and declared, for they attack those who are in form their Christian brethren as disingenuous traitors, who, whether consciously or not, are moving towards the Church of Rome, a church which is the church of anti-christ. This bitterness leads even to riotous interruptions of Anglo-Catholic services which are deeply disgraceful to those who make them and indirectly to the whole Church of England. The Anglo-Catholic extremists are better mannered, but can they be acquitted of uncharitable provocation? Do they really care what anger or alarm or distress they cause? There is no active charity towards their opponents, no attempt to remove misunderstandings or to cleanse the shame of an embittered quarrel between Christians, a shame that necessarily stains both sides. The South Indian scheme has stirred the embers of this evil fire. It is the Anglo-

Catholic group that has been heated and we have been told of "masses of reparation", which somehow sound inappropriately uncharitable. Even those Anglo-Catholics who would shrink from such polemical devotion, yet feel alarmed at the inauguration of the Church of South India, alienated from plans for reunion and fearful that the Church of England may be enticed into some undenominational unity which would destroy its character as part of the catholic and apostolic Church. The effect of the Church of South India in England has not been to promote charity and union but variance and fear. The troubles that have vexed the venerable Society for the Propagation of the Gospel are an example of the mischief that has been done.

Contrast with South Indian reunion, the recent unions of Presbyterians in Scotland and of Methodists in England. These unions have been smoothly made and everyone seems content. They were unions of organizations whose members were already agreed in opinion. No one had to accept any formula or ministry knowing that someone else accepted it in a different sense. Agreement came before union whereas in India it is to come, if at all, afterwards.

It thus seems that experience suggests a certain orderly method which should be followed. First (as I hope all will agree) there must be union of love: all the members of the uniting bodies must sincerely and without reservation love one another. This means not an emotional state of feeling but a principle controlling perfectly all acts and all words, so that no member of either body wishes to hurt or is carelessly indifferent whether he does hurt any member of the other body, but all in both bodies are joined by warm goodwill. This is the union for which Christ prayed and always proves that Christians are indeed his disciples. If attained it will naturally and easily lead to all sorts of co-operation in good works and for good causes, and even for mutual helpfulness in matters not directly affecting faith and order. In recent years, notably during the last fifty years, very great progress has been made towards union of love in England, and in some degree throughout

Christendom. The Church of England and the Free Churches have become warm in friendship. The old antagonism between Church and Dissent has cooled and the feuds that raged about churchyards and schools are half-forgotten. At the same time there have been a series of mutual courtesies between the Anglican Churches and the Orthodox Churches of the East. The like has happened between the Church of England and some of the Lutheran Churches of the Continent. Even our Roman brethren, whose principles require that they should hold the rest of Christendom at arms' length, have become more kindly mannered. The present Pope speaking of Protestants said that they are Christians outside the framework of the Catholic Church. Some of his predecessors would have said that they were heretics who ought to be burned and were only not burned because it was impossible to burn them. Of course one would prefer to be regarded as a framed and not unframed Christian. But it is much nicer to be thought of as an unframed Christian than as frustrated fuel.

Really the progress in mutual charity among Christians has been very great in the last half-century. In this respect the Lambeth Appeal of 1920 did much good. And even more potent have been the fearful manifestations of evil in the last forty years. In face of common danger Christians have drawn together. The saying: " By this shall men know that ye are my disciples if ye love one another " no longer sounds painfully in our ears—turned by human wickedness into a dreadful irony. In general, though not always nor everywhere nor without exceptions, Christians do now love one another. They do, that is to say, show kindness and goodwill to one another and help one another, especially their brethren who are suffering wrong or persecution.

There are, I suppose, exceptions to this friendship among Christians in Eastern Europe and in Asia. But the exception with which we in the Church of England are most concerned and directly or indirectly in some degree responsible for, is the hostility between Protestants and Anglo-Catholics, a hostility arising because the latter are thought to be too like Roman

Catholics. I have already referred to this. It is necessary to realize that it in great degree hamstrings any effort by Anglicans towards Christian reunion. I heard Archbishop Frederick Temple preach a sermon in the year 1900 in St. Paul's at a service for the Church Congress, in which he said that the Church of England cannot effectively lead Christendom towards reunion until it is more perfectly united within itself, a closer unity for which he strongly appealed. That seemed true at the time; and surely it has been confirmed by experience. If on one side approach is made towards Rome or even towards the Orthodox East, there is uneasiness and unrest among Evangelical Protestants, and on the other hand if there is union with Methodists and Congregationalists, as in South India, Anglo-Catholics begin to say masses of reparation and even persons like myself are made anxious by the South Indian Church. As long as there is distrust and hostility between Protestant Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics within the Church of England, each party thinking the other may at any time injure the Reformed or else the Catholic character of the Church, no attempt at reunion with any body outside can usefully be made. We must first achieve a whole-hearted union of love between these nominally fraternal antagonists so that though there may still be disagreement there will be no distrust, and the disagreement, precisely understood and charitably recognized, will never be either exaggerated or embittered. I am persuaded that about the Eucharist good-tempered discussion would show that there is a large element of misunderstanding in the disagreement of the two groups. But before any discussion there must be a thorough and sincere wish in the minds of both parties not to vex or distress one another; and I am not sure that at present this condition is satisfied. Moreover among a small section of Protestant Anglicans the opinion is still strongly held that the Pope is antichrist. This opinion is not taken seriously by other Churchmen to whom it seems to lie on the outward verge of sanity. But it is unhesitatingly held; and there are others who with less precision yet sincerely believe Roman Catholicism to be definitely an evil thing—not a mistaken nor partly corrupted form of a good thing but a thing certainly belonging to dark-

ness and not to light. How far this way of thinking exists outside the Church of England among the Free Churches I do not know, but it certainly exists within the Church of England, and as long as it exists it gravely hinders any useful activity of the Church for Christian reunion. For it is a perennial fountain of distrust: among Protestants there is fear of all High Church actions as possibly tending toward the Roman antichrist, while if there is any approach towards the Free Churches, High Churchmen are afraid that they are being enticed into a unity from which Rome and probably also the Orthodox are to be excluded—a unity which they would think worse than the present division. High Churchmen must always shrink from Christian reunion which seems only "no popery" in disguise.

What I am urging is that to achieve Christian reunion we must first labour for a true union of love comprehending all Christians, and that the immediate task for us in England is to heal the bitter antagonism which Protestants feel towards Roman Catholics and, in spite of the bond of common Church membership, towards Anglo-Catholics as tainted with Romanism. Until the union of love within the Church of England is complete, it is futile and mischievous to try for any union of organization with any body outside the Anglican communion. Efforts might, indeed, be made to clear up topics of disagreement with such bodies. Something of the kind would naturally happen in the course of any sincere drawing together in charity: if people love one another they will try to soften, if they cannot remove, disagreements between friends. This would be very well. Much might be done, I think, to clear up misunderstandings. Only do not let it be done by ambiguous formulas which different people accept in different senses. Where agreement cannot be reached let the disagreement be stated as clearly and precisely as possible. Whether, when the time comes for planning unity of organization, it must hinder and delay, that unity must depend on its importance and how far it interferes with the practical and devotional life of the Church. If it does so hinder, unity of organization must wait. It is only the union of love that cannot wait. In no case must

disagreement be veiled: it may be treated as subordinate, but it must never be hidden. If it is, there grows up a want of mental truthfulness, that enfeebling infirmity.

Thus I see Christian reunion as a work to be done in three stages: first must come the union of love, strong, universal and whole-hearted; next there must be healing of disagreement so far as may be possible: lastly, if either agreement has been reached or if disagreement, clearly defined and understood, is seen not to be in devotion nor in Church order nor in active spiritual work, an obstacle to united action, then plans may begin to be made for unity of organization. If all this means long delay in reaching unity, that delay must be patiently borne; for it is only the union of love that is spiritually urgent; it is that union for which Christ prayed and, as he taught, is the mark of discipleship.

THIS EXISTENTIALISM

By BASIL S. MOSS

THE purpose of this article is to distinguish and discuss the various senses of "existential", "existentialism", in common use. I write as a beginner for beginners, that we may be able to defend ourselves against the scorn of high-brows, and avoid some of the snares of the newest fashion in words.

We may start from a fundamental sense of the word "existential" which is immediately intelligible and useful to English readers of every philosophical school or none. (The rest of this paragraph owes a great deal to Dr. Richardson's *Christian Apologetics*.) Sciences are existential in so far as the personal standpoint and personal judgement of the observer have to be taken into account. In the natural sciences every attempt is made rigorously to exclude the effects of any bias in the investigator. But it is increasingly admitted that even in the natural sciences we must begin with *some* presuppositions; we must adopt, however tentatively, *these* principles of schematization and interpretation rather than *those*. The categories of biology are not the same as the categories of physics. In the case of the sciences of history and theology we may perhaps go further, and say that here such objectivity as the natural sciences can achieve is neither possible nor desirable. Subjective factors enter in as of right; and therefore these sciences are properly described as existential. The reason is that in these sciences the investigator is studying man, or God's revelation of himself to man. There is therefore no question of subjectivity versus objectivity, but only of *this* subjective standpoint versus *that*. The whole being of the investigator is personally involved. His history cannot but be at the least a selection of facts made by some criterion of his

own, not derived from the facts themselves. His theology is necessarily conditioned by his belief or unbelief. *Fides praecedit intellectum.* And in this connexion, Rationalism might well be described as reason depending upon concealed subjective presuppositions while denying that it is using any.

When we turn to philosophy we find the word "existential" in use in two quite distinct senses, by the disciples of St. Thomas Aquinas and by the disciples of Kierkegaard respectively. Only in the Kierkegaardian sense has "existential" succeeded so far in generating an "-ism". I suppose all philosophy starts off from the queries which the world of experience raises in the mind of man. It interests and puzzles us. We are conscious of an "unsatisfactoriness", a "relativity", an "insufficiency", a "need of metaphysical explanation". And so we try to frame the right questions, and we try to find the right answers. The Thomist accepts as sound the common-sense view of our knowledge of the world, and analyses this "unsatisfactoriness" in ontological terms. He goes on to explain it by saying that the world of experience is relative to something other than itself (including its observer),—i.e. God, who is the sufficient ground for the world's existence, and himself more real than it, being indeed the *ipsum esse subsistens.* Thus the "existential question" is the right question, the *why* of a certain existence; and the right answer to it is an ontological answer, an answer which follows the pattern of the *quinque viae.* This is the setting of the Thomist use of "existential". On the other hand, as everybody knows, Descartes remarked *Cogito, ergo sum,* and thereby initiated a revolution in philosophy. Philosophers of the tradition which is found this side of the Cartesian watershed analyse the "unsatisfactoriness" of the world of experience in epistemological terms (i.e. in terms of knowledge rather than being). *Our* experiencing the world gives it what coherence and sufficiency it has; and its insufficiency is our insufficiency, which is either admitted as ultimate (as in empiricism and positivism) or transcended (as in Absolute Idealism). The world's *raison d'être* is not God but the human observer. To speak less rashly, and

in more technical language, instead of working with an ontological contrast between the necessary and the contingent, we identify the contingent with the empirical, as a complementary factor with the *a priori* in the constitution of a body of objects of knowledge. *Esse est percipi*: "being" is a word which only has meaning with reference to the knowing-activity of the human subject. This is true whether we say that "to be" is simply for the Ego to assert its identity, continuity and interpretative power in a fleeting succession of atomized sensa and sensibilia; or whether we try with the followers of Hegel to save our sense of a public universe by deifying our epistemological processes and asserting "I believe in Mind". In the latter case we solve the problem of the "unsatisfactoriness" of the world of experience by a doctrine that Reality is all-comprehensive knowledge, a systematic rational structure, that thought is Reality conscious of itself (of which an individual's thought is but a part of Reality partly conscious of itself); and that this single comprehensive "Absolute" is God. It is against this background of Hegelianism that Kierkegaard formulated his doctrine of *existenz*.

It may already have occurred to the reader that the Achilles' heel of post-Cartesian philosophies is the question of our knowledge of other minds, and the possibility of ethics and personal relationships. The difficulty is particularly acute for Hegelian Idealists. If all reality is to be analysed in terms of thought, and the unity of thought is the fundamental axiom of philosophy, an individual human being is either God, or else part of God and identical with God to that degree. How then can there be a realm of moral activity and responsibility, a realm of *guilt*, before God or men? Kierkegaard held passionately that there is such a realm, that it is a realm of "existence" as opposed to "thought", and that as such it cannot be described, analysed or systematized. "Existence", the truth about a man that really matters, can only be known inwardly. It coexists in an agonizing way with his thought about the world, and perpetually affirms the inadequacy of that thought. Truth is inwardness, an inner opaque subjectivity of the moral

man. "Existence" is affirmed not in acts of knowing but in acts of ethical decision, in acts of the will. Some quotations from the *Unscientific Postscript* will make this clear:

> The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. Away from the subject the objective way of reflection leads to the objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity; for all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity . . . Quite rightly, since as Hamlet says, existence and non-existence have only subjective significance (p. 173).
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> Let us take as an example the knowledge of God. Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God . . . It is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But this is in all eternity impossible, because God is a subject, and therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness (p. 178).
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> The only reality that exists for an existing individual is his own ethical reality. All knowledge *about* reality is possibility. The only reality to which an existing individual may have a relation that is more than cognitive, is his own reality, the fact that he exists. Abstract thought requires him to become disinterested in order to acquire knowledge; the ethical demand is that he become infinitely interested in existing (p. 280).
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> The real subject is not the cognitive subject, since in knowing he moves in the sphere of the possible; the real thinker is the ethically existing subject. An abstract thinker exists, to be sure, but this fact is rather a satire on him than otherwise. For an abstract thinker to try to prove his existence by the fact that he thinks is a curious contradiction; for in the degree that he thinks abstractly he abstracts from his own existence . . . The attempt to infer existence from thought is thus a contradiction. For thought takes existence away from the real, and thinks it

by abrogating its actuality, by translating it into the sphere of the possible (p. 281).

> The only way in which an existing individual comes into relation with God is when the dialectical contradiction [of the God of objective thought] brings his passion to the point of despair, and helps him to embrace God with the "category of despair" (faith) (p. 179 n.).

Thus Kierkegaard holds that there is a complete dichotomy between thought and existence. While he allows a certain validity to "objective" thinking, it is the validity of the abstract. It is when we try to relate our abstract thinking to the concrete realities of subjective existence as a person that we realize its futility and bankruptcy. It is when we are confronted with this dichotomy that we cannot but know the *Angst,* the dread and despair of our situation.

The modern existentialism of Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Marcel and their various disciples, which is exercising such a widespread influence abroad at the present time, especially in France, and is beginning to attract great interest here, has Kierkegaard as its immediate and obvious source. In its broadest sense existentialism is a doctrine of man. On the one hand, it insists upon the unique moral facts of freedom, decision and guilt. On the other, it attacks the pretensions of all forms of Rationalism, particularly in the spheres of epistemology, ethics and history. That is to say, we find a profound scepticism about the ability of human thinking either to find reliable answers to the problems of knowledge, or to formulate or justify an adequate philosophy of life. With this is combined a passionate assertion of man's stature as a *person,* conscious of and capable of freedom and responsibility. Here is a doctrine which we might dare to express in Biblical language. The fact that we are "formed of the dust of the ground", we might say, makes all the difference to the fact that we are "made in the image of God". We cannot escape the prison of finitude, particularity and contingency into which we were born, and in which we must do our thinking and living. If the mind can transcend that finitude, and weave for itself a coherent pattern

of life, the individual person cannot. It is *here* that we *exist*. Like caged birds we have wings, but can only flutter them behind the bars. *This* is the desperate tragedy of man's intellectual and moral situation. Awareness of it is the ground of his perpetual agony of insecurity, his "dread" (*l'angoisse, die Angst*). "Existentialism puts a man face to face with his freedom . . . Confronted with the extent of the responsibility which his freedom lays upon him how can he be anything but in anguish?" (Sartre).

Whenever a philosophy becomes fashionable we may be sure that it reflects in some measure the temper of the age. The conscientious optimists of the pre-1914 century found some form of Idealism very helpful. The inter-war generation, especially in England, so eagerly engaged in debunking the very standards and values by which it lived and still lives, has lightheartedly embraced the donnish philosophies of agnosticism, the negative creeds of the Logical Positivists, and the dishonest pragmatism of the "Scientific Attitude" people. The present vogue on the continent of existentialism (better described as an attitude to life than as a philosophy) is directly connected with the inevitable spread of a scepticism very different from that of the well-fed, respectable and comfortably-off, the external setting of whose lives has still to crumble. It is a scepticism of a strange urgent tragic quality, a profound desperation of soul.

Readers of Arthur Koestler's *Arrival and Departure* will recall how vividly the author portrays the combined effects of Nazi brutality and modern psycho-analysis upon Peter Slavek. They completely dissolve away all the concepts a man lives by. The possibilities of justice, courage, self-sacrifice for a cause, are not merely beyond realization: the ideals themselves have no meaning, they are idiotic. Peter is left in a state of complete disillusionment, unable to give any justification for living with the stature of a man. At the end he finds himself making a decision of will to do the heroic thing (to go back into the war) in conscious irrationalism. *Arrival and Departure* was published in 1943. Since then nearly every great city in Europe has been bombed and shelled, and the hopes of a speedy and

easy recovery of the old framework of life have almost vanished. Western Europe, exhausted by the horrors and futilities of two wars, faces the apparent inevitability of a third. The physical ruins aptly symbolize the mental ruins. Many, no doubt, will clutch at Communism; many (such as Koestler himself) are the "further side" of Communism. The language of the existentialists affords an opportunity of expressing the prevailing sense of being a *survivor,* a survivor who has but a short time to debate the issues of suffering and death before they overtake him also, a survivor who must find his freedom and self-realization in some terrible personal decision of the will, a survivor whose only chance to do a noble act in defiance of a monstrous world might be to anticipate the end by suicide. It is no accident that of the two most influential existentialists, Heidegger began to write for Germany after Versailles, and Sartre writes for present-day France. They both reflect to a large degree the mood of the times.

Modern existentialism takes both Christian and atheistic forms (Marcel, e.g., is a convert to Rome). For the Christian existentialist the impasse of moral and metaphysical thinking point the way back (and it is an intellectual *via crucis*) to faith in the mercy of God, the hidden personal God, of whom St. Thomas said long ago *quid non sit cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum* (S.c.G. III, 49). Sartre, on the other hand, bitterly attacks Christianity precisely because he sees in this appeal to God an attempt to escape from the *angst* of our situation, to find a false comfort in our despair, to throw upon God the final responsibility which is ours. The noble tragedy of our experience is destroyed if we tack on a happy ending.

> We have nothing to do with the Christians, who find it easy to address themselves to God for a solution of the problems posed by our human condition (I don't say human nature). We believe that even if God existed man would not be able to escape from himself. It appears to us that Christians and Materialists, on different planes, both refuse to assume their freedom. (Sartre, "Existentialism", art. in *The Student Movement,* May 1947.)

It will be clear from this that existentialism does not take

the Christian by surprise. The war between existentialism and the various forms of Rationalism, which is now sharply dividing secular thought, has divided Christians from the beginning, and has long been fought within the Church under other names. It is to be discerned in the conflict of opinions about the relation betweeen faïth and reason, revelation and reason. The Church has her own prophets of darkness, who have bitterly attacked the claims of men to comprehend the mysteries of God, who have insisted that we walk by faith and not by sight, and who have bluntly accused philosophers, Christian and non-Christian alike, of sinful pride and futile self-deception: "If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness". It is by faith alone that we stand trembling before the unknown God, as creatures before the creator, as men blinded by sin before the all-holy. Had not Paul said that "God has made foolish the wisdom of the world"? or Augustine, "*crede ut intelligas*"? or Luther, "the intellect is the devil's whore"? Such voices are familiar. What gives real point to the prophetic deliverances of the Barthians and their "fellow-travellers" is the extent to which they are constrained to speak by the contemporary scene, the extent to which it is the *fact* of intellectual bankruptcy which they but voice and interpret. Gilson suggested in a recent broadcast (Philosophical Movements in France, *Listener*, Feb. 6, 1947) that existentialism (which he describes as a religious philosophy without God) is what Augustine's Confessions would be, had the author been left to his own devices, and without the saving grace of God. It is indeed true that Augustine lived at the end of an epoch in man's thinking and living, and he knew it. But he saw the hand of God *in* all the desperations of his intellectual and moral pilgrimage. And he found salvation in and through his insecurity, by grace alone. We cannot escape the question Augustine faced and answered: Is the present mess the hard way of learning the truth about man? Is God's finger in the contemporary situation, writing on the walls of the world for those who can read it a judgement against all attempts to think and live securely in our own strength, a judgement against all attempts to do without giving him that humiliating acknowledgement which he requires?

ON DEFINING RELIGION

By D. W. GUNDRY

THE simplest questions are very often the least asked and the least answered: yet they are very often the most fundamental. One such is "What is religion?" Perhaps the truest answer would be the same as that given by Origen to the question as to who wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews—"God knows." But it can hardly satisfy man's unquenchable thirst after knowledge. Like most apparently simple questions, it cannot be simply answered.

If we called in a hundred passers-by, gave them a pencil and a piece of paper, and asked them to write down in two minutes what religion is, we might well receive a hundred different answers; and it may be hazarded that not a few of the hundred would find great difficulty in writing anything down at all. This does not mean that they would necessarily be irreligious people. On the contrary, the more religious they were, the more probable would be their inability to give a satisfactory definition.

Religion is so universal, so all-embracing, so personal, so intimate, so varied a thing that it is well-nigh impossible to define it in a few, or even in many, words. What was said long ago of a few events in the life of the founder of but one religion must hold true of the definition of all religion: "I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." Many of the stock answers to the question "What is religion?" we know well enough. It is "belief in God," "living up to one's ideals," or "going to church"; but clearly these will not do, because they leave so much out. In any case, severally they cover only this religion or that in part, and are quite inapplicable to other religions.

The etymology of the word "religion" does not help us greatly. Even if we knew for certain its origin, we should be in a position to state only what the ancient Romans thought to constitute the essential feature of religion, and not what religion in fact is. As it is, there is some uncertainty about the origin of the word. Cicero, in his *De Natura Deorum*,[1] derives *religio* from *relegere* (to re-read, ponder). This view was supported later by the grammarian Gellius, who remarks, *relegentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas.* Religion is thus a re-consideration, a pondering of things, or, in its debased form, a recitation of formulae. On the other hand, the "Christian Cicero," Lactantius, in his *Institutiones Divinae*,[2] finds the source of *religio in religare* (to bind back), and is followed in this etymology by Augustine and by Servius, the commentator on Virgil. Lactantius quotes the *De Rerum Natura*[3] of Lucretius in support: *religionum nodis animos exsolvere.* Religion is, in this view, a bond, a tying down—for Lucretius a hindrance to be broken, for Augustine that which holds man back from destruction. But neither derivation helps us much. At the most they show what at one time might have been a characteristic of that abstraction which we now call Roman religion. Actually, the popularization of the word *religio* is indicative of the religious breakdown of the Hellenistic world. The very fact that cultured Greeks and Romans came to regard religion as a human activity which could be isolated from other human activities was a symptom of the deep-rooted "failure of nerve", as Gilbert Murray describes it,[4] in the spiritual life of the Graeco-Roman world.

Prior to the rise of the great philosophical schools in Ancient Greece, as well as in the early Roman kingdom and republic, it is doubtful whether a Greek or Roman would have understood easily what we mean by "religion." Indeed, for the ancient world at large there was no such thing as, say, Egyptian

[1] *op. cit.*, 2, 28.
[2] *op. cit.*, 4, 28.
[3] *op. cit.*, 1, 931; 4, 7.
[4] *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, cap. IV, Oxford, 1925.

religion, Babylonian religion, Hebrew religion, Greek religion, Roman religion. This classification is merely a modern academic device. We find it convenient to speak of Egyptian history, Egyptian science, Egyptian art, Egyptian law, Egyptian religion; but, for the peoples of the ancient world generally, there was no such departmentalism. Religion and life were one and the same thing. Culture or civilization was religious through and through: there was little or no distinction between the sacred and the secular, such as has become common in post-Renascence Europe.

It is widely held that European civilization largely derived its religious heritage from the Jews. While our aesthetic and speculative inheritance is mainly, though not entirely, Greek in origin, our legal and institutional Roman, our scientific Arabic, there is no questioning the Jewish origin of Christianity. The Hebrews were the religious geniuses of the ancient world. Yet they had no word for religion. Religion as a factor in their national life which could be separated from the rest, as something which could be studied from outside, was unthinkable. For them religion and Israel were one and the same thing. The nearest approach in Hebrew thought to what we understand by religion is contained in the word *berith,* covenant. But for the Hebrew this covenant was a fact with very practical implications, not a speculation. We, from our study chairs, may see in the word *berith* a reference to the totemic meal, which Robertson Smith and others thought to have played a big part in earliest Hebrew religion. But the fact remains that the Hebrew himself, until perhaps he was influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, was unconscious of any such thing as religion. Had you asked him what religion was and had he understood, which is unlikely, all he could have done would have been to point to his race as it lived from day to day.

It was the intellectual and spiritual unrest of the Hellenistic world, following the breakdown of the old Greek and Roman state cults and the criticism of the philosophers—widely unintelligible, often destructive or sceptical—that gave rise to that historiographical or antiquarian outlook on religion, which

appears to be so characteristic a feature of decadent civilization. What, for example, Plutarch in his *Moralia* and Pausanias in his *Description of Greece* did in the first and second centuries A.D., may be compared with the activities of those late eighteenth and early nineteenth century gentlemen who liked to make often enough competent antiquarian surveys of the ruined abbeys and churches of our land, which they suitably illustrated with engraved plates; or with the historical study of religion which has grown apace during the last three-quarters of a century. Religion in these instances has become a subject for detached study—a museum piece to describe and on which to speculate: it is no longer the dynamic of personal and social life. It is generally the case that as soon as the religion of any age is treated in this way its death-knoll is being sounded: another religion, or another form of the same religion, is about to rise up in its stead.

After the disappearance of the Roman Empire, during what we miscall the Dark Ages and during the Middle Ages, this antiquarian interest in religion was less marked. Christianity became far too serious and vital a matter for such leisurely and disinterested inquiry. Instead, it was the only thing which survived the collapse of the old political order and which saved Western Europe from complete conquest by the Gothic hordes. Generalization is always dangerous; but the generalization that the mediaeval man found in Christianity his civilization can hardly be gainsaid. It is admitted even by those modern historians who regard Christianity as an outworn system which ceased to be significantly operative after the seventeenth century. The mediaeval man's outlook was different from that of modern man in that it was fundamentally theocentric, while that of post-Renascence man has been fundamentally anthroprocentric. It must not be understood, of course, that in the Middle Ages people had no essentially human interests, or that since then there have been none who ever cast a thought Godward. The point is that the prevailing " climate of opinion ", to use a phrase of Joseph Glanvil's popularized by the late A. N. Whitehead, has changed. We no longer see, even ideally, our own commun-

ity or human society or the trend of history or the universe as a whole, as one complex structure created by God and intended to give to him the glory. To-day religion is just one of many human activities which we find about us. There is no need to expatiate here on how human success in various fields and the influence first of the natural sciences and then of the human sciences, particularly psychology and sociology, have engendered this changed outlook. All we are concerned to indicate at the moment is that for most people religion is one amongst many human interests, something which, like art or music, may have a value for society or for the individual, but tells us nothing of the truth of things, because the truth is unknowable—or, if knowable, can only be expressed in weights and measurements, statistical formulae.

Were one to survey minutely the theological, philosophical and kindred literature of the last half-a-century, one would find no difficulty in amassing hundreds of answers to the question, "What is religion?" And, in most cases, the subjective character of the definitions would be patent—all, no doubt, of interest to the sociologist but of little help to those whose quest is for the truth. As Dr. W. R. Matthews prettily remarks: "The problem of the definition of religion has been a favourite topic of philosophers, and their labours have at least been fruitful in a large crop of formulas, if not perhaps in great illumination."[5]

Nevertheless, these definitions are interesting, and a consideration of some of them may enable us to go a step further in trying to answer our question. But first let us make a brief excursus to clear up one point which may have occurred to the reader just now in our reference to the religions of antiquity and particularly to that of the Hellenistic world. If the Old Testament does not help us to find an inclusive definition of the word "religion", does the New Testament? Such references to "religion" as do occur in the English Bible are to be found in the Acts and Epistles. But even these are not as valuable

[5] *God in Christian Thought and Experience*, London, 1930, p. 5.

as they might at first appear to be; for the translators were not using the word in our modern inclusive sense. Thus, when in Galatians i, 13, Paul says, "Ye have heard of my conversion in time past in the Jews' religion", he does not mean a particular kind of religion which was Jewish. The words he uses are ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ; and Judaism was not simply a religion, but a culture. It included, it is true, rites and ceremonies which we should regard as of a specifically religious nature; and it is equally true that in his distinction between Judaism and, as here in the Epistle to the Galatians, the Church of God, or, as in the Epistle to the Romans,[6] that natural religion—"the invisible things of him from the creation of the world clearly seen"—which was the common possession of the human race, the impact of Hellenistic thought upon Paul shows itself clearly. Nevertheless, there still lingers in the Apostles something of the older Hebrew view of religion as national culture.

In Acts xxvi, 5, Luke, or whoever wrote this passage, records that Paul testified to Agrippa that κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἵρεσιν τῆς ἡμετέρας θρησκείας ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος — "after the straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee." Θρησκεία however, is not strictly religion; it is only a part of religion, *viz.*, worship, rite or cult.[7] It is the same word which Paul uses in his warning to the Colossian Christians against participating in the mysteries, particularly "the worshipping of angels", ἡ θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων [8]

And this limited meaning, which is not accurately conveyed by the English word "religion", applies also in the Epistle of James, where, at first sight, we might think we have the classical New Testament definition of religion. Θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ αὕτη ἐστίν . . .—"pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this . . ."[9] Yet θρησκεία is, even here, no more than rite or worship, the

[6] *op. cit.*, 1, 20.

[7] From θρέομαι, to cry aloud, shriek. *Cf.* Sansk. *drara*, Germ. *dröhnen*. Eng. *drone*.

[8] Colossians ii, 18.

[9] *op. cit.*, i, 27.

external observances of religion. The remark is but an extension of the argument of the Epistle that "faith without works is dead." If there was any serious controversy with Paul about the relationship of faith to works, then this dictum may have been meant as a corrective of Paul's fideism; but it may also be regarded as a blow at the legalism which was so characteristic of Judaism at the time.

Classical definitions of religion are not likely to be of more than historical interest. The question "What is religion?" is a modern question; and it must have a modern answer, that is, an answer showing an understanding of the contemporary state of mind which sees fit to ask it. The question did not bother our forefathers, for whom religion and life were much the same thing. It greatly bothers modern man, because for him religion is not synonymous with life: in fact, he does not see what relevance religion has to life at all. The tragedy is that there are plenty of definitions, but none of them appears to satisfy.

The reason for this inadequacy of the labours of so many learned gentlemen is the misunderstanding of what a definition of religion is supposed to do. There appear to be two quite different kinds of definitions, which have frequently been confused. One is what I would call the normative definition: religion ought to be such and such. This clearly is a statement of the writer's own conviction. The other is the phenomenological definition—the attempt to state what religion appears to be, as a result of detached scientific observation.

As an illustration of the first, let us turn to what Bosanquet had to say in a little book which he wrote as an old man, *What Religion Is*. True to his idealist ancestry, he declares, "In a word, religion *is* just the weld of finite and infinite."[10] It may be questioned very much whether you will be any clearer as to what this means after reading the book through two or three times, unless—and this is important—you have had the same

[10] *op. cit.*, London, 1920, p. 62.

kind of experience as Bosanquet and come to the same conclusion; and that is doubtful. At the end of the book he defines religion again in terms which, it must be assumed, mean the same thing as before: "To be one with the supreme good in faith which is also will—that is religion; and to be thus wholly and unquestioningly is the religious temper. Then all the riches of the spirit may add themselves to the mood, on condition that nothing in them stands out to impair or violate it."[11] Whatever this conveys to you and me, clearly it summed up Bosanquet's own conviction of what religion ought to be. Presumably he was not, after all, concerned with what religion is. He saw in the pantheistic idealism, so popular in his hey-day, the only religion worth the name.

It is interesting to note that much the same kind of thing is contained in Aldous Huxley's recent works touching on religion, notably his *The Perennial Philosophy,* in which he picks out passages from the monistic writings of Eastern and Western philosophers, and presents them as summarizing the only satisfactory religion. It is, I suppose, all that one can fall back on, if one lets the physical scientists get away with their pretension to be philosophers. The claims of religion have been gradually rejected, one by one, since the Renascence, particularly during the last century-and-a-half; and, for a long time, all that has been left has been the mystical experience of individuals, which, as far as they can ever be satisfactorily expressed in words, suggest that there is some kind of unity in man's insatiable religious quest.

There is, however, the other type of definition, that which endeavours to describe its general pattern as a human institution. Herein there is no interest in stating whether this should or should not be lent support by any enlightened mind: it is merely a statement of fact. Such a definition is that of Sir James Frazer, in his monumental work on primitive religion and folk-lore, *The Golden Bough.* Religion, he says, is "a

[11] *op. cit.*, p. 79.

propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."[12] No doubt Frazer's personal view was that most of what was understood by religion up to his own time was largely outworn; but in his definition he is concerned only to state the facts of the case—what religion in general appears to be, as a result of his anthropological investigations.

Now a great deal but not all of the confusion that has arisen over the definition of religion has arisen through the failure to distinguish between saying what religion ought to be and what religion, as a given phenomena, appears to be. The normative and phenomenological aspects of the exercise have not, as a rule, been clearly noted. A great deal more light would have been shed on the subject if they had been distinguished; for neither aspect can be ignored. In so universal and yet so intimate a thing as religion personal conviction must be paramount; and yet, because there has been and is, as a matter of fact, so much disagreement and intolerance in religion, the fair-minded inquirer cannot ignore the experience and conviction of others in this field.

A purely scientific survey reveals that most religions have always had three essential constituents: an attitude of mind, a philosophy, a belief or doctrine—the precise name does not greatly matter; a traditional form of conduct, a code of behaviour, an ethic; and a form of worship, a ritual. Logically, if not otherwise, belief is fundamental: it is the personal outlook of the devotee. Ethic and ritual are the outward manifestations of that outlook in two directions—manward and Godward, or, if you prefer, towards society and towards whatever power or powers are conceived to lie behind the universe.

It would seem, as a matter of observation and comparison, that all three are necessary components, and that no religion is complete without them. And because all three components are found in nearly all the great religions, past and present, I would

[12] *op. cit.*, abr. ed., London, 1922, p. 50.

suggest that even before we come to discuss religion from a normative point-of-view, the comparative study of religions at least shows that the experience of the human race is that man is not likely even to be partially satisfied in his religious quest unless his religion is a harmonious structure of all three—doctrine, ethic, liturgy.

Most of the many modern definitions of religion have erred because they have stressed one of these three aspects of religion to the exclusion or neglect of the others. Very different scholars have claimed that religion is primarily an intellectual construction, a philosophy—in the case of primitive peoples a crude philosophy, but for them a philosophy nevertheless. Such is Tylor's well-known " minimum definition " in his monumental work *Primitive Culture,* which put before the world the still widely held theory of the animistic origin of religion. Tylor, it is true, has in mind primitives and not peoples at an advanced stage of civilization: yet he claims that, for the savage, religion is simply " belief in spiritual beings "[13], a crude metaphysic —to us very inadequate, of course—purporting to explain the nature of the world and the phenomena in it.

Herbert Spencer, in his *First Principles,*[14] nearly ten years before Tylor, tried to make a more general statement to cover all religion. Religion is " an hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible." The inference is, of course, that it does nothing of the kind; but Spencer was at this point making no more than a statement of fact—that religion is universally an intellectual construction. Nor is there a dearth of people to-day, many of them devout folk, who would have it that religion is little more than that. Within Christendom itself there are both Catholics and Protestants who, after their own fashion, insist that we are required by our religion to do no more than give assent to certain propositions. This is no new claim. It can be detected in the Greek philosophers, who, on the whole, regarded knowledge as the key possession of the en-

[13] *op. cit.,* London, 5th ed., 1884, p. 43.
[14] *op. cit.,* 5th ed., London, 1913, p. 424.

lightened mind. It was not by accident that the maxim, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, so often said to summarize the Socratic philosophy, was carved in the temple of Delphi, the most famous of the Greek oracles. The view that knowledge is the essence of religion has cropped up ever and again. It was the theme of the Gnostics. It is noteworthy in the case of Spinoza, for whom it amounted to a mystical love for God; and it is not infrequently the implicit, if not explicit, view of those who are unfortunate enough to be regarded as "intellectuals."

Yet, if religion is either, as a matter of fact or ideally, a mental construction, a theory about the universe, we must disregard as religious the experiences of the mystics, who found reason of decreasing importance as they progressed along the mystic way. We must disregard as such a system like Confucianism, which, whatever else it is, is certainly not metaphysical, or even theological. Few would doubt that Confucius is one of the greatest figures in the history of religion; and yet he himself maintained a consistent silence on specifically religious matters. He preferred to speak of God as Heaven rather than as Lord. Asked about the hereafter he replied, "Not knowing what life is, how can I tell what death is." And also in the *Analects* we are told that the Master refused to speak of prodigies or the supernatural or the workings of Providence. But even so Confucius, because he would not speculate on these things and taught what amounts to a social and political ethic, cannot be denied his rank as one of the foremost of the world's religious teachers.

Confucianism, however, is by no means a better specimen of religion as a human phenomenon than the intellectual systems to which we have already alluded. On the contrary, it is even less satisfactory, as is demonstrated by the fact that Confucianism never existed as a religion in itself but was supplemented by the state cult as well as by Taoism and Buddhism.[15]

[15] It may be convenient to speak, as does W. E. Soothill, of "the three religions of China", but in fact there is one religious amalgam, made up of three distinct strands—more strictly four, if we include the indigenous cult along with Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

Religion is not synonymous with ethics; and yet the contention that it is primarily morality has gained widespread acceptance, particularly in Western Europe and America since the time of Kant. It was Kant himself who set the fashion. He did not think any sure knowledge could be gained from metaphysical speculation in religion. A subjective consideration of religion was for him the only satisfactory one; and, in that case, he contends it is simply "the recognition of our duties as divine commands."[16] Kant practised what he preached: he did not go to church, and thought public worship pointless except in so far as it served to impress the categorical imperative upon the congregation. Consistently, he looked upon prayer as no more than snivelling to God about failure to cultivate a good will, which, apparently, he thought it easily within the reach of human beings to do unaided.

Ever since lecture-platforms and pulpits have re-echoed the Kantian heresy, although the events of the last ten years should have made it yet clearer that if religion is entirely or mainly "morality touched with emotion", as Matthew Arnold put it, then the outlook is black indeed. I take at random the following definition of J. S. Mackenzie's to illustrate how, at the beginning of this century, the Kantian thesis had found its way into a college text-book: "Religion may perhaps be best regarded as the explicit recognition of the faith that is ultimately involved in ethical and aesthetic terms."[17] You do not need me to point out how, under the same Kantian influence, preachers made the sad mistake of finding the whole of Christianity in the *Sermon on the Mount.*

Now if religion is largely morality, with perhaps a ritual aurora, then Gathic Zoroastrianism or Confucianism must be regarded as among the most representative of the world religions; but clearly they are not such. The very fact that the relatively simple ethical monotheism of Zarathushtra gave place

[16] *Kritik of Judgement,* Appendix, 91 (trans. J. H. Bernard, London, 1892, p. 423). *v.* also *Kritik of Practical Reason,* Dialectic ii, 5.

[17] *Outline of Metaphysics,* London, 1902, p. 140.

to the more elaborate religion of the Magi is not explained away by saying that after the time of the prophet the religion degenerated. No doubt the perversity of man had much to do with the long-term failure of Zarathushtra's reform, as was the case with the relative failure of the prophetic protest in Israel. But there is more to be said; for probably the same forces were at work amongst the peoples of Iran and Palestine in the six centuries or so B.C., as were at work in India following the Upanishadic period in Hinduism itself and following the establishment of the Buddhist schism. In all four—Zoroastrianism, Hebrew religion, Hinduism and Buddhism—the work of ethical reformers in the case of the first two, and that of philosophical speculators in the case of the two latter, proved incapable of satisfying the specifically religious needs of the mass of the people. The religion of the Magi, popular Judaism, the theistic movement in Hinduism with its *avatar* (or incarnation) doctrine and the emergence of Mahayana Buddhism with its quasi-theism standing in strange contrast with the original atheism of the Buddha, for all their departure from the noble teaching of their founders, did seek to include in themselves essential parts of religion—liturgical and doctrinal—which the founders had either omitted to teach or had cast aside.

The case of Confucianism is much the same. The very fact that it has never existed in isolation as a religion, but has been merged into the religious complex of China demonstrates its lack of certain essential religious constituents. Religion cannot for long exist simply as an ornate system of morals. If one examines the various forms of Christianity, none, not even the Unitarians themselves, would be prepared to contend that Unitarianism—which, it would generally be agreed, stresses the ethical element in Christianity as much as any other denomination—is a more typical form of Christianity than, say, Roman Catholicism. A man may consider his own particular religion normatively the best; but he cannot deny that all other religions which profess to be such have, when objectively considered, as much right to the name "religion" as his own. Or, to take a more extreme illustration, few would agree that the

Ethical Society, which dispenses as far as it can with doctrine and ritual, is typical of religious institutions. Yet the Ethical Society, in our own time, would appear to be in pretty close accord with Kant's definition of religion.

Different again but equally mistaken are those who have seen religion as primarily the expression of individual and corporate experience. There is no doubt that the emotions play—and should play—their part in religion, as in life as a whole; and normally they express themselves in the form of ritual. The term " ritual " here must be interpreted in a broad sense. Rites are not the same thing as ceremonies. Ceremonies are only certain stereotyped physical movements which accompany rites. Any religious activity of a widely accepted and widely practised kind may be regarded as a rite. Sometimes the activity may be of a particularly colourful kind appealing to more than one of the five senses and making demands upon all who join in it. Art, music, poetry and pageantry play their part. Sometimes only speech is used to the same end, as when the preacher carries his hearers with him into a highly emotional condition, which facilitates forgetfulness of the immediate environment and stimulates the imagination. The religious dance characteristic of many ancient cults and in more recent times of such sects as the Shakers in North America, the silent worship which " moves the Spirit " cultivated by the Friends, and, outside the specific activity of worship, the process known as " sudden conversion " encouraged by certain Christian sects or groups, are all cases of the surging forth of human emotion according to a more-or-less defined pattern. And what is often regarded as typical of religion as a social phenomenon is held also to constitute the essence of personal religion.

Most theological students for the last quarter-of-a-century have been well and truly grounded in Rudolf Otto's thesis of religion as the *sensus numinis*. Otto's *Das Heilige* was a remarkable book, but he was not altogether original in his theory. He was largely gathering up a great deal of speculation on the nature of religion which had been going on for a hundred years,

ever since the Romantic movement started to influence theology. Indeed, there have never been wanting advocates of the view that religion is fundamentally a profound non-rational, but not necessarily irrational, experience, either of the group or of the individual. The mystics provide an obvious instance.

A century-and-a-half ago Schleiermacher stunned his cultured German audiences with this particularly powerful theory in his *Reden,* where he postulated that religion is basically an "immediate consciousness" of God, not a matter of reason or volition, and pleaded his case in the most florid rhetoric. "Did I venture to compare it, seeing I cannot describe it, I would say, it is fleeting and transparent as the vapour which the dew breathes on blossom and fruit, it is bashful and tender as a maiden's kiss, it is holy and fruitful as a bridal embrace, nor is it merely like, it is all this."[18] Just over twenty years later Schleiermacher wisely modified his view, and, in his *Glaubenslehre,* was content to describe reliigon as "a feeling of dependence" upon the Divine. But the pace had been set. Even Hegel's gibe that, if religion is a feeling of absolute dependence, then Schleiermacher's dog must be more religious than his master, did not prevent the spread of religious Romanticism. In experience, it was held, religion has at last found its inviolable citadel against the criticism of the materialist and the nineteenth-century scientific philosopher. We know now how this optimism, like the rest of Victorian optimism, has proved false: the psychologists have broken into the citadel. But fortunately they did not find religion there. Religion, which has escaped exact scrutiny ever since man became curious, is too elusive still.

In the present century W. E. Hocking has blatantly declared that "the whole apparatus of reason in religion has retreated in importance, in favor of a more substantial (*sic*) basis —which we have agreed to call feeling."[19] It is unnecessary here to discuss the vagueness of the word "feeling": that has

[18] *Rede* II (trans. Oman), London, 1893, p. 33.

[19] *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* New Haven, 1912, pp. 37-38.

already been done in many places. All we have to bear in mind is that not a few have held that religion is fundamentally something other than reason, which expresses itself in doctrinal propositions, or will, which expresses itself in moral principles: it is an emotional experience, expressing itself in personal devotion or contemplation or in group cultus.

The condition of institutional religion in this country today is proof enough that this view of religion is incomplete. It just does not satisfy. For a while emotionalism may attract multitudes, but ere long, when the effervescence has been dissipated, the multitudes find that there is nothing left and look to pseudo-religions for their guidance. If religion is profound feeling, then apparently only mysticism or revivalism is religion; and Confucius and Kant were as non-religious as their teaching. And according to this criterion, it is doubtful whether the New Testament is a religious record.

We have glanced at but a few of innumerable definitions of religion. If you want any more Leuba's book, *A Psychological Study of Religion,* will provide an ample quantity. On this collection, J. B. Pratt has commented thus wisely and wittily: "Professor Leuba enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from as many great men (and, elsewhere, adds two of his own, apparently to fill out the even half-hundred). But the striking thing about these definitions is that, persuasive as many of them are, each learned doctor seems quite unpersuaded by any but his own."[20] It is, in Bishop Warburton's famous words, a case of "orthodoxy is my doxy, and heterodoxy is the other fellow's doxy"—a remark true not only of Church doctrines.

The fault with all these definitions is that each unduly stresses one element in religion to the exclusion of the others. As Brabant points out, in his able criticism of Otto's *sensus numinis* theory in *Liturgy and Worship,*[21] there is no one part of human nature which is the peculiar medium of religion. Reli-

[20] *The Religious Consciousness,* New York, 1920, p. 1.
[21] *op. cit.,* cap. II, London, 1932.

gion is both normatively and as a matter of fact something intimately bound up with the whole man, with life in its entirety. Our ancestors in the ancient and mediaeval world were, and the simple religious folk of to-day are, without knowing it, much nearer the truth. A great deal of so-called religion these past few centuries has been but a shadow of the thing.

I would now direct your attention for a few minutes to two somewhat different types of attempt to state what religion is. The first overlaps the three which have already been mentioned —religion as intellectual construction, religion as moral behaviour, religion as emotional experience. It is the view that religion is simply a human phenomenon, and implies that any metaphysical quest will be fruitless. It is nowadays preeminently the sociologist's estimate. Early in this century the contributors to *L'Année Sociologique,* notably Durkheim and Levy Bruhl, set the fashion by producing, from their study of modern savage peoples, the theory of religion as originating in a tribal group sense. Primitives, it is believed, have no individual mentality: as individuals they share in the mentality of the group. And some members of this school have gone so far as to imply that even advanced religion is basically the product of the same group-mentality. The American psychologist, E. S. Ames, while not necessarily concurring with the Group-theorists, agrees that religion is preeminently a communal matter: it is "the consciousness of the highest social values." This view is widespread at the present time, and is, no doubt, an application to religion of the socialism which has, in our time, replaced the tenacious individualism of the last century.

There can be no doubt that a religion which does not express itself in group terms is incomplete; but there is a danger in regarding it even as mainly a social phenomenon. Despite the fact that he is born into society, that he is dependent all through his life on society and owes almost all that he has or hopes to have to society, the individual is still the individual. His own innermost thoughts and feelings are his own and no one else's; and no one, other than himself, will ever know what they are. In striking contrast to the sociological view of religion

stands that which, equally at fault, sees religion as only one's personal concern. It is implicit in St. Augustine's utterance, "I desire to know two things, God and my soul. Nothing else? No, nothing else at all", though it is inconceivable that as a Churchman he would have assented to a thorough-going individualism in religion. But William James, in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* is more explicitly in favour of it. Surveying some of the creative religious geniuses of the world, he is led to assert that religion is made up of "the feelings, acts and experience of individual men in their solitude",—a definition which is re-echoed in the famous dictum, widely attributed to A. N. Whitehead, that religion is "what a man does with his solitariness." The truth is, of course, that religion is both a personal and also a social thing. Indeed, as we have already noted, all definitions err in that they assume that the exercise of defining religion is a question of "either this or that."

The other type of designation of religion to which I would briefly refer before trying to put before you a conclusion is that which considers religion in purely destructive terms on the grounds that science, particularly psychology, provides a complete explanation of all human phenomena without reference to any transcendental factors. Not all scientists or psychologists, of course, are so narrow-minded as to take this starting-point; but some are. J. H. Leuba, to whom reference has already been made, argued that religion is the outcome of human experiences which work according to known psycho-physical laws corresponding to which there is no objective reality. Freud saw religion in much the same light: it is but a projection on the part of the infantile imagination of the idea of a Heavenly Father, an illusion without much future now that man can meet the unfriendly universe with such aid as modern science can lend him, and, in any case, with Stoic-like fortitude. Bertrand Russell concurs: for him religion is a matter of seeking comfort in a world which, dispassionately considered, is a terrifying wilderness. This is not really an original idea: as both Lucretius and Petronius suggested two thousand years ago, *primus in orbe deos fecit timor.* The Christian may not like these dicta, but

they cannot be lightly dismissed. Like all other terse utterances on religion they contain a grain of truth.

Yet such statements are not properly definitions: they are rather judgements passed upon certain kinds of religion. A general principle, alleged to be the result of psychological inquiry but really a philosophical dogma, is propounded to explain away religion in its entirety. Any correspondence between religion and transcendent value is denied quite arbitrarily at the outset without reference to psychology; the denial is axiomatic. And, even if we allow, for the sake of discussion, that these sweeping statements cover the psychological rise of religion, they still do not tell us what religion *is*, nor do they prove or disprove whether the metaphysical reality which religion claims to exist does exist. Suppose a visitor from some other planet marvellously visited us: suppose, too, that he was intelligent, as we count intelligence, and he could converse with us: and suppose that he did not know what religion is and would like to know. Would it in any wise enlighten him to be told that, say, the religion of Ancient Sumeria or Christianity or Islam was a compensatory illusion which man had fabricated because he was frightened of the universe? He would merely have somebody's one-sided estimate. He would have neither a normative definition—he could not know what any religion seriously claimed for itself, nor would he have a dispassionate description of the phenomenon—he would not know how to recognize religion were he to chance across it.

So far we have discovered no satisfactory definition of religion amongst the several which have been given. Is one possible? All-inclusive definitions have been attempted, but in the very nature of the case they are so vague as to be virtually useless. E. S. Waterhouse gives one in his text-book, *A Philosophical Approach to Religion*: "Religion is man's attempt to supplement his felt insufficiency by allying himself with a higher order of being which he believes is manifest in the world and can be brought into sympathetic relationship with himself, if rightly approached."[22] It is a valiant attempt, but

[22] *op. cit.*, London, 1933, p. 25.

it would not be difficult to find a religion or form of religion which did not accord with some part of his statement.

The fact is that no adequate definition is possible; and, if that is so, you may be inclined to say, why have we wasted so much time over the topic at all? You may wish to endorse the conclusion of a modern philosopher, G. Dawes Hicks, when he says: "To reach a verbal definition, which should set forth the characteristics common to all types of religious belief, is for the purpose of a philosophical treatment, at any rate, a perfectly futile undertaking.".[23] Yet I am not so sure. Our brief inquiry has at least had this value, that it has reminded us that religion is far too big, far too kaleidoscopic a thing to be imprisoned in a sentence or two. The infinitely varied quest of the human being—not only his mind, but his whole personality, over countless centuries—for some anchor-hold, which he refuses to believe is not there somewhere, suggests that even an ability to define religion, were that possible, would not help us much in the urgent business of the human spirit, and that it is impossible to know even faintly what religion is without being religious. What *we* find in religion is, let us admit, disappointing enough. The same is true of what we find in all our striving to learn the truth. "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

To conclude, the reader is left with a definition of religion which is different from, and as a definition excels, all the others which have been quoted. "Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things, something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest."[24]

[23] *The Philosophical Basis of Theism,* London, 1937, p. 34.

[24] *Science and the Modern World,* London, Pelican Books, 1938, p. 222.

This is not empty rhetoric. Whitehead's definition is something more than the product of an armchair study of religion; it is the product of a mind struggling after the truth. And to it, as such, Christians can have no great objection, indeed can only assent, provided—and the proviso is important—they read into Whitehead's statement no more than what he says. "Religion is the vision of something" which man can never attain. Whether or not anything has been done by Someone other than man to make it attainable is a matter which it does not fall to us to discuss here, save to remark that Christian theology through the ages has, on the whole, witnessed to the fact that religion at its highest is not primarily what man has discovered but what God has revealed. That is what was meant just now in saying that what *we* find in religion is disappointing enough. It is still true that much study and striving, much intellectual questing and moral endeavour, are a weakness of the flesh, persist in them as we must. It was a profound inspiration that led George Herbert to hear God say of baffled man:

> Let him be rich and weary that, at least,
> If goodness lead him not, yet weariness
> May toss him to my breast.[25]

[25] From *The Pulley*, a fine religious poem that deserves to be better known.

BAPTISM AND THE GIFT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

By JOHN C. SLADDEN

THE contemporary problem of the relation of the Holy Spirit's work and gifts to baptism and confirmation was stated by the late Canon Moberly as follows:

> "Even when baptism comes to be thought and spoken of in conscious distinction from what we call confirmation . . . (the) primary phrase 'rebirth' is the one that is most characteristically attached to it: along with the thought of symbolic cleansing, or remission . . . It is indeed the proper phrase for the earliest initiation into life; even though the meaning of life is not realized . . . until that life is consummated in the vision of the glory of God. This is an ambiguity which few spiritual phrases can escape. Their meaning is never quite complete till the final consummation."

But there is

> "an additional ambiguity, due to the fact that Baptism, as standing alone, does not constitute the whole initiation."

Owing to the separation of confirmation from baptism there is

> "always . . . an element of practical, if not logical, inexactness."

For

> "in whatsoever sense or degree . . . the power of practically exercising spiritual rights . . . may remain, for a time, in abeyance, the essential right to all rights is, from the moment of baptism, already there. Whoever has been admitted into Christ has been admitted, implicitly at least, into all the fullness of the powers of the Spirit of Christ."[1]

[1] *Atonement and Personality*, Ch. vi.

This difficulty faces those Churches whose order is derived from the mediæval West. The Eastern Church feels no corresponding problem. For since she treats Christian initiation as one, in theory and practice, she need not define exactly the meaning of each part of her rite separately. The thoroughgoing Protestant does not face the difficulty. Karl Barth does not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is given to men on earth as a "Spirit of *fulfilment*" in any form or degree, but only as the eschatological "Spirit of *promise*": there is then no question of a "gift of the Spirit", in the Catholic sense, being predicated of any sacrament, or indeed of this present life at all.[2] Anglicans have traditionally adhered to the late mediæval theory, according to which "confirmation" supplies an *increase* of the Spirit-gift or gifts which have been sacramentally secured at the font. This is still the view of many. Canon Peter Green, speaking of baptism as the sacrament of regeneration, describes the "new birth" as involving the gift of "Christ's divine-human nature" which is "filled with Spirit". Confirmation he describes in terms of the "strengthening" of the regenerate in those gifts, which the divine Spirit has bestowed, and which are the imparting of himself.[3] Since the revival of Patristic Studies which accompanied the Oxford Movement, this "robur" doctrine has been exposed to criticism in the light of history; so that Anglicans have become increasingly aware of the problem. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Dr. A. J. Mason made a detailed historical analysis to prove that the ceremony of "confirmation", in some form, had been an integral part of the Christian initiation-rite from the sub-apostolic age, if not the apostolic age itself. The "robur" idea was shown to be a mediæval attempt to account for the fact that the rite had somehow become divided.[4] Dom Gregory Dix has re-affirmed Dr. Mason's thesis, maintaining that the sacrament of initiation involved a double ceremony from the very beginning in the Apostolic Church. He would

[2] *The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life*, Ch. iii.
[3] *The Holy Ghost the Comforter*, Chs. iv, vi.
[4] *Baptism and Confirmation.*

allow the Anglican Church to keep its present customs, but on the understanding that water-baptism by itself is considered incomplete, and even that confirmation is, in a sense, more important than the water-ceremony. For on this view the laver signifies only the negative aspect of Christian initiation, while the laying-on-of-hands (and/or unction with chrism) signifies the positive aspect, the gift of the Holy Spirit. The curious dichotomy is supposedly covered up by insisting that the two parts of the rite are bound together like the concave and convex sides of a curve.[5]

It is the burden of the present essay to show that, although most patristic writers appear to support this theory in their explicit and expository statements, yet at no time could the undivided Church in actual fact consistently dissociate the Spirit-gift from the water-ceremony itself. And further, an attempt will be made to define the relation of " confirmation " to baptism in a manner which avoids the doctrinal untidiness of the " robur " theory.

John the Baptist prophesied that Christ, unlike himself, would baptize with the Holy Spirit. This, we take it, was fulfilled at Pentecost, after a corroboratory prophecy by the risen Lord himself.[6] It is reasonable to suppose that, when the Apostles brought others into the fold, from Pentecost onwards, they used water-baptism as a sacrament of the Pentecostal gift, in obedience to their risen Master's words.[7] It was this Spirit-gift which constituted the New Israel. Cyril of Jerusalem says of Pentecost:

> " (The Holy Spirit) came down to clothe the Apostles with power and to baptize them . . . For as he who plunges into the water and is baptized is encompassed on all sides by the waters, so were they also completely baptized by the Holy Spirit. The water however flows round the outside only, but the Spirit baptizes also within, and

[5] *The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism.*
[6] Acts i, 5; ii cf. Luke xxiv, 49.
[7] Matthew xxviii, 19.

that completely . . . The House became the vessel of spiritual water . . . they were entirely baptized according to promise, and invested soul and body with a garment of salvation."[8]

This correct understanding of water-baptism, as the sacrament of Spirit-baptism in the fullest sense, is reflected in Irenaeus' words:

"Neither could we, being many, be made one in Christ without water from heaven . . . For our bodies have received unity . . . by means of that laver which leads to incorruption; but our souls by means of the Spirit."[9]

The Spirit, we deduce, is the "heavenly water". Tertullian speaks less ambiguously, in terms of a sort of sacramental *communicatio idiomatum*:

"The spirit", he says, "is corporeally washed in the waters, and the flesh is in the same spiritually cleansed".[10]

Unfortunately, like most of the Fathers, he fails to recognize the full implications of a "spiritual baptism". Gregory Nazianzen speaks in much the same terms as Irenaeus, but again shows how negative the idea of the lavacral gift has become: "the Spirit cleanses the depths", but his positive powers are overlooked, so far as the laver is concerned.[11] However, a much later representative of the Eastern Church, John Damascene, can say to catechumens:

"Prepare yourself so that baptism can restore-by-cleansing[12] not only (your) body but also the divine image (in you) . . . For just as he who is immersed in water becomes wet all over, so he who is baptized in the Holy Spirit is rendered spiritual and holy throughout, and is restored both in mind and in action."[13]

[8] Cyril, Cat. Lecs. XVI, xiv-xv.
[9] Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. V, xi.
[10] Tertullian, De Bapt. iv.
[11] Greg. Naz., Oration on Holy Baptism, viii.
[12] Lat. version, *abluat.*
[13] J. Damascene, *Liber Parallelorum,* lv.

It is significant that he connects "restoration", in a positive and even ethical sense, so indissolubly with "cleansing". Where the Holy Spirit is agent, there he also indwells.

Returning to the New Testament, we may examine the record of our Lord's discourse with Nicodemus.[14] In this *locus classicus,* whatever be the exact genesis of the phrase "water and the Spirit", the "regeneration", here referred to, is conceived as identical with the "baptism of the Spirit", in the sense in which we have understood the latter. "The Spirit" is that which is sacramentally signified by the *water,* and not by any additional outward sign:[15] otherwise we should read, "born of water and of chrism", or, "born of water and of imposition of hands". Undoubtedly the primitive Church very early began to interpret the tradition of these words as though two sacramental acts had been implied. We might cull from the Fathers examples of this in abundance. But there are also clear signs, direct and indirect, that the original truth continued to shine through. There are patristic passages in which "the Spirit" is so closely connected with the "water", in one way or another, that the Spirit-gift must be deemed to be obtained through the water. We have already noted one or two instances of this.

If, before we proceed, further Scriptural evidence is required, it may be pointed out that in the earliest Gospel narrative the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus is described as occurring while he is coming up out of Jordan, not at a moment subsequent to his emergence.[16] Jerome remarks:

> "Jesus Christ no sooner raised His head from the stream than He received the Holy Spirit . . . not that He was ever without . . . but to prove that to be the true baptism by which the Holy Spirit comes."[17]

Gregory of Nyssa speaks of our Lord as "the firstborn among

[14] John iii, esp. v. 5.

[15] In Ezekiel xxxvi, v. 25 describes the *same* event as vv. 26 and 27.

[16] Mark i, 10.

[17] Jerome, *Dial. c. Lucif.*

many brethren", who led the way by "drawing down upon the water, by his own baptism, the Holy Spirit."[18] The baptismal rite of Alexandria, two or three centuries later, gives the sense of St. Mark unmistakably in reference to Jesus' baptism; and also the prayer:

> "O Lord Who hast given us a font (*or* fount) of true cleansing . . . give from thence, to the water of this baptism, virtue . . . unto the riches of the receiving of Thy Holy Spirit."

And there are significant and repeated references to the Spirit's gifts later, during the fontal part of the rite.[19] In a hymn of Cosmas of Jerusalem we read:

> "The whole Trinity was made manifest in Jordan .... The Father cried, This (is) my beloved Son (who) is baptized: *at the same moment*[20] the Spirit arrived."[21]

Just as we have taken the Spirit-baptism of Pentecost as our standard in interpreting the idea of "baptism" or "birth" of the Spirit, so we take the full Johannine meaning of the word "life" as our standard in judging the implications of the terms "new life" and "water of life" in connexion with baptism. "Life" is "possession of (or by) the Holy Spirit". The Paraclete who comes in Christ's name is the Spirit of Truth, and therefore also the Spirit of Life, the Spirit of Christ himself who is the Truth and the Life.[22] It was this "life", this Spirit which our Lord promised to the woman of Samaria as "living water", "water springing up into eternal life."[23] The primitive Church preferred to use "living water", i.e. running water,[24] for baptisms; and this, incidentally, is reminiscent of the

[18] Greg. Nyss., C. Eunom. II, viii.

[19] Rite of Severus of Alexandria. [Latin version, Bigne's Bibl. Patrum, Bk. VI.]

[20] Lat. version, *simul.*

[21] Cosmas Hierosolymitanus, *Hymnus* ii [ap. Bigne, *ibid.*, Bk. VIII.]

[22] John xiv, 26, 17, 6; and cf. Nicene Creed: "giver-of-life".

[23] John iv, 14, 10.

[24] Gr. ὕδωρ ξῶν ; cf. Didachē.

"rushing mighty wind" at Pentecost. When Justin Martyr equates the "laver of repentance" with the "water of life", and calls it a "laver of the knowledge of God", he is testifying—albeit perhaps unconsciously—to the Spirit-gift in water-baptism.[25] The figure of "rebirth" takes on a more positive meaning than is often given to it. In the light of this we interpret Hippolytus' references to the "immortality of baptism" and the "*water* by which . . . man is begotten again and *endued with life*".[26] A closely related figure is that of the laver as a "womb" or "mother". Zeno of Verona speaks of the "divine gift" of "new life" which is bestowed as the baptized emerge from their "mother".[27] In a very different age, John Scotus Erigena refers to the "womb of faith", to which the "womb of the font" corresponds: of this "pure mother", Christ is "conceived" and "born" in the believer, and even "nourished".[28] The water-ceremony, in fact, is sacramental of every phase of God's work in the human soul, although the latter will need another sacrament, and that repeatedly, during its developing life.

Irenaeus, even where he has spoken of "two sacraments" of initiation, uses a figure of water to describe the Holy Spirit himself: namely, the dew on Gideon's fleece. The Spirit is "the dew of God."[29] Cosmas, in another hymn, sings of the fire of Nebuchadnezzar's furnace as having been "transmuted into dew" for the Three Holy Children, and regards this as a foreshadowing of the Pentecostal fire.[30] The "fire" theme is varied by Ephraim, who puts into the mouths of his neophytes the words:

> "Our bodies . . . in the water with the fire of the Holy Spirit have been mingled."

[25] Justin, *Dial. Tryph.* xiv.
[26] Hippolytus, *Discourse on the Holy Theophany*, § 8.
[27] Zeno of Verona, *Talks to Candidates for Baptism*.
[28] J. S. Erigena, quoted in book by Alice Gardner, 1900.
[29] Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* III, xvii.
[30] Cosmas (ap. Bigne), *Hymnus* ix, on Pentecost; and cf. Prayer Book, Prayer for Clergy and People: "dew of Thy blessing".

For

> "these are the waters whereby reconciliation is made with heaven."[31]

The Fathers use the terms "gift of the Spirit" and "gift of grace" unmistakably, at times, of water-baptism: and in certain instances the gift definitely includes an element of "strengthening" for the battle of life. Gregory of Nyssa explains that without the right conditions (repentance and faith)

> "the water is but water, for the gift of the Holy Spirit in no way appears in him who is thus baptismally 'born'."[32]

Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of "the spiritual grace that is given with the water."[33] Unfortunately it is not always clear whether only the *water*-ceremony is in mind: Cyprian writes:

> "The same spiritual grace which is equally received in baptism by believers, is subsequently either increased or decreased according to conduct."[34]

It may be observed, however, that on the subject of the rebaptism of heretics and schismatics, both Cyprian's and his opponents' views give implicit testimony to the doctrine of the lavacral Spirit-gift. For if, as Cyprian claimed, the power or right of bestowing the Spirit may be predicated only of those who have the power or right of baptizing,[35] and if moreover one who has "obtained remission of sins" must also have been "sanctified" (or "consecrated") and become "the temple of God",[36] then we cannot really avoid the conclusion that water-baptism is *per se* a sacrament of the Spirit-gift: or otherwise the "further-ceremony" has to be deemed so essential that without it there is no sacrament even of remission of sins. And on the other hand, the theory of "validity" as distinct from

[31] Ephraim, Hymns on the Epiphany, viii, 4, 13.
[32] Greg. Nyss., Catech. Oration xl.
[33] Cyril, Cat. Lec. iii, 3.
[34] Cyprian, Ep. lxxv, 14.
[35] e.g. Ep. lxix.
[36] Ep. lxxii, 12.

" efficacy ", developed later by Optatus and Augustine, yields to a similar argument. A person who has been " validly " baptized in the name of the Trinity, but outside the Catholic fold, is not (by this theory) deemed to be in possession of " remission of sins " while lacking certain more positive baptismal gifts: he has *none* of these, but only a token or receptacle, the " character " which will enable him to receive them all together if he is brought into the Catholic fold.[37] It is interesting to note that both Dionysius of Alexandria, Cyprian's contemporary, and a much later writer such as Pope Gregory II, forbid " rebaptism " on the ground that anyone already baptized with water in the name of the Trinity has already received the " Holy Spirit " or the " gift of God's grace ".[38] Augustine is led into inconsistency whenever he tries to posit that " regeneration " or " adoption " can somehow be predicated of valid heretical baptisms: it is hard, for instance, to agree that one who has " put on Christ " can still be " in darkness ".[39]

Continuing our examination of more explicit references to the Spirit-gift, we find Aphraates expressing himself thus:

> " the Spirit stays aloof from all flesh, until they come to the new birth of water, and then they receive the Holy Spirit ".[40]

Diadochus, Bishop of Epirus and a contemporary of Leo the Great, describes baptismal regeneration in colourful terms, whose meaning is the same as that of earlier quotations already given: " Even before baptism, ' grace ' exhorts from *without* to better things ", while " Satan hides at the bottom of the heart " . . . " But from that very hour in which we are *regenerated*, the Devil is indeed without but ' grace ' is within."[41] " Grace " clearly means the Holy Spirit himself, not merely as acting in the Sacrament but as indwelling. Diadochus may, of course,

[37] Augustine, *De Bapt. c. Donatistas*, III, xii, 18; xvi, 21.

[38] Dion. Alex., *Ep. to Philemon, presbyter to Pope Sixtus*: Gregory II, *Ep. to S. Boniface* dated Nov. 726.

[39] Augustine, *De Bapt c. Donat* I, xi, 16.

[40] Aphraates, *Demonstr. VI, " Of Solitaries "*, § 14.

[41] Diadochus, " On Spiritual Perfection ", lxxvi.

have been associating a "further-ceremony" with water-baptism, because the two could not be kept apart, in his mind: but for us, the Scriptural sacrament of regeneration is the water-rite. We can scarcely suppose that the λουτρὸν παλιγγενεσίας [42] means "the washing (or laver) which is part of the (complex) sacrament of regeneration." In any case, it is "the washing (or laver) of *water,* with the Word" by which the Church has been "purified and consecrated",[43] that is to say, by which her members have been sacramentally "regenerated".

With regard to the positive and inclusive character of the "grace" thus given, we may quote Clement of Alexandria:

> "Believing alone, and regeneration, is perfection in life . . . And he who is only *regenerated* . . . is enlightened . . . We who are baptized, having wiped off the sins which obscure the light of the Divine Spirit, have the eye of the spirit free, unimpeded and full of light, by which we contemplate the . . . Holy Spirit flowing down to us from above."

And:

> "This is the grace of illumination, that our characters are not the same as before washing."[44]

Clement's use of language is loose; but his words imply that the power which enables to sanctification is a proper part of that of which the laver is sacramental. We may recall Cyprian's reference to the "increase or decrease", subsequent to regeneration, of the grace therein bestowed. And in John Damascene's passage concerning the effect of baptism on the "mind and action", this "restoration of the divine image" is regarded as involving not only the "effacement of sins" but also the "reform of behaviour".

Fundamentally, as we have tried to show, it is impossible to draw a distinction between "regeneration" and "the gift of the Spirit". Ideas such as "adoption" and "the putting on

[42] Titus iii, 6.
[43] Ephesians v, 26.
[44] Clem. Alex., "Paedagogus" I, vi

of Christ" are in the same category. Distinctions in perspective there may be, but the sacrament of Christian initiation "overarches" them: and this sacrament is, on the material side, properly one of water only. It is, moreover, difficult to draw any line between the condition resulting from "remission of sins" or "cleansing" and the aforementioned gifts. Cyril of Jerusalem tries to do so, since he regards John's baptism as having actually *conferred* remission of sins.[45] Logically, Cyril's views here would imply that the lavacral part of the contemporary Christian initiation rite was no more than the equivalent of a Johannine baptism, merely preparatory to the Spirit-gift-sacrament. Needless to say, this conflicts with other statements of his, quoted already. Chrysostom says, pointedly, "It is not" distinctively "a laver of remission of sins nor a laver of cleansing but a laver of regeneration", and "it creates and fashions us anew."[46] The settled view of the Church concerning John's baptism takes the phrase εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν as having a forward eschatological reference.[47] Certain it is that remission of sins, as Christians understand it in the light of the Atonement, could not be presently appropriated (sacramentally) until our Lord's redemptive act had been accomplished through the Cross and Resurrection: and Pentecost was but the outsharing of the Resurrection-life, which under one aspect is characteristically the "cleansed" and "forgiven" life, and under another, the Spirit-filled life.

It is notable that in our Creeds, in the definition of the Spirit's work, we pass directly from (baptismal) remission of sins to the Resurrection, without mention of any further New-Testament Spirit-gift parallel to the Old-Testament prophecy-gift mentioned in the Nicene Creed. Our Lord's words to the Samaritan woman[48] illustrate the practical identity of "forgiveness" with the Spirit's gift of "life", in his thought.

St. Paul, referring to the divine Redemption accomplished

[45] Cyril, Lecs. to Neophytes, xx.
[46] Chrysostom, Instructions to Catechumens, i, 3
[47] e.g. Tertullian, De Bapt., x.
[48] John iv.

by Christ "that we might receive the adoption of sons",[49] makes this "adoption" virtually equivalent to the sending of the Holy Spirit into our hearts crying "Abba". Doubtless the Apostle thought of "adoption" and "life in the Spirit" as having begun together in each individual, and in fact to be two names for the same condition. Hippolytus makes this identification, putting into John the Baptist's mouth the words:

> "I baptize with the baptism of repentance, but He confers the gift of adoption: He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire."[50]

In St. Paul's thought "adoption" is closely linked with the doctrine of mystical union "with" and "in" Christ, or the "putting on" of Christ.[51] Theologically, this is as inseparable from the "being clothed" with the Holy Spirit as is the idea of "regeneration".

There is a passage by Clement of Alexandria, in which the apparently strange order of his thought bears out the general trend of our argument. After describing Jesus' baptism as a sacrament of "perfection by washing" and a "sanctification (*or* consecration) by the descent of the Holy Spirit", Clement states that "the same takes place in our case", and that "this work is variously called 'grace', 'illumination', 'perfection', and 'washing'." Expanding these terms one by one, he makes it clear that by "perfection" he means "the bestowal of perfect (*or* complete) gifts".[52]

We have already deduced St. Paul's views from his general doctrinal position. But it is instructive to examine two passages in particular. In I Corinthians x, 2, the Israelites, he says, were "under the cloud" and "passed through the sea", and were "baptized . . . in the cloud and in the sea." The Fathers, knowing all the Biblical associations, quite reasonably took the "cloud" to be a type of the Holy Spirit in Christian baptism.

[49] Galatians iv, 6ff., c.f. Romans viii, 14ff.
[50] Hippolytus, Discourse on the Holy Theophany, § 3.
[51] e.g. Galatians iii, 26-27.
[52] Clem. Alex., "Paedagogus" I, vi.

Now in the Exodus narrative we find that the "cloud" appeared *before* the Red Sea crossing and actually enabled Israel to cross safely.[53] This might support T. W. Manson's thesis that primitive Christian initiation included an anointing before, but not after, the laver.[54] What is certain is that it gives no typological parallel with any *post*-lavacral unction (or imposition of hands) signifying the Spirit-gift as distinct from or additive to the laver-gift. More positive is the evidence of Romans vi, 2-11. The whole process of our reception of the benefits of the Atonement, in both its negative and its positive aspects, is signified by the ceremonial of water-baptism. The descent into the water involves sacramentally "death with Christ": since he was "made to be sin" for us, this means that the sin in us, our "old man", is dead and buried. The rising from the water involves sacramentally "rising with Christ", that is to say, partaking of the power of his Resurrection. Although the Apostle's thought moves immediately to the final Resurrection,[55] he affirms that we are already "alive unto God in Christ Jesus":[56] and in his Colossian letter, his exhortations are based on the claim that his readers "were raised with Christ" and "were made alive together with him" through an event in the past.[57] This whole association of ideas belongs to water-baptism, in the primitive form of the ceremony. Elsewhere St. Paul gives fuller meaning to his "death-life" symbolism, by defining the Christian's "risen" life in this world in terms of the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ.[58] During our earthly pilgrimage the Spirit is a "Spirit of promise", or an "earnest": yet this is no mere token of something for which Christians wait until the final Resurrection, but a real sharing in the life of the risen Christ here and now.[59] In other words,

[53] Exodus xiii, 21-22; xiv, 19-20.
[54] *Journal of Theological Studies*, Jan.-Apr., 1947. (T.W.M.)
[55] Romans vi, 4, 5, 8: N.B. future tenses.
[56] Romans vi, 11.
[57] Colossians iii, 1; ii, 12-13.
[58] Romans viii, 9-11.
[59] Ephesians i, 13-14; II Corinthians i, 22.

the "seal" of the Spirit is a real "anointing" from on high.[60] As St. John puts it:

> "Ye have an anointing from the Holy One. . . . And . . . the anointing which ye received of him abideth in you, and . . . teacheth you concerning all things, and is true."[61]

Thus we come round again to the theme of Pentecost, and the Paraclete. The "anointing" neither is nor implies a sacrament of unction, but is itself that Spirit-baptism of which water-baptism is the sacrament.

The Fathers give variations of, or add touches of colour to, the Pauline theme of death and resurrection-life through the laver. Hermas says, plainly and bluntly:

> "The seal is the water: so men descend to the water dead, and come up living."[62]

In the Epistle of Barnabas, we are reminded of the thought of "Christ the first fruits", when we read that the baptized "come up bearing fruit". Jerome emphasizes the part played by the faith of the baptized:

> "We are buried with Christ in baptism, and we have risen again by faith in the working of God who has called him again from the dead."[63]

Ambrose, eager to uphold the separate sacramental significance of ceremonies other than the laver itself, could not always confine the Spirit-gift to the post-lavacral chrismation: for he admits that "we are buried in the water that we may rise again *renewed* by the Spirit";[64] and in baptism, as also in penitence, "the destruction of the flesh tends towards the growth of the spirit"[65] — the human spirit informed, presumably, by the Divine Spirit. Zeno of Verona enriches the thought that we share Christ's Resurrection from the moment of baptism with

[60] II Corinthians i, 21.
[61] I John ii, 20, 27.
[62] Hermas, "The Shepherd".
[63] Jerome, Ep. to Oceanus.
[64] Ambrose, *De Sp. Sancto*, I, v.
[65] Ambrose, *Duties of Clergy*, I, xviii.

the theme of the mother bringing to birth,[66] and with another theme which we have already met:

> "These (neophytes) whom ye see, redolent with the savour of exquisite cooking, (are they) that have been baked not in an oven but in a *font*: with fire not human but divine."[67]

He speaks also of "the harvest of a well-watered summer",[68] much as Barnabas speaks of the "fruit". From Augustine we may take a final quotation illustrating that the Christian's share in Christ's risen life is bestowed sacramentally in the laver itself:

> "We are righteous, not in ourselves but in Him; as He is 'sin', not His (sin) but ours: . . . that . . . whereas He had never Himself lived according to the oldness of sin, He might by His Resurrection signify our new life springing to life again from the old death . . . This is that very sacrament of baptism . . . , that whosoever pertain to that grace should die to sin, . . . and should live again by being born again from that laver, as He Himself by rising again from the sepulchre."[69]

There are more subtle indications of the positive character of the Spirit-gift in water-baptism. For example, there is a certain overlapping of the symbolism and typology of the Eucharist with that of the laver. It might be, and has been, objected that this is due to a confusion between water as a cleansing material and water as a drink. It might be claimed that the "water of life" should not be referred to Baptism, although it was so understood by Justin, Irenaeus,[70] and many others. In that case an earlier phase of our argument would be invalid. But may we not claim that on this point the instinct of the Fathers was right? The material water of baptism is

[66] Zeno of Verona, *Sermons to Candidates.*
[67] Zeno of Verona, *Sermons to Neophytes.*
[68] As [66].
[69] Augustine, Enchiridion to Laurentius on Faith, Hope and Charity, §§ 41-42.
[70] See earlier quotations.

sacramental of a spiritual fount of "water springing up unto eternal life" in the baptized: hence we find the figure of nourishment alongside that of cleansing, as already noted more than once. In Ambrose's baptismal rite, the water was regarded initially as requiring to be "sweetened", like the waters of Marah, by the application of a wooden cross.[71] Israel used the sweetened waters of Marah for *sustenance,* of course, like the miraculous water of Massah-Meribah which St. Paul takes as a type of the Eucharistic wine.[72] As the Eucharistic cup signifies Christ's gift of himself to the believer throughout continuing time, so the baptismal laver signifies the initial gift of the Holy Spirit at the outset of the Christian life. It may be significant that our Lord at Cana used water intended for "purifications" as his raw-material in providing wine.[73] And whereas some Fathers describe the Eucharist as the "medicine of immortality",[74] Clement of Alexandria speaks of baptism as "the one Paeonian medicine";[75] and Ephraim uses the phrase "medicine of life" with reference to baptism.[76] It is noteworthy that the figure of medicine, or of healing, was also used with reference to the *Cross*, from which both Sacraments derive their meaning. There is possibly another indication of the way in which the two Sacraments are inevitably interlocked in thought. Gregory of Nyssa suggests that the Eucharist is the means of salvation to the body, baptism to the soul:[77] while other Fathers whose thought shows a similar dualistic tendency prefer to think of the body and soul as "saved" *together* in baptism, by means of the action of the water and the Spirit respectively.[78]

Even more significant than the "overlapping" of bap-

[71] Ambrose, *De Mysteriis.* cf. Exodus xv, 25.
[72] Exodus xvii, 6-7, c.f. I Corinthians x, 4.
[73] John ii.
[74] e.g. Ignatius.
[75] Clem. Alex., *Paedagogus* I, vi.
[76] Ephraim, *Hymn vii on the Epiphany,* v, 23.
[77] Greg. Nyss., *Orat. Catech.* xxxvii.
[78] e.g. Irenaeus, passage quoted above.

tismal and Eucharistic terminology is another characteristic of patristic thought, dependent still more directly upon the death of Christ: namely, the attitude to martyrdom. It was held that, for those at least who had not either willingly shirked baptism or courted heresy, to die avowedly for Christ's name was equivalent to baptism: for this was a sharing in Christ's sufferings, which he himself had called a "baptism". It conferred all the privileges which Christian initiation could confer. The author of the anonymous treatise "on Rebaptism" deals with the subject at length, alongside the problem of those who died after water-baptism but before what we should call confirmation. He begins by observing that Christ, and also the Apostles, had hallowed both water-baptism and martyrdom, "so that either one of the two, or both kinds, might afford . . ." salvation. He sees as a further demonstration of this, the fact that water and blood together issued from our Lord's pierced side.[79] Then he expounds I John v, 6, concluding "that water is wont to confer (the Spirit), and that man's blood is wont to confer the Spirit, and that the Spirit himself is wont to confer the Spirit": for "the Spirit breathes where he will, . . . sometimes . . . upon those who are unworthy of him . . . for the sake of some needful operation" (and the case of King Saul is cited). He goes on:

> "Thus, cleaving to the baptism of men, the Spirit goes either before or follows it; or failing the baptism of water, it falls upon those that believe."

Out of these somewhat vague remarks we can conclude at least that *water*-baptism, signifying Christ's death, is the normal Sacrament of the Spirit-gift, martyrdom being for this very reason equivalent to it.[80] (Like other Fathers, this author is inconsistent when he treats explicitly of the "further-ceremony".)

The earliest use of the Trinitarian formula in baptism affords further indirect evidence of the meaning of the sacra-

[79] John xix, 34.
[80] *De Rebaptismate*, §§ 11-15.

ment itself. Our Lord, according to the author of the first Gospel, enjoined baptism εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου πνεύματος.[81] If "the Name of Jesus" was sometimes used in very early times, this was soon deemed inadequate.[82] The preposition εἰς, not ἐν or ἐπι, is the one which appears in Matthew xxviii, 19. Now, when at Ephesus the disciples of John told St. Paul that they had "not so much as heard whether the Holy Ghost is" (*or* "has been given"), his reply was: "*Into* what then (εἰς τι) were ye baptised?"[83] Their subsequent baptism was "into the Name of the Lord Jesus": clearly, St. Paul thought of it also as "into the Holy Ghost". Basil of Caesarea echoes this thought, misquoting I Cor. xii, 13: "We are all baptized in one body *into* one Spirit."[84] Unless we are obsessed by the idea that baptism has two parts, we see the same implied in St. Peter's words at Pentecost: "Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ unto remission of your sins; and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost."[85] It was a natural step to the recognition that Christian baptism is "into" all three Persons of the Trinity or none. It is a pity that the Fathers, especially the Latin Fathers, preferred the sense of "in", rather than "into", the Threefold Name. The meaning of the formula was weakened. It came to signify merely the authority and agency of the Three Persons, without the fuller thought of the baptized as "clothed upon" with the Godhead. Thus the Pentecostal associations of primitive water-baptism ritual were obscured; and the formula came to be used not only at the laver but with other parts of the ceremonial in the developed rite, especially with the Chrismation. However, the use of the Threefold Name, even deprived of its maximal significance, continued to bear witness in a more general way to the simplicity of the sacrament, reminding the Church that

[81] Matthew xxviii, 19.
[82] Acts ii, 38; viii, 16; xix, 5.
[83] Acts xix, 3-4.
[84] Basil, *De Sp. Sancto*, x, 61.
[85] Acts ii, 38.

Christian initiation is "one"—if we may use our Lord's description of the unity of the Divine Persons—"one thing".[86] In fact we are but restating earlier arguments, when we conclude that over and above the diverse aspects under which baptism may be viewed, the Divine activity or fact or event of which it is the sacrament is essentially too simple to require more than the single ceremony of ablution as its outward sign. It is perhaps regrettable, from this point of view, that the Church should have introduced the custom of the trine immersion or affusion. Historically this custom doubtless helped to establish firmly the doctrine of the Trinity.[87] But in the long run, especially where affusion has replaced immersion, this advantage has been outweighed by the dimming of the proper symbolical associations of the laver, namely, death to sin and the sharing in a Risen Life by virtue of our Saviour's unique act of "Atonement" or reconciliation.

It would be ideal, for the purpose of working out our main thesis, if the early history of the subordinate ceremonies of unction and laying-on-of-hands (in association with baptism) could be clearly traced out and understood: if a clear account could be given of the reason why either or both came to be deemed essential to the initiatory rite: if the veil could be lifted from the period during which (in the West) a rite of "confirmation" became separable from the fontal rite for certain purposes: and finally, if the guiding hand of the Divine Providence could be discerned in each stage of the process. Unfortunately, even the specialists are in the dark. Nevertheless, certain suggestions may be made.

First, not only the language of the Fathers, but their baptismal ritual itself, testifies by implication to the originally auxiliary character of the "further-ceremonies". The very fact that there were *two* is good evidence. In the case of chrismation, there is also the fact that a part of the early Church, in Syria,

[86] John x, 30, cf. xvii, 11. (Gr. ἕν).

[87] cf. Origen: *De Princ,* I, iii, 2. Athanasius: *Contra Arianos,* ii, 4. Ambrose: *De Myst.*, § on laver. Ambrose: *De Sacramentis,* II, v. Gaudentius: *Sermon ix.*

used the ceremony *before* the laver, while in other regions it was used after the laver.[88] It is reasonable to conclude that the custom was derived from the New Testament references to the "unction from above", rather than *vice versa.* It symbolized primarily the sharing in Christ's Messiahship, that is to say his Kingship and Priesthood. Dr. E. O. James classifies it as an example of a universal "coronation" pattern of ritual.[89] It indicated the royal priesthood of all believers. But the Messiah's "chrisma" was the Holy Spirit himself. Now since the Old Testament metaphor of "outpouring" of the Spirit was as vividly presented in the Christian "paradosis" as was the parallel metaphor of "clothing" or "baptism" with the Spirit, the chrismation tended to appropriate to itself a sacramental character which rightly belonged to the laver. It is noteworthy that some more developed rites had unctions before the laver also, but with oil. These were *preparatory,* symbolizing (for instance) exorcism, the preparing of the "body" of the "old man" for burial, the preliminaries of an "athlete" of Christ. But they could be accompanied by prayers for the descent of the Holy Spirit, in language scarcely less restricted than at the chrismation. Even a brief and somewhat casual study prompts the student to ask whether a clear distinction can in fact be drawn between the chrismation as "essential" and the preparatory ceremonial as "non-essential". It is true, of course, that the former continued to be performed by the bishop (or with chrism consecrated by him) when the laver and other ceremonies had been delegated to priests and deacons. But it is also true that generally the laver itself had to be consecrated with the episcopal chrism. Taking all into consideration, we are inclined to deduce that all ceremonies, before and after the laver, were accretions: but that the chrismation early acquired a special importance, partly because it symbolized the Messianic chrisma, partly because it was the last of a series

[88] Dom Connolly's work. cf. T. W .Manson, *Journal of Theological Studies,* Jan.-Apr. 1947. Ephraim, *Hymns on the Epiphany,* v and vi.

[89] E. O. James, *Christian Myth and Ritual.*

leading towards a climax, and partly (as we shall suggest) because of supposed Scriptural authority or precedent.

The laying-on-of-hands, which eventually became combined with chrismation, appears to rest on direct Scriptural authority in a way in which the latter does not. But actually, in the Apostolic Age, it was *not* regularly performed with baptism. It may be suggested, tentatively, that its use by SS. Peter and John at Samaria and by St. Paul at Ephesus[90] was due to an observed lack of the Spirit-gift (as then conceived) in the baptized. We may further suggest, in all reverence, that God, having taught men the primary facts about his Holy Spirit, was trying to wean them from the first stage of their education during which they had needed visible evidence of the Spirit's indwelling. Even the Apostles were slow to learn, and God dealt patiently with them. If this surmise is near the truth, then God has had to extend his patience and to use the shortcomings of Christians to his eventual glory. For, apparently, after the phenomenon of visible Spirit-possession had ceased to be normal, the Church felt an even stronger need, namely for some specific sacramental mode of reception of the Holy Spirit, beyond the laver itself. This would account for the fact that the laying-on-of-hands was regularized. The association with it of the chrismation was a natural development, especially if divergences of practice were removed thereby. The somewhat different Scriptural backgrounds of the two ceremonies brought a richness of meaning to the post-lavacral ritual.

The influence of Scripture was important in several ways. The laying-on-of-hands was a gesture of blessing. By it the promises to Abraham, the inheritance of God's chosen People, had been handed on from Isaac to Jacob[91] and from Jacob in a special measure to Joseph's sons.[92] By it, too, the prophetic commission of the Lord to Moses had been handed on to Joshua. Anointing had been the sign of consecration of priests and

[90] Acts viii, 14-20; xix, 5-6.

[91] Imposition of hands implied, presumably, in Genesis xxvii, 22b: cf. Tertullian, *De Bapt.*, viii.

[92] Genesis xlviii, 14.

kings. In a derivative, more metaphorical and spiritual sense, the term was applied to prophets[93] and above all to "Messiah". If there was any association common to both customs, it was that of "adequacy" for the job to which God called a man. The combination of the two in the Church may be said to have expressed the Christian's "adequacy", or "wholeness", to which his inheritance of the promises, his prophetic calling,[94] and his "royal priesthood",[95] all contributed. The theme of "wholeness" ran also through the association of both ceremonies with *healing*. It is, altogether, not surprising that the Church tended to transfer from the laver to these ceremonies the sacramental value of the Spirit-gift.

When the two ceremonies were both attached to Christian baptism, and this transfer of ideas began, it was not agreed which of the two (if either) was to be regarded, strictly, as sacramental of the Spirit-gift, or why. Tertullian, speaking of the chrismation, merely draws attention to Old Testament anointings: and he describes the laying-on-of-hands as analogous to the spiritual anointing of Jesus,[96] without any clear perception of sacramental significance.[97] Pope Urban I, who can speak in an apparently definite manner, of "receiving the Holy Spirit after baptism by imposition of the bishop's hands", shows that he also is really groping: for the object, he says, is

> "that they may be found to be Christians *fully*; because when the Holy Spirit is shed on them, the believing heart is *enlarged for prudence and stedfastness.*"[98]

Evidently the "robur" theory had its exponents from early times!

Possibly the greatest single motive, humanly speaking, in

[93] Isaiah lxi, 1-2.

[94] Jeremiah xxxii, 34; Isaiah liv, 14; Joel ii, 28-29; and derivative N.T. references.

[95] Exodus xix, 6; I Peter ii, 9; Revelations i, 6; v, 10.

[96] Some Fathers assumed that the Baptist had laid his hands on Jesus.

[97] Tertullian, *De Bapt.* vii-viii.

[98] Urban I, *Ep. to all Christians.*

the separation of the Spirit-gift from its association with the laver, was the number of apparent "types" or precedents. The Fathers point us to Genesis i-ii, drawing attention to the fact that the creation of Adam was one event, and the inbreathing of the life-giving Spirit of God into him was another and subsequent event:[99] likewise, they imagined, should it be with the new Adam, the new creation in Christ. In I Peter iii, 21, baptism is compared to the Flood. Now Noah's dove, symbol of the Holy Spirit, was sent forth *after* the Flood had subsided, (in fact *because* it had subsided).[100] The authors of the first and third Gospels were influenced by this in their rendering of the Marcan account of Jesus' baptism; and the Fathers reproduce the parallel thus created.[101] Above all, there was the fact that Pentecost had been a separate event, subsequent to the Cross and Resurrection. But if the laver is in any case allowed to signify the Cross and the Resurrection, and presumably also the Ascension, three events separated in time, there is really no difficulty in adding Pentecost to the list. Pentecost was part of Christ's single redemptive act. The final precedent for a "further-ceremony" was provided by the events related in Acts viii, 4-24 and xix, 1-7. But as we have noted, these were not so regular as the Church came to suppose.

The development of the "further-ceremonies", and their eventual "conflation" (so to speak), had its providential use in the clarification of doctrine. Was there also Divine guidance in later developments? In the Western Church, "confirmation" became separated from the laver, at first for the sake of penitent heretics and schismatics, and later owing to the effects of rapid expansion. Meanwhile at no time, it seems, was the "further-ceremony" universally put on a par with water-baptism. Jerome could wonder whether it was only a form of

[99] Cyprian: Ep. lxiii, 7. Augustine: *Confessions* XIII, xxviii-xxix.

[100] Tertullian, *De Bapt.* viii. Ambrose, *De Myst.* Jerome, *Ep. to Oceanus.*

[101] Ambrose, *De Myst.*; Jerome, *Ep. to Oceanus.* cf. Matthew iii, 16; Luke iii, 21.

respect to the bishop.[102] Augustine contrasts it with water-baptism as not being essentially unrepeatable, since a man who has undergone it may leave the Catholic fold and then return and undergo it a second time: it can be called "reconciliation", in fact; and the really vital factor is the fellowship of the Church, in which alone the Holy Spirit dwells.[103] Leo apparently adhered to Augustine's views, although Dr. Jalland tries to avoid this conclusion.[104] In a later century, Pope Zacharias describes the Catholic "confirmation" of heretics as "absolution".[105] In later mediæval times we find that even the "confirmation" of those baptized into the Catholic fold is given a subsidiary importance in practice. This corresponds with the spread of infant baptism, and with the development of the "robur" theory.

Was not all this used by God to prepare the Church for her life within a "Christendom" in which infant baptism would be normal, and in which moreover every ordinary Church member would contribute effectively to her life and thought? If so, we may draw together our conclusions concerning the Spirit-gift and water-baptism; and taking into account the comments we have made on the "further-ceremony", we may suggest an outline of the meaning of baptism and "confirmation" as they are intended to be.

A child is born, and is baptized with water in the name of the Trinity, preferably with only one application of the water. We do not ask whether something "happens" at the moment of baptism: for as Clement of Alexandria said, "You cannot tell the time".[106] It suffices that God has promised the gift of his Holy Spirit. This gift includes "death with Christ", i.e. remission of sins and spiritual cleansing, and "rising with Christ", i.e. regeneration and the Spirit-gift, the earnest of eternal life. The baptismal gift is only a first instalment—if we may use the dangerous analogy of quantity—but it is a real

[102] Jerome, *Dial. c. Lucif.*
[103] Augustine, *De Bapt. c. Donat,* III, xvi, 21.
[104] Leo., *Ep.* clxvi, 2.
[105] Zacharias, *Ep. to S. Boniface,* dated July 1, 746.
[106] Clem. Alex., *Paedagogus.*

first stage in the race, so to speak. " Qualitatively ", the Spirit-gift of Pentecostal power is sacramentally made over at the font. So long as the child is young, in actual fact this " indwelling of the Spirit with power " has to be mediated through faithful adult Christians and the Church in general. The child has all the *privileges* of Christian initiation, but cannot yet be expected to exercise the corresponding *responsibilities*. When he can, the Church recognizes the fact in a rite of " Confirmation ". This includes the laying-on-of-hands, and preferably unction also. Herein is represented God's calling and ordaining the young person to the *exercise* of that " royal " (and prophetic) priesthood of which he has already had the privileges. " Confirmation " is thus in a real sense an ordination, but differs from that which we usually call " Ordination " in being applicable to *all* adult Christians. It is not strictly " necessary ", as baptism is, because the gift of the Spirit is received sacramentally in baptism once for all. But in a Church in which the priesthood of all believers is recognized, and whose *κοινωνια* therefore involves the personal contribution of each God-guided member severally, confirmation is a quasi-essential service of commissioning, blessed by God. It is proper that the minister who is " given authority in the congregation "[107] to represent the whole Church, namely the bishop, should take the chief part in the rite. And it is fitting that the occasion should normally mark the admission of the baptized person to the Holy Communion: up till this time his parents and sponsors, and indeed the Church at large, have communicated on his behalf and have mediated to him the benefits of Communion.

In conclusion, we claim first that baptism in water (in the Name of the Trinity) is properly the sacrament of the gift of the Holy Spirit " with " whom and " into " whom the disciples were baptized spiritually at Pentecost: secondly, that the Patristic doctrine, on which depends the view of writers such as Dr. A. J. Mason and Dom Gregory Dix, involved an error but helped (under God) to promote a fully Trinitarian theology: and thirdly, that the separation of " confirmation " from bap-

[107] cf. Article XXV, Prayer Book (XXXIX Articles).

tism in the West heralded a return to the New-Testament understanding of water-baptism, and further, a move forward into an age in which the proper understanding of κοινωνια would give new point to the separated rite of confirmation, while maintaining its traditional connexion with the priesthood which is ours in Christ.

CONFIRMATION IN OTHER DAYS

By W. J. BROWN

THERE is in the Deanery Library at Hadleigh a very valuable MS. book containing much interesting historical information about the church and town of Hadleigh. The greater part of the book is in the handwriting of Dr. Wilkins, rector in 1719, but subsequent rectors have also made their own contributions. The benefice is a Peculiar of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the incumbent having the title of Dean of Bocking. Until 1838, when the jurisdiction of peculiars was abolished, the rector acted under the direct authority of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and exercised rights over a group of parishes within the deanery of Bocking. This comparative autonomy seems to have led to difficulties in regard to confirmations, as the archbishop himself could only very rarely visit the parish, even if it were thought etiquette to do so, and diocesan bishops were invited occasionally for the purpose. In the handwriting of the various rectors from July 25, 1761, until September 18, 1833, there are accounts of eleven confirmations in all which were held in Hadleigh parish church. It may be of interest to transcribe the passages from the MS. book as they throw some light upon the administration of confirmation at that time.

Dr. Tanner, the rector, describes a confirmation by Thomas Secker, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, as follows:

"On Saturday, July 25th (1761) he proceeded to Hadleigh" (from Bocking, where Dr. Tanner had preached the Visitation Sermon and the archbishop had confirmed). "Mr. Hewitt the Curate, Messrs. Ward and Mighels Churchwardens with all the principal and many other Parishioners on Horseback met his Grace at Kersey near S^{r} Thos. Thorowgood's

House, riding before and escorting Him to the Parsonage House.

"On Sunday Morning when the Clock struck ten the Bell began to toll for Church—proper Persons were placed at the middle, South and Chancel Doors to let in the Inhabitants of Hadly, and better Sort of Strangers only—Who being placed in proper Seats the Ch. Wardens with white Wands came to Conduct the ABp from the Parsonage—then the Great South Door was opend And his Grace entered—walked up the middle Isle—two of his own Gentlemen and the Churchwardens going before, his Chaplain Dr. Hall, Dr. Tanner and Mr. Hewitt following Him. The Organ playing, and an Anthem singing, whilst He robed in the Vestry, the Reader prepared the Lessons etc. Dr. Tanner read Prayers. The ABp. preached on the Office of Confirmation as it is prescribed in our Comon Prayer Book on w^ch^ office the Sermon was an excellent Commentary. He then Confirmed the Parishoners of M. Illeigh and those that came with Tickets from a Distance. About 4 o'clock in the Afternoon, He was attended by the Ch. Wardens with Wands from the Parsonage, walked up the middle Isle, the Organ and a full Anthem as in the Morning. Mr. Hewitt read Prayers. Sermon omitted—then his Grace confirmed all that offerd bringing Tickets, but no one without a Ticket—the N^o^ in all about 450 morning and afternoon together.

"Everything was conducted with great Decency, and as little Noise or Croud as possible in so large a Concourse of People. On Monday about 8 o'clock his Grace set out for Lambeth."

On June 2 (Saturday) and June 3 (Whitsunday) 1770 Dr. Tanner describes two confirmations at Hadleigh, when the candidates came from the Peculiars of Hadleigh and M. Illeigh and the neighbouring villages. In all there were between 770 and 780 candidates! The Bishop of Norwich (P. Yonge) was the officiant. Dr. Tanner says: "The Chancel was kept entirely empty—none admitted without a Ticket—produced to the Ch. Wardens who stood at the Entrance in ye Middle Isle

for that Purpose. Tickets afterwards delivered up at y^e^ Rails . . . As soon as one set about 100 were confirmed, they were let out at the Chancel Door—then another set let in—all finished within two Hours—with great Decency, and as little Noise or Crowd as possible."

Dr. Tanner notes that the bishop confirmed on Whitmonday about 1,000 at Lavenham—where he says there was great crowding and noise!

On Monday, August 27, 1781, Dr. Tanner records that "A Bishop Cornwallis and his lady came to Hadleigh Parsonage—on Tuesday his Grace confirmed the Peculiars of Hadleigh and M. Ely only—500 w^th^ Tickets—between 20 or 30 without. All things were orderd as on the foregoing Page June 2nd and 3rd and his Grace was pleasd to say with much less Noise and Crowd than usual on such Occasions."

The last entry by Dr. Tanner is May 20, 1784: "L. Bagot Bp. of Norwich attended by Mr. Gooch his chaplain confirmed at Hadleigh the A Bishop's Peculiars of Hadleigh and M. Illeigh with 37 of his own Parishes. No in all 1507. Prayers being omitted no Persons were Admitted into the Church but the Clergy and their respective catechumens. So that everything was done with the utmost Decency and good Order—and without the least crowding or confusion."

On Monday, June 9, 1788, Dr. Bagot conducted another confirmation at Hadleigh, the incumbent who describes it being Dr. Drake. On this occasion there were 418 candidates.

The next confirmation was on April 20, 1797, the rector being Dr. Drummond and the Bishop of Gloucester the officiant. The rector writes: "After the Prayers the Girls were first Confirmed at the Communion Rails and then the Boys—in all 370."

The Bishop of Norwich (Henry Bathurst) twice confirmed during Dr. Drummond's incumbency, on Oct. 1, 1806, and June 1, 1813, when there were 616 and 720 candidates respectively.

Dr. Drummond's last entry is June 15, 1827, when the

confirmation was administered by the Bishop of Chichester. "After Prayers the Rector went with the Bishop within the Rails and at the Altar and confirmed 456 catechumens."

The last extract from the MS. book is in the handwriting of Hugh James Rose, at whose suggestion the famous Hadleigh Conference was held. If only he had left on record an account of that conference! He writes: "On Wednesday, September 18, 1833, a Confirmation was held in this church, by the Bishop of London. It was at first intended only for the Abps Peculiar, but afterwards at the request of the Bishop of Norwich about 20 of the Parishes of that Diocese were admitted. The whole no. of tickets received was 960, of which 195 were for this Parish and about 100 of the Parish of Monks-Eleigh. There was ample room in the Church for the above number at the *same* time, but this number was sufficient."

Confirmation is much in the mind of the Church of England at the present time, and although the lapsed constitute a disturbing problem, it seems clear enough that the candidates are far more carefully prepared and the rite administered with a greater reverence and devotion than was the case at the time the above accounts were written.

REVIEWS

GOD WAS IN CHRIST: AN ESSAY ON INCARNATION AND ATONEMENT. By D. M. BAILLIE, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of St. Andrews. (Faber and Faber, 1948.) Pp. 213. Price 16s.

JESUS, SON OF MAN: STUDIES CONTRIBUTORY TO A MODERN PORTRAIT. By GEORGE S. DUNCAN, D.D., LL.D., D.Th., Principal of St. Mary's College, and Regius Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of St. Andrews. (Nisbet and Co., 1947.) Pp. xvi + 290. Price 16s.

To one whose staple reading matter is provided by theses of candidates for degrees, works of mature scholarship bring great relief and refreshment. Especially is this so with books of such genuine maturity as these two, books which express the product of prolonged reflection on their subject matter by authors who are ripe scholars.

Professor Baillie and Principal Duncan are agreed in rejecting the antithesis between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history. They are well aware of the problems that have been raised by form-criticism and of the Barthian theory of the incarnation as the divine incognito. They give their reasons for holding that it is possible historically to know something of the deeds and words, the mind and character of Jesus, and that what is historically known is inexplicable except by acceptance of the Christian faith in him as God incarnate. From this common starting point their roads diverge, Baillie going on to consider the implied doctrine, Duncan to recover the historic portrait. The books were not, I am told, produced by collaboration between the two professors. Yet the result is a happy harmony: the doctrine and the portrait can recognize themselves in each other.

Dr. Baillie treats in order of christology, the Trinity and the Atonement. He begins by addressing those who say that they can believe in God, but not in the incarnation. "What," he asks, "do you mean by God?" Then he develops the argument that if we think of God as the God revealed to us through Christ

we must think of him as the gracious God of Christian theology. But we can only think of him thus if we think from within the Christian experience of God's grace. This is an experience which in human language can only be expressed in paradox: the "I, yet not I" of St. Paul, the *Da quod iubes et iube quod vis* of St. Augustine. It is the God of whom we think in this way who is asserted in the Christian creed to have been incarnate in Jesus, to be the blessed Trinity, in the Atonement to have been reconciling man to himself in Christ.

Here we have a suggestion, opening up new avenues of thought, which impresses me as one of the most important of contemporary contributions to theology. It may be that I am prejudiced in its favour because it is a suggestion so much in line with my own thinking, as may be seen from pp. 150 and 161 of my *Towards a Christian Philosophy*, where I wrote "the most real thing of which we have any experience is our relationship to God in Christ. It is not surprising that we should be unable to 'explain' this relationship in terms of any other relationship experienced or observed upon earth. On the contrary, it contains within itself the explanation of everything else." I cannot but rejoice at seeing a brother theologian independently adopt this same principle, and work out its implications for the central doctrines of the Christian faith. "The dilemma disappears when we frankly recognize that in the doctrine of the Incarnation there is a paradox which cannot be rationalized but which can in some small measure be understood in the light of the 'paradox of grace'" (p. 131). "The doctrine of the Trinity sums up the Gospel by telling us that the God of grace, who was revealed through the Incarnation and Pentecost as the One who paradoxically works in us what He demands of us, is the same from all eternity and for ever more" (p. 147). "In whatever way the process of salvation through the Cross is conceived, God's merciful attitude towards sinners is never regarded as the *result* of the process, but as its cause and source . . . His wrath must not be regarded as something which has to be 'propitiated' and so changed into love and mercy, but rather as being identical with the consuming fire of inexorable divine love in relation to our sins" (p. 188).

The book is of real importance because of the way in which it puts long standing theological problems on a new footing. It is pioneer work, and there are some details in its exposition which

I suspect will need revision. His criticisms of my essay on the Incarnation and of kenotic christologies are surely based on misunderstandings, and I doubt whether his denial of tripersonality, in the full modern sense of the word, in the godhead is consistent with the Father-Son relationship in the Incarnation which he emphasizes on p. 88. I am not sure that his theology allows for a genuine incarnation, as distinct from the perfect instance of such indwelling of God in man as in greater or less degree is found elsewhere: "We may say that God was continually pressing through into human life in every age, so far as man would allow, and the reason why the Incarnation did not take place earlier is because man was not sufficiently receptive" (p. 148). I cannot dismiss as readily as Dr. Baillie the doctrine of divine impassibility; Plato's argument in *Republic II* still seems to me unanswerable.

To question his views on certain matters is not to dispute the value of Dr. Baillie's book. Over and over again the reader will find his thought illuminated by its masterly grasp of problems and by flashes of insight. The exposition of the position of christology in present-day theological discussion is an instance of the one; the description of the "modern" man's "moralistic substitute for the sense of sin" (p. 162) and of the nature of the suffering of the forgiven sinner (pp. 167-170) are instances of the other. And, as I have already indicated, the book as a whole is one of those seminal books destined to bear fruit in the enrichment of subsequent theological thinking.

Principal Duncan challenges the widespread opinion that in his earthly ministry our Lord made central the claim to be accepted as messiah. His disciples who wrote the New Testament were right in presenting him as one who had been the messiah, for that he truly was. But his own aim was to bring his hearers to know the true character of God; to have invited them to be considering whether or no they were to accept him as messiah would have been a hindrance rather than a help to this. The background of Jesus' use of the title "Son of Man" is to be found in Ezekiel rather than in Enoch; it was used to express his kinship with, his representing, humanity. "It was not as the Messiah, but as the Son of Man, that Jesus offered up His life on behalf of His brethren." (p. 153).

On the negative side, I think Dr. Duncan underestimates the strength of the evidence for our Lord having both thought

and spoken of himself as messiah. To get the true balance his book needs to be read along with Professor William Manson of Edinburgh's *Jesus the Messiah*. And there are passages on pp. 176-7, 180-1, and 194 in which the word "spiritual" is used in a manner more reminiscent of the thought of the Bishop of Birmingham than of sound Christian theology.

With these two reservations, *Jesus, Son of Man* is strongly to be commended for the value of all its working out of its positive thesis that at the heart of our thought of our Lord must be that of God-consciousness, of his mission to bring his hearers face to face with God in order that enrolled under his banner they might be sent forth to the rescue of his world from evil.

> Thus the End might be "at hand"; but it was equally plain to those early Christians that the End was (as they said) "not yet." Their fundamental conviction might be expressed by saying that through the coming of Jesus Christ the world had passed from a peace to a war footing. Had not Jesus Himself said so—"I came not to bring peace, but a sword." And being at war, with the risen Christ leading them on, they knew that the last stage in the great conflict with the powers of this world had begun. (p. 257).

This takes up what had been said earlier:

> It is an essential element in the mission of Jesus to accomplish this deliverance, and to bring every part of the present world-order (including politics and economics and all that may be called Caesar's) under the dominion of the Spirit of God, which, by controlling and revitalizing it, will end by transforming it and making all things new. (p. 40).

Dr. Duncan shows throughout that he is thoroughly at home in the world of New Testament criticism, and this gives weight to what he has to say on the work of St. John Baptist (pp. 83-105, 118), on the Fourth Gospel (pp. 252-254) and on divine sonship (pp. 44, 108-9, 115-6). While Dr. Baillie's book will mainly appeal to readers already at home in the world of theological scholarship, Dr. Duncan's may well be recommended to enquirers who say they have heard of biblical criticism, but know nothing about it, and would like to be told what an educated man can reasonably believe about the historic Christ.

I conclude by putting side by side passages from the two books about the place of Christ in history:

> If we conceive history as the Jews conceived it, as revealing in human affairs the working out of a divine purpose, then Last Things may begin long before the end of the time process; they take place at any time when God effectively breaks through into history and it can be said of Him, "Lo, this is our God, we have waited for Him and He will save us" (Isaiah xxv, 9).
>
> *Jesus, Son of Man*, p. 50.

> In the case of spatial measurements the beginning and the end of a track determine the location of its middle point; but in the case of history in the true sense the historical point which reveals the meaning of the whole process must be called the centre, because it alone gives a meaning to "beginning" and "end". And for Christian faith that point is Christ.
>
> *God was in Christ*, p. 74.
>
> LEONARD HODGSON.

FROM JESUS TO PAUL. By JOSEPH KLAUSNER; translated from the Hebrew by W. F. STINESPRING. (pp. xvi. + 624). (Allen and Unwin.) 15s.

DR. Klausner's book on the Apostolic Age and the life and teaching of St. Paul should be received with interest, and deserves careful attention for several reasons. In the first place, it is a full-scale treatment of the Apostolic Age, and deals with the history of Christian expansion, the cultural and religious background, and the thought of St. Paul; in a day when most books give either a bird's eye view of a large area, or a microscopic inspection of a limited one, it is interesting to find a work which is both comprehensive and detailed. Secondly, Dr. Klausner is a learned historian, with the power of judgement and the gift of lucidity. Thirdly, a Jew's criticisms of the faith in the Resurrection and Atonement must command a hearing, and stimulate the Christian to examine afresh the grounds upon which he should base his reply.

It had seemed that the days of comprehensive volumes on the history and doctrine of the Apostolic Age were past; Dr. Klausner's book is therefore very welcome. Many of the chapters are well written, and nearly all are packed with information;

the generalizations are supported with interesting illustrations, which are often the better for being unfamiliar. On the theological side, the author is maintaining an important and controversial thesis about the origins and development of the Christian faith. But it is not easy to combine controversy and almost encyclopaedic history, to argue and to be a mine of information at the same time; and the present attempt is not altogether successful. The background and history are more prolix than the author's thesis would require. True, a theory of the origins of Christian belief would be valueless without the historical evidence; but in such a study only that evidence should be given which is sooner or later to be relevant; and it should be given in the order that best advances the argument; where the history and background are not in dispute, much may be taken for granted. But Dr. Klausner has not limited his study in this way. If, on the other hand, the primary aim of the book is an objective historical study, the Christian reader will be irritated by the frequency of the polemic. The author has in fact given us a history, interlarded with disputation; and the result is confusing.

As an historian, Dr. Klausner is often admirable. His accounts of the Jewish background are vivid and authoritative, and should be very useful to students. His treatment of critical problems in the New Testament is judicious, and his verdicts often seem conservative when contrasted with those of Christian Form Critics, whose conclusions he himself attributes to "sophistical scepticism". For example, critics often appear to work on the assumption that no man's viewpoint can change within a short period, and any writings containing inconsistencies are therefore split up into self-consistent fragments; this assumption Dr. Klausner criticizes severely, and he provides interesting illustrations on the other side. When, however, controversial points are involved, it seems to the Christian that his impartiality falters; argument gives way to assertion, and the vital question is begged rather than asked or answered.

The summaries of thought and doctrine, whether Greek, Jewish, or Christian, seem to the present writer far inferior to the narrative and description. The author's felicity of style deserts him when he is giving the substance of Biblical writings and the arguments of philosophers; sentence often follows sentence in a disjointed and monotonous way; and it is not easy for the reader to follow the sequence of thought with any interest.

But what of the actual points at issue between Christian and Jew? These arise in many passages, but unfortunately the arguments are scattered through the book, never systematically presented, and at times even inconsistent. The author never really succeeds in stating and criticizing the usual Christian view of the Messiah. According to this, the Messiahship of Jesus rests upon a "creative reinterpretation" of the Old Testament; it is not a slavish reproduction of current Jewish views, but is characterized by its rejection of Jewish racialism, by the elevation of ethics above ritual, and by the doctrine that the Christ must suffer; but it is not a pagan importation either, since the germs of all these developments are contained in the prophetic books of the Old Testament itself. Dr. Klausner is, of course, aware of the relevant passages; but he rules out of court the Christian claim that the New Testament correctly interprets the Old, holding it to be axiomatic that the only legitimate interpretation of the Old Testament is that of orthodox Judaism. Hence Christianity is virtually pagan by definition. The author recounts at length the pagan myths of dying and rising gods; but is the Christian faith really derived from these, or is it essentially Hebraic? This question is not really considered impartially; the Christian reader will disagree not only with the conclusions expressed in this book, but also with the method by which they are reached.

The handling of Greek words and accents is usually (but not always) accurate; the errors on pp. 192 and 278 are doubtless misprints. But some of the Latin quoted is less convincing; cf. both the text and suggested translation of a passage on p. 70, and the apparent assumption of the translator on p. 68 that *sequere* is an infinitive. It is surely unwise to refer to the Seven of the Acts of the Apostles as διάκονοι (*sic*), since this noun is not used to describe them in the Greek. The translation into English has been made from Hebrew; it is in many ways excellent, and the occasional blemishes are therefore to be deplored all the more. It is claimed in the preface that an attempt has been made to retain some of the flavour of the Hebrew style. (But the word "assimilationism" can hardly be due to this.) Perhaps the frequent use of inversion is one of the methods employed for this purpose. Unfortunately, in English this is merely irritating unless used with moderation and in accordance with the underlying logic of the sequence of thought; the excuse that it is meant to reproduce a Semiticism can hardly be allowed, except in the case

of such atrocities as the one on p. 54, "Thus always is the course of history." Too many sentences begin with "And"; some are too long, one on p. 29 running to 173 words; and some stride along magniloquently, only to limp home very lamely when we reach the main verb. But the translator has done most of his work well, and it would be wrong to finish on a note of complaint. We may be grateful to him for his labours.

G. M. STYLER.

THE EARLY TRADITIONS OF ISRAEL. By C. A. SIMPSON. Pp. 677. (Blackwell). £3 3s.

THIS full-length study of J and E material in parts of the Hexateuch is by the Professor of Old Testament Literature in the General Theological Seminary at New York.

The introduction shows that the author is familiar with the history of Hexateuchal criticism since Isaac of Toledo; most space is given to critics since 1843, such as Graf, Kuenen, Wellhausen, Budde, Gunkel, Smend, Eissfeldt and Eduard Meyer, but little enough to English critics like C. F. Burney. It is curious to find no reference in the entire book to the works of Dr. Oesterley and Robinson.

Dr. Simpson's aim is limited: it is "to isolate the J and E material from the narrative of the Hexateuch and to reconstruct the basic documents from which this material has been derived . . . . The thesis advanced . . . is that . . . the earliest document of the Hexateuch is that of J 1, based upon and setting forth the tradition of the southern tribes; that this was used by J 2 as the nucleus of his own more extensive work, which included also certain traditions of a part of the house of Joseph; that this J 2 document was, in the course of time, subjected to a certain amount of casual elaboration by various hands; that the E document represents a thoroughgoing revision and adaptation of the J tradition in the light of the tradition of a group within the house of Joseph other than that from which J 2 had derived the material with which he had supplemented the narrative of his predecessor; that this document was also expanded and to some extent revised, by later hands; and that the J and E documents in their final form were ultimately conflated by the redactor Rje, whose

aim was to unify the divergent traditions . . . . The work of Rje was more complex than has usually been supposed." One hardly knows whether to admire the ingenuity of J 2, E and Rje more than that of Dr. Simpson, who disentangles their strands from the fabric.

His notes to the introduction include a brief but valuable criticism of P. Volz and W. Rudolph's *Der Elohist als Erzähler* but merely a reference to S. Mowinckel's study of Gen. i-xi, in which the non-P material was treated as a conflation of J and E.

An analysis of Gen. i to Judges ii, 5 follows, taking up 280 pages, followed by 70 pages of notes. Genesis i, 1-ii, 4a is ascribed, as usual, to P and left undiscussed. The treatment of Genesis ii, 4b-iv, 26 may be taken as typical of the analysis. The reader finds that for various reasons given the following verses in this section are judged to be "secondary": ii, 5, 9-14, 15-17, 19-20, 24; iii, 15, 16b, 18, 19a, 21, 22, 24a; iv, 1a, 7 ("hopelessly corrupt"), 13-15, 17b and 23-24: the following being "casual additions", ii, 14, iii, 6 a c, 15, 16b, 20-21, iv, 13-15, 17b, 23-24. The reasons adduced for this verdict are not always convincing, e.g., the grounds for treating Genesis ii, 16-17 as inconsistent with the main narrative are "(a) the tree is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil whereas in iii, 3 it is called the tree that is in the midst of the garden, (b) the command is given before the creation of the woman who is nevertheless cognizant of it when she talks with the serpent, (c) the absence of any prohibition from touching the tree" (but what else does ii, 17 do than prohibit eating of it?). Professor Aage Bentzen's *Introduction to the Old Testament*, Vol. 1, reminds us again of Gunkel's insistence upon Form Criticism of the Hebrew myths; in that light (a) and (b) above are arguments which hardly arise.

Analysis of this kind is carried out, in great detail and with a wealth of references to German critics, for the whole of Genesis, Exodus i-xxxiv, Numbers x, 29-xxxii, Deuteronomy xxxi, xxxii, 48-52 and xxxiv, Joshua i, 1-Judges ii, 5. The traditions embedded in Deuteronomy xxxiii are not analysed, which is unfortunate. After taking each section like that of Genesis ii, 4b-iv, 26 cited above, the reader would be well advised to turn on to pp. 491ff, "The J 2 document with commentary" or *mutatis mutandis* to pp. 427 ff, "The J 1 document with commentary, or to pp. 581ff, "The E document with commentary," to read

a reconstruction of the sources quoted, before the reader passes on to a new section. These reconstructions are prefaced by an essay (pp. 419-426) on the " Beginnings of Jahvism ": the J 1 narrative is said to refer to the Exodus and then to the march to Kadesh, which became an important centre of Israelite life and the base of a trek northwards to victory over the Canaanites of the south. For the significance of Kadesh rather than of Sinai, the reviewer would refer to the comparable arguments of a former pupil, J. R. Porter (J. T. S. 44, 139ff.): as Dr. Simpson says, it is only with Kadesh that Moses is associated in this earliest tradition of his work. " The Joseph tribes did not form part of the group to which this tradition belonged: the purpose of J 2 was to unify the tradition preserved in J 1 with that of another group whose entry into Palestine had been from the east not from the south and for whom Sinai was still the only centre of Judaism." The site of Sinai suggested is in the desert of Arabia, south-east of Edom and east of the gulf of Akabah. The God of Sinai, Jahveh, flamed forth in the volcano or showed his dread presence in the storm. There is no reference to the similar Semitic god Hadad. Nor is there any discussion of the Kenite hypothesis popularized by Budde nor of any of the " stages " through which the Hebrews may have passed, such as animism, animatism, polytheism, polydemonism, possibly totemism, and henotheism on their way to ethical monotheism nor of the theory championed by Lagrange of a primitive monotheistic faith. Nor is there any reference to the form of the name " Yau " in compound form on tablets as old as the first Babylonian Dynasty.

The last section of the book deals with the E document, in which Beersheba is represented as the chief sanctuary of the south, sharing with Shechem and Bethel in the north the significance formerly ascribed to Hebron, which is never mentioned in E. " The ancient tradition of the south, which had found its way into, and become a part of the tradition of, the north, is re-written in a northern interest." This theory, instead of a clear contrast between a southern J and a northern E, is interesting. Dr. Simpson comments on E's use of " Amorite " instead of Canaanite but he does not discuss the recent excavations at Mari or the work of Professor Parrot bearing on the Amorites.

In the notes to the analysis of the text, there are numerous emendations of the Hebrew text recorded, partly gleaned from the works of Gunkel, Proksch and others, partly the result of the

author's research. Some, e.g., for Genesis xxiv, 62, do not seem entirely necessary. It may be a pity that the Hebrew is not transliterated to reach a wider circle of readers.

There are three useful tables: (A) of words and expressions characteristic of J and E, (B) of P and RP words and expressions of which 41 are listed, as compared with 50 in Dr. D. C. Simpson's *Pentateuchal Criticism*, (C) of certain words and phrases appealed to as an indication of a Deuteronomic hand. The work is well indexed. It is likely to prove useful to the specialist and the third-year student; but all readers will find such verdicts as the following to be of interest, even if they remain unconvinced: In Genesis xlix " the older tribal material " is said to be found in verses 3b, possibly 4b, 5, 6b, 9aa, 14, 17a, 19, 20, 22 (corrupt) and 27; in verse 10 " until Shiloh come " is emended to " until he comes who belongs to him (Judah) " by changing Shiloh to shelloh or ᵃsher lo. In Exodus i, 11, the famous second clause " breaks the connexion between 11a and 12a." In Exodus iii, 14a " I am that I am " is said to be a late theological gloss.

C. S. C. WILLIAMS.

FLORA SHAW. By E. MOBERLY BELL. (Constable). 15s.

THE life of Lady Lugard is well worth reading because she was the first woman political journalist of serious importance and very influential. She did much work for imperial education on the *Manchester Guardian* and *The Times* before the Boer War, but if she had not appeared before the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid, she might never have been a conspicuous figure in journalism, for she hated " publicity ". That committee sat over fifty years ago, and since then remembrance of the Raid and even of the war, have been dimmed by greater events. Even F.M. Smuts's fame seems to new generations to have begun as an imperial soldier and statesman (perhaps to have its climax as a most welcome Chancellor of Cambridge). To make her subject lighter, her friend, daughter of an admiring colleague, Mr. Moberly Bell, whose penetrating judgement led him to press *The Times* insistently to take her work, has mingled her domestic life closely with her professional career.

This adds charm and completeness to the book, for Flora Shaw, of mixed Irish Protestant and French blood, was wrapped

up in devotion to her family, even when on long journeys alone. She was probably the ablest member, to whom they naturally turned for support in their many troubles. She managed to lavish affection, money and even home-life on those who needed them; and all this in spite of professional tours through Africa and the Empire and of several dangerous illnesses. She was not physically strong, but must have had a wiry and enduring constitution. The hardship of her Australian travels seemed incredible for any woman until we read of the appalling nightmare of her journey in the Klondyke. The only climate which defeated her was, unhappily, Nigeria. She married in her fiftieth year Sir Frederick Lugard, and after her first visit was forbidden to live there. Except during his leave, they were torn asunder until he went to Hong-Kong as governor (yet another imperial experience for her), where she fell ill again. In 1914 she was working herself up to boiling-point over Ulster, but the war threw her into vigorous work for Belgian refugees. After Sir Frederick's further term in Nigeria, they had peace and constant work in the Surrey home which she had made.

Of all this Miss Bell writes pleasantly and tactfully, giving a tale of travel, adventure and of domestic charm. Readers will expect us not to glide over too easily the controversies, in particular those over South Africa, which are not wholly clear even to-day. Miss Bell had masses of papers, diary, etc., from which to select, and in dealing with her friend's and her father's parts she has used tact. Some of us can remember the knowing gossip, rife before the Jameson Select Committee, of the beautiful young woman who was the dupe or the inciter of Rhodes in his utterly unscrupulous deeds, of the evil genius of *The Times*, and so forth. It is enough to say that the Committee was as pleased as it was astonished by her evidence and the impression that she made, and she came out with great credit. She knew her subject and more (all her life she had devoured Bluebooks and official papers); she threw light upon many things unknown to the Committee and yet carefully confined herself to answering questions asked. Members of the Commiteee who hoped to unmask her sinister part in a jingoist plot were shaken by her devastatingly plain answers. She could not be blamed for Dr. Rutherford Harris's disingenuous messages to her from South Africa, but it is doubtful whether we should forgive her for a too ready admiration for Rhodes, for we are not convinced that he always deserved

it. What wonder if an eager young woman was blind to faults in such a masterful man, who had some great and admirable qualities? On Miss Shaw's question, early in their acquaintance, why he had sent £10,000 to Parnell, and his answer that it was for the sake of the Federal Union of the Empire, Miss Bell comments, "There was no subject on which he did not display a generous outlook". Was this one? More than one wise man condemned him as showing the vulgar and contemptuous belief in the irresistible power of his money to buy any politician.

Again, we cannot wholly acquit Miss Shaw of denying to Mr. Buckle the complete frankness that an editor is entitled to expect from his correspondents. Heaven knows that the problems were difficult for her intelligence and her conscience. Apparently she had the confidence of Rhodes and Chamberlain: was it right in such momentous days to go along at the official pace of *The Times*, of the cautious Buckle? Excuses were foreign to her nature, but if Mr. Bell, manager of *The Times*, knew everything, need she suppose that *The Times* was not fully informed? The night before she was called before the Committee, Buckle wrote to her a letter of advice which is frankly printed here, and we are told, "Flora was hurt . . . the letter rankled and cast a shadow . . . on her work at Printing House Square". It probably did, but had nothing "hurt" Buckle? Did nothing "rankle" with him? At any rate, there seems to have been relief on all sides when it was arranged that Miss Shaw should go to the Klondyke for five months before coming back to Printing House Square.

The book is illustrated with five portraits, three of Lady Lugard.

CASTOR.

OVER LAKELAND FELLS. By W. A. POUCHER. (Chapman and Hall). 25s.

THIS book is a dreadful temptation! It takes one's mind off all that one should be doing, to indulge in memories or anticipations of holidays amid the Cumbrian mountains. Mr. Poucher's photographic studies of this district are already well known, but this is, I think, the best series yet, and brings out grandly the

exhilaration and surprise of the ever-changing views when seen not merely from the valleys, nor from the summits, but from the ridges. If any visitor doubts that the real method of enjoying the fells is by ridge-walking, rather than by just going up and down again, these pictures will guarantee his conversion. Their technical excellence is of the highest order, and the author's enthusiasm is infectious. This is, indeed, a lovely book, and it makes one murmur εἴθε γενοίμην If all goes well, I shall be, six weeks hence; and Mr. Poucher will certainly go with me.

R. S.

THE STORY OF JERICHO. By JOHN GARSTANG and J. B. E. GARSTANG. New Edition Revised. (Marshall Morgan and Scott Ltd., London: Edinburgh), 1948. Pp. 200. 8s. 6d. net.

THE story of Jericho lies very close to the roots of the history of Israel; for its fall marked the climax and consummation of the great series of events which brought the people to its heritage in the Promised Land. That is why, even in these days of paper-scarcity, the student of the Old Testament will welcome a new edition of the present work. So far as concerns the excavations themselves it is an authoritative account of the facts by the man who discovered them. The interpretation of them and their connexion with the "miracles" of the Exodus, given by Mr. J. B. E. Garstang in the last chapter, are obviously open to challenge, not so the facts themselves. It is of the utmost importance to make this distinction. There is at least one Biblical "Atlas" in circulation in this country which still champions the obsolete theory that the Exodus took place in the 13th century B.C. One can only suppose that its American authors are ignorant of the evidence. For that evidence is quite conclusive. The facts make it clear (and all experienced archaeologists are agreed on this) that the last city of any note to be built upon the site was destroyed (and deliberately burnt to the ground) between 1400 and 1385 B.C. It is quite true that the authors of this act remain anonymous, but the cumulative evidence is surely irresistible. The collapse of the walls outwards, the signs of seismic action such as only in recent years effectively dammed the flow of Jordan at Ed Damieh (*Adam* in Joshua, iii, 16), the abandonment of the site save for minor settlements which can readily be identified with those of Eglon and Hiel;—all these point one way only. Add to this that the Egyptian records show Israel already established in Canaan by the 13th century, and you have the picture of invasion

and gradual occupation narrated in the earlier (pre-Deuteronomic) strata of the Books of Joshua and Judges.

The new details supplied by Professor Garstang about the Eglon-occupation merely clinch this conclusion: they confirm the substantial accuracy of the chronological table which he gives here from his previous work, *Joshua, Judges.* Thus it appears more certain than ever that the alternate periods of freedom and oppression described in the Old Testament story are to be explained by the waxing and waning fortunes of contemporary Egypt. For the historian this is a great step forward. What had been little more than legend is seen now to be full of significance. The mists part, and early Israel emerges as a real and living figure. For this reason alone this brief and popular survey of the evidence must remain indispensable to every student of the Bible: but it should be added that the book contains much more. The pre-historic evidence has a special interest of its own, and the chapter on "Excavations and Discoveries" should fascinate anyone who has a leaning towards practical archaeology.

W. J. P.-A.

PERIODICALS

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KNOWLES, DOM DAVID.—*The Religious Orders in England*, 348 pp. (Cambridge University Press). 30*s.*

DAWES, ELIZABETH, and NORMAN H. BAYNES, trs. by.—*Three Byzantine Saints*, 275 pp. (Basil Blackwell). 21*s.*

ARMSTRONG, A. H.—*An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, 241 pp. (Methuen). 15*s.*

MACDERMOTT, K. H.—*The Old Church Gallery Minstrels*, 77 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 7*s.* 6*d.*

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